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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines the limitations of the legal responses to ‘domestic 
violence’ from the perspective of two central arguments; first, domestic violence 
is a social problem, rather than one caused by the deviancy of particular 
individuals, and, secondly, legal and societal understandings display a 
misplaced focus on ‘violence’ as the defining feature of an abusive relationship. 
By failing to address the root social causes or comprehend the true dynamics of 
abusive relationships as a range of coercive and controlling strategies, incidents 
of mainly physical violence and the behaviour and personality of the abused 
woman become the social and legal focus.  
 
The thesis asserts that the root causes of domestic violence are the gendered 
expectations placed upon masculinity and femininity, thus explaining why it is 
women that are predominantly the victims. To refute the common 
misconception that women would exit an abusive relationship if they wanted to, 
a comparison is made between domestic violence and capture crimes such as 
kidnapping, and the range of social and psychological difficulties encountered 
by women as a result of the abusive relationship are used to support the claim 
that the sense of self, autonomy and decision-making ability of the victim is so 
undermined by the abuser’s tactics that they become entrapped in the abusive 
relationship. It is then argued that societal and legal misunderstandings of the 
dynamics and impact of the abuse lead to misinformed legal responses based 
upon the premise that women are able to safely report domestic violence and 
receive an adequate response, should they choose to do so. 
 
Bringing together critiques of the operation of the civil and criminal justice 
system in this context with the possibilities and limitations of the international 
human rights system, the thesis aims to demonstrate not just where the legal 
responses pertaining to domestic violence are limited, but also why. The 
research concludes that a legal approach to this problem which overlooks the 
root causes and over-emphasises isolated incidents of mainly physical violence 
does not and cannot work; the causes and impacts of domestic violence must 
be understood and addressed at a society-wide level.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis aims to critique the understanding of, and approach taken to, 
domestic violence that is found within the legal system of England and Wales. 
By ‘legal system’ is meant the civil and criminal justice systems insofar as they 
impact on attempts to protect victims of domestic abuse. The purpose of this 
introductory chapter is thus to outline the importance of assessing the legal 
treatment of domestic violence as a field of study and to explain the focus on 
females as victims. An overview of the legal and policy reforms will be provided  
to indicate that the Government is aware of the need to tackle domestic 
violence, providing the basis for the analysis of why these reforms are not 
working to reduce the prevalence of domestic violence, improve the protection 
offered to victims and increase the likelihood of a criminal conviction for 
perpetrators. There will then be an explanation and clarification of two of the key 
terms and concepts to be used throughout; ‘domestic violence’ and ‘patriarchal 
society’. Following this, an outline of the purposes and aims of the analysis 
contained in the thesis will be provided, situating the critique in the context of 
the current literature on legal responses to domestic violence.  
The critique contained in this thesis will aim to provide support for two 
central arguments concerning the causes, context and dynamics of this type of 
inter-personal violence or abuse, and the ways in which they impact upon 
understandings of domestic violence found in the operation of the civil law 
remedies, criminal justice system, and international human rights law 
mechanisms. The first of these arguments is that domestic violence is first and 
foremost a social problem, not one caused by the deviancy of particular 
individuals and relationship dynamics. If found to be true, this would carry the 
implication that individualised responses which ignore the root causes of 
domestic violence do not and cannot work. The second of the two central 
arguments is that legal and societal understandings of domestic violence 
remain premised upon violence – mainly physical violence – as the defining 
feature of an abusive relationship, despite increasing recognition, particularly 
outside of the legal sphere, of the importance of recognising other abusive 
strategies. If this second argument is found to accurately reflect the legal 
understandings, there would need to be an assessment of whether this focus on 
physical violence limits the legal responses, and, if so, how. 
14 
 
The Importance of Addressing Domestic Violence 
 
Even before it is taken into account that an over-emphasis on physical harm 
and injury may be excluding many women from being categorised as victims in 
the prevalence statistics, the extremely high numbers of victims already 
identified within current statistics clearly demonstrate that developing 
appropriate responses is of paramount importance in terms of protecting the 
physical and mental well-being of all women and children as actual and 
potential victims. The statistics and broader indications of the prevalence of 
domestic violence indicate that ‘women are still at more risk of violent crime at 
home than anywhere else’1 and the ‘single most significant risk to women’s 
safety and the safety of their children is entering into a heterosexual partnership 
arrangement’.2 Statistics indicate that domestic violence is the leading cause of 
death world-wide in female 19-44 year olds, ahead of war, cancer or road traffic 
accidents.3 Annually in the UK nearly 1 million women experience at least one 
incident4 of domestic abuse each year,5 at least 750,000 children a year witness 
domestic violence,6 and almost 50,000 women and children shelter from 
violence in refuges.7 Whilst being ‘chronically under-reported’, this type of 
violence accounts for 16% of all violent crime, has more repeat victims8 than 
any other crime (76%),9 with costs in excess of £23 billion per year. On average 
two women die per week at the hands of their current or former male partner.10 
Wykes and Welsh11 identify the prevalence statistics contained in the British 
Crime Survey (2001) on domestic and sexual violence as ‘staggeringly high’ 
and also emphasise that these are still likely to be underestimated12 because 
many people do not recognise that what has happened to them is a crime.13 
                                                          
1
 Keir Starmer (Director of Public Prosecutions): 2011 (http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/articles/domestic_violence_-
_the_facts_the_issues_the_future/) 
2
 Wykes and Welsh: 2009 p. 43 
3
 Crime in England and Wales 04/05 report 
4
 Criticisms of this narrow ‘incident’-based approach will appear throughout this thesis. 
5
 British Crime Survey: 2009/10 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/116347/hosb1210.pdf 
6
 Department of Health: Women’s Mental Health: Into the Mainstream: 2002 p. 16  
7
 BBC Panorama ‘Hitting Home’ (2003) 
8
 A victim endures an average of 35 assaults before first calling the police (Wykes and Welsh: 2009 p. 2). 
9
 Flatley, Kershaw, Smith, Chaplin and Moon: 2010 p. 24  
10
 Wykes and Welsh: 2009 p. 2 – statistics from Crime in England and Wales 04/05 report. 
11
 Wykes and Welsh: 2009 
12
 See Walby and Myhill: 2001 
13
 Wykes and Welsh: 2009 p. 42 
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Much of the behaviours that it will be claimed are the defining features of an 
abusive relationship will be recorded as ‘no-crimes’ by the police.14  
 
 
Explaining Female Violence and Refuting Symmetry in Male and Female 
Perpetrated Domestic Violence 
 
The question thus arises – why women? This thesis intends to answer this 
question by demonstrating that the root social causes of domestic violence is 
the oppression and subordination of women that occurs within a society 
characterised by patriarchy and helps to maintain the current system of social 
order. Domestic violence will be shown to be both symptom and cause of the 
hierarchical structure of society in general, and the family in particular, under a 
patriarchal system. In a small minority of societies wife beating does not 
occur,15 lending support to the hypothesis that it is not an inevitable 
consequence of the differences between the sexes or of women’s ‘natural’ 
place in society. The following section will explain reasons for the focus on 
female victims.  
Since the 1970s, the Battered Women’s Movement has highlighted that 
physical violence in the home is commonplace and that women are its usual 
victims and men its usual perpetrators. Pence and Paymar in the 1990s showed 
how every source of data16 points to an enormous gender disparity between 
who is initiating the violence, who is more physically harmed, and who is 
seeking safety from violence.17 Despite this, there is often claimed to be 
symmetry in levels of male and female violence in intimate relationships which 
is sometimes used to argue against the focus on female victims of domestic 
violence and service-provision aimed at them.18 It is therefore necessary to 
establish why this symmetry is believed to be erroneous in order to justify the 
present focus on men as perpetrators and women as victims. This can be done 
by examining research on types of violence in a domestic context, and through 
                                                          
14
 This does not mean that the incidents are ignored, the police do record them and they will be used as a part of a 
domestic abuse risk assessment  using the DASH 2009 Model (see http://www.dashriskchecklist.co.uk/)  
15
 For example the Central Thai studied by Levinson: 1989 and 16 other societies in his cross-cultural study. 
16
 From police reports, A&E records, counselling centres, divorce courts, and so on. 
17
 Pence and Paymar: 1993 p. 5 
18
 See, for example, an article in the Guardian in 2010 claiming that 40% of domestic violence victims are male 
(http://www.theguardian.com/society/2010/sep/05/men-victims-domestic-violence) and another article from 2011 
claiming women are as likely to use domestic violence as men (although accepting that women are twice as likely to be 
injured or killed) (http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/jun/07/feminism-domestic-violence-men).  
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research into the differences in terms of context, consequences, purpose, 
severity and frequency in male and female-perpetrated violence.  
 The most prominent and extensive work on typologies and domestic 
violence is that of Michael Johnson and colleagues, who first posited that there 
are different types of violence occurring in domestic situations more than twenty 
years ago. Johnson has since this time developed and refined his conceptions 
of the various types of domestic violence, calling the type that will be focused 
upon here ‘coercive controlling violence.’19 This type of violence is typically 
perpetrated by a man against his female partner as a way of controlling her and 
involves a ‘pattern of emotionally abusive intimidation, coercion, and control 
coupled with physical violence.’20 This type of violence is distinct from ‘violent 
resistance’ used in response to coercive controlling violence, ‘situational couple 
violence’ (not motivated by control but used in response to a particular situation 
or conflict, perpetrated equally by men and women and ‘[p]robably the most 
common type of partner violence’,21) ‘separation-instigated violence’ (occurs in 
the context of separation with no history of violence nor does it continue after 
separation22), and ‘mutual violent control’ (when both partners use violence to 
control the other, this form of violence is ‘rare’ and little is known about it (p. 
950).23   
 Research indicating symmetry between violence inflicted by male and 
female partners can thus be explained by a failure to distinguish between 
different types of violence in a domestic setting, thus overlooking the differences 
in context and consequences of the different types. This has led to a reliance on 
the measurement of discrete acts when assessing the prevalence of male and 
female perpetrated violence in the home in a way that merely conflates the 
number of incidents, with no separation of severity or context.24 Nearly all the 
studies that have found gender symmetry in domestic violence have relied upon 
some version of the Conflict Tactic Scale25 (CTS). Under this scoring method, it 
                                                          
19
 Kelly and Johnson: 2008 
20
 Kelly and Johnson: 2008 p. 476 
21
 Kelly and Johnson: 2008 p. 11 
22
 Research by Humphreys and Thiara: 2003 on ‘post-separation violence’ and by Mahoney: 1991 on ‘separation 
assault’ have provided useful definitions and descriptions of the violence that can occur when a woman tries to leave an 
abusive relationship characterised by coercive controlling violence. An understanding of this type of violence has helped 
to emphasise that a woman is at the highest risk of death or serious injury at the point of separation, one of the ways 
that the proposition that a woman would ‘just leave’ if she wanted to can be undermined. 
23
 Kelly and Johnson: 2008 p. 950 
24
 Studies have found that women typically only use violence in self-defence or when partners are using similar levels of 
violence against each other (Hester: 2009 cited by Herring: 2011 p. 77) and the degree of violence used by women also 
differs with injury rates being much greater for women (Silverzweig: 2010 cited by Herring: 2011 p. 77). 
25
 Straus: 1979 
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is only necessary for a man or woman to have committed one act to be 
classified as violent; therefore ‘a woman who has committed one trivial act is 
equated with a man who has committed several serious acts of a different 
nature’.26 Reece claims that family violence research that uses the CTS to 
assess levels of domestic violence is ‘insensitive to context: by concentrating 
narrowly on discrete acts, the research de-contextualises these acts’.27 So, for 
example, playful kicking while in bed together would be recorded as a couple 
kicking each other, and, whilst ‘throwing a lamp at a partner is very different 
from throwing a pillow… both are recorded as throwing an object at one’s 
partner’.28  The CTS has been amended by its designers,29 but it seems that 
any kind of scoring method based on a version of the CTS is simply not capable 
of moving beyond a narrow act-based approach to the definition and 
measurement of violence. Therefore, to develop this approach, the context, 
consequences, severity, frequency, motivations, intentions and reactions that 
accompany the acts need to be taken into account. Once this is done, it is found 
that domestic violence is ‘overwhelmingly an issue of male violence against 
women’.30 This is borne out by the latest Home Office Research – Domestic 
Violence, Sexual Assault and Stalking - which found the asymmetry in rates of 
domestic violence was even more pronounced when regard was given to 
context and consequences.31  
 Furthermore, whilst women can be violent to men, the nature of this 
violence can be seen to differ from men’s in two ways. First, women’s violence 
rarely occurs in the context of an ongoing abusive relationship32 and instead is 
typically used in self-defence33 or when a couple use similar levels of force 
against each other.34 It is important to distinguish the abuse that occurs within 
marital relationships from fights that take place between two people as an 
irrational response to an argument.35 Pence and Paymar found that women do 
often kick, scratch and bite the men who beat them, but this clearly does not 
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constitute mutual battering.36 A further difference is found in the degree of 
violence used with injury rates being much greater for women37 and women 
being more likely than men to sustain physical or emotional injury as a result of 
domestic abuse.38 In 2004 the Dobashes39 conducted a study with 95 couples 
indicating that, even if the levels of violence were comparable (which the 
statistics suggest is not the case), male and female experiences of violence are 
very different.40 Claiming a simple correspondence that ‘women do it too’ 
ignores the realities of politics and the family, both of which, it will be argued in 
Chapters One and Two, are institutions of male control and domination.41  
The level of violent incidents in England and Wales perpetrated by men 
is also of significance to the symmetry arguments; the most recent British Crime 
Survey found that 91% of violent incidents perpetrated in general in Great 
Britain in 2009-10 were perpetrated by men, and during the 2011 summer riots 
92% of the first 466 defendants were male and of the 124 individuals charged 
with violent offences, all were male.42 Of course, it cannot be ignored that 
women do sometimes use violence, and that there are clearly a number of male 
victims of domestic violence each year. The aim here is not in any way to 
minimise or trivialise the abuse that male victims of domestic violence can 
suffer. However, the focus here on male violence against women can be seen 
to be justified by the overwhelming prevalence of this type of violence and its 
greater severity.43  
 
  
Legal and Policy Reforms 
 
A critique of the limitations, misconceptions and failures that make up much of 
the legal system’s present approach to domestic violence needs to be seen in 
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the context of the considerable reforms to legislation and policy in this area over 
the last 30 years. In addition, support services such as Independent Domestic 
Violence Advocacy Services (IDVAs),44 Specialist Domestic Violence Courts 
(SDVCs)45 and Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conference (MARAC) 
coordinators and administrators46 have all been introduced in order to improve 
the support available for victims. 
In terms of policy changes, 2013 saw the cross-government definition of 
domestic violence, although – significantly – not the legal one, expand to 
include 16 and 17 year olds within its definition of who could be a victim, and to 
incorporate coercive and controlling behaviour. Domestic violence and abuse is 
now defined as ‘any incident or pattern of incidents of controlling, coercive, 
threatening behaviour, violence or abuse between those aged 16 or over who 
are, or have been intimate partners or family members regardless of gender or 
sexuality. The abuse can encompass, but is not limited to: psychological, 
physical, sexual, financial, or emotional’.47 In addition, currently (2013) being 
piloted is a domestic violence disclosure scheme48 enabling women to ask 
police to check whether their partner has a violent past. The scheme is also 
assessing how the police can proactively release information to the partners of 
those with a violent past when it is ‘lawful, necessary and proportionate’ to do 
so. Another scheme with the aim of protecting victims was also piloted in 2012 – 
the Domestic Violence Protection Notices and Orders (DVPO). This gives 
victims who might have had to flee their homes time to get the support they 
need by giving police and magistrates powers to stop the perpetrator of an 
attack from contacting the victim or returning home for up to 28 days (a period 
of time when the victim may be particularly vulnerable because the police were 
unable to charge the perpetrator for evidential reasons and because of the time 
it generally takes for an injunction to be granted). The future of these two 
schemes is yet to be decided. 
Following extensive criticism, the police service and the Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS) have both attempted to improve their response to 
domestic violence. Police Domestic Violence Units were introduced in the 
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1990s along with special police officers49 intended to work closely with other 
agencies involved in domestic violence service provision, and the CPS now 
takes a more pro-active role in gathering evidence and has established a 
network of domestic violence experts who work with women’s specialist 
services and other agencies.50 The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) 
admitted in 2011 that it is ‘only in the last ten years that [domestic violence] has 
been taken seriously as a criminal justice issue’51 and in the same speech 
showed clear recognition of the ‘serious and pernicious’ nature of domestic 
violence. However, he himself recognised that ‘the refrain “it’s just a domestic” 
is still heard far too frequently’ within the CPS and their criminal justice partners, 
and ‘a change in attitude is clearly needed’.52 This thesis intends to develop 
arguments to show the reasons for and difficulties arising from ingrained cultural 
attitudes towards domestic violence, and why the change is needed.  
For a time there was an increase in gender-neutral language and 
although this is reflected in the recent governmental definitions above, the 2010 
Home Office paper ‘Call to End Violence against Women and Girls,’ (although 
recognising that men and boys could be victims of domestic violence) does 
focus firmly on gender-based violence, as does the 2011 ‘Call to End Violence 
against Women and Girls: Action Plan’ which sets out short and long term 
priorities and frames ‘policy development within an equalities and prevention 
framework’53 and is backed by a £28 million fund to support the provision of 
prevention work and specialist services for victims. 
The number of refuges and other support services for victims of domestic 
violence has increased dramatically over the last forty years and has been vital 
in helping many women exit abusive relationships, rebuild their lives, and bring 
their partners to justice under the criminal justice system. The work of these 
organisations is often frustrated by obstacles and these are not just financial 
and resource-based ones – many women either do not wish to leave a violent 
partner, or return multiple times despite having access to the support required 
to leave. Legislation such as the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (PHA) 
and the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 (DVCVA) has been 
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developed in this area, which reflects a growing acceptance of the distinct 
characteristics of domestic violence, and breaches of civil protection orders are 
now criminalised under the latter as well. These reforms show a clear 
commitment to provide protection and legal redress for victims of domestic 
violence, thus providing the background against which the effectiveness in 
practice of these measures must be considered, to assess whether rhetoric is 
matched by action. 
 
 
Terminology Difficulties: Domestic Violence 
 
The use of the term ‘domestic violence’ poses some problems that warrant 
further consideration. Various writers have attempted to find useful alternative 
terms to characterise abusive relations to include economic, psychological and 
emotional control and abuse. Numerous alternatives such as domestic abuse, 
intimate partner violence, intimate abuse, and so on have been utilised. The 
term ‘intimate partner violence’ is becoming increasingly common, and does 
seem more successful in at least alluding to the fact that this type of abuse is 
inflicted by an intimate, not a stranger. Evan Stark coined the phrase ‘coercive 
control’ to highlight this dynamic, which, as will be claimed in Chapter Seven, 
seems to convey a far more accurate picture of the actual abuse that occurs. 
The risk is that the term might be taken to refer to a type of abuse other than 
domestic violence because this is typically understood to be physical violence. 
However, the concept does explore more fully the nature of abuse, as the 
second of the two central arguments of this thesis requires. 
As Kelly has emphasised, if something is not named it is invisible and, in 
a social sense, it does not exist.54 This means that if the term ‘domestic 
violence’ does not reflect victim’s experiences, for reasons explored below, then 
the type of abuse they are suffering is not seen as a problem by themselves, 
the law and by society. Whilst the expression domestic violence could be seen 
as a useful one due to its ‘juxtaposition of words’ because ‘the domestic sphere 
has traditionally been regarded as a refuge and a haven, not the site of 
violence’ and so the ‘broad acceptance of the term means that is no longer a 
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given that women are safe at home’,55 the term has proved to be highly 
inadequate. This is because, although commonly understood, it has become 
‘watered down’ in recent years (‘it’s only a domestic’) so that it ‘neutralises the 
harm done’.56 Isabel Marcus argues that characterising some violence as 
“domestic” explicitly diminishes its seriousness; ‘we do not utilise the terms 
“stranger violence” and “domestic” violence as parallel terms. We separate out 
from “violence” abuse which occurs between partners or in a family by 
modifying it and characterising it with a term connoting a status relationship – 
“domestic”. The unmodified term “violence” which is applied to situations not 
involving intimates is “real” and, therefore, clearly punishable. Due to its 
linguistic location, the category “domestic”, which modifies and specifically 
locates violence, is residual and, perhaps, less clearly subject to disapproval or 
punishment’57 and this will have implications for the addressing of domestic 
violence.  
Furthermore, work by Ohana-Eavry examining the processes of legal 
naming and social exclusion demonstrates that naming is a social act, with the 
more powerful groups in society being the ones able to shape and name a 
phenomenon, deciding what the name means, and what it will exclude. She 
emphasises that in choosing the name ‘domestic violence’ a mechanism of 
trivialisation was at work in relation to incorporation of the word ‘domestic’, and 
that at some point a ‘choice’ was made to focus on physical violence, as 
opposed to other forms of coercion. The decision to use the term ‘domestic 
violence’ in legal and policy definitions has thus resulted in there being no legal 
name for women victim’s experiences; the term ‘violence’ does not describe 
what happens58 in any meaningful way and thus leads to misunderstandings 
concerning the dynamics and impact of the abuse. 
A further problem with using the term domestic violence is that the 
identity of the perpetrator is omitted; Kuypers alleges that the terms used to 
identify male violence against women, including domestic violence, reflect an 
unwillingness to clearly implicate the male.59 This can be linked with Stanko’s 
point that male violence ‘is still defined as a problem for women; men have yet 
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to define their own behaviours as problematic’.60 Victim-blaming, or focusing on 
the person to whom an act was done rather than the person who did the act, will 
be shown to be pervasive in relation to sexual and domestic violence.  
However, despite the limitations and misconceptions perpetuated by the 
term ‘domestic violence’, it is at least a term understood by most people, and 
the one used by the majority of legal and social institutions. Throughout this 
thesis, therefore, the term ‘domestic violence’ will be generally used to include 
physical violence and wider forms of violence, although the expressions 
intimate abuse, domestic abuse, or coercive control will be substituted on 
occasion to indicate the contrast of such strategies with physical violence. 
 
 
‘Patriarchal Society’: How the Concept will be Used 
 
The development of patriarchal society has a long history and the view that the 
phrase can still be used to accurately describe modern Western society is 
widely debated. Despite being problematic, and sometimes unpopular and 
controversial even within feminism,61 the concept of a patriarchal society or 
system will be employed throughout this thesis to refer to the type of society 
currently in existence in England and Wales. The first of the central arguments 
of this thesis focuses on showing that domestic violence is first and foremost a 
social problem, not one caused by the deviancy of particular individuals and 
relationship dynamics. This requires, therefore, an analysis at the societal level. 
A quote from Rhonda Copelon enunciates the reason why the term patriarchy is 
felt to be needed due to the link it reveals between male superiority and 
violence against women: 
‘Domestic violence against women is systemic and structural, a 
mechanism of patriarchal control of women that is built upon male 
superiority and female inferiority,62 sex-stereotyped roles and 
expectations, and the economic, social and political predominance of 
men and dependency of women. While the legal and cultural 
embodiments of patriarchal thinking vary among different cultures, there 
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is an astounding convergence in regard to the basic tenets of patriarchy 
and legitimacy, if not necessity, of violence as a mechanism of enforcing 
that system. Violence is encouraged by and perpetuates women’s 
dependence and her dehumanisation as “other,” a servant and a form of 
property’.63 
 
Patriarchy will thus be used to mean a system of male privilege which sustains, 
and is sustained by, the current societal structure. A society is characterised as 
privileging maleness to the extent that is male dominated, male identified, male 
centred, and characterised by an obsession with control.64 One of the key 
aspects of this need for control is the oppression of women,65 of which the use 
of violence is a key component.66 A society would be male dominated, and thus 
patriarchal, when positions of authority (political, economic, legal, religious, 
educational, military, domestic) are generally reserved for men, with it being the 
exception to the rule when a woman gains one of these positions.67 Male 
identification is seen in a society where the ‘core cultural ideas about what is 
considered good, desirable, preferable, or normal are associated with how we 
think about men and masculinity.’68 A further aspect of patriarchy can be seen 
when the description of masculinity and the ideal man69 uses terms that closely 
resemble what is valued most by society as a whole. These ‘male-identified 
qualities are associated with the work valued most in patriarchal societies - 
business, politics, war, athletics, law, and medicine - because this work has 
been organised in ways that require such qualities for success’.70 Under a 
patriarchal system, qualities associated with femininity and femaleness are 
devalued, except when women are prized for their beauty as objects of male 
desire (but in this they are possessed and controlled in a way that devalues 
them).71 Male-centredness is reflected in the way that patriarchal culture uses 
male experience to represent human experience. If a society is patriarchal, this 
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would be evident when the ‘focus of attention is primarily on men and what they 
do’72 – such as in newspapers, films, mainstream literature and television 
dramas all containing mainly stories about the lives of men. The final element – 
obsession with control – is emphasised by Johnson as the core value around 
which social life is organised in a patriarchal society; men maintain their 
privilege by controlling women. This in turn depends upon a clear division 
between the sexes because it is only possible for one group to dominate and 
control another if the two groups have clearly opposed characteristics. 
 In view of the above, the claims of this thesis will be founded upon the 
hypothesis that contemporary English and Welsh society is patriarchal, when it 
is understood as referring to the type of society delineated above. There is a 
large body of opinion that Western society continues to be male dominated or 
patriarchal73 because its key institutions – the state, the Church and the family – 
continue to be male-dominated and there is perceived to be a strong division 
between the sexes. If these opinions are correct, the impact on the ability of the 
legal system to deal with domestic violence effectively is likely to be profound 
because of the relationship that patriarchal structures have with all forms of 
violence against women, including domestic violence. It will be shown that there 
is a failure in the legal system to address domestic violence fully, which in turn 
indicates that this hypothesis is correct. Furthermore, it will be claimed that the 
connection with patriarchy is not often understood in the context of the literature 
evaluating the legal responses to domestic violence and that this overlooks the 
role that violence has in maintaining the current patriarchal social order. 
The claim that Western society is based upon a system of male privilege 
and the idea that men are superior to women does not does not mean that all 
men are powerful, but that where there is a concentration of power, men are 
more likely to be the ones to have it; they are the default. Men as a group reap 
‘the patriarchal dividend;’ the benefit all men have from the dominance of men 
in the overall gender order. Although it is not equally enjoyed by all men, as a 
group all men draw on that power and dominance. This also does not mean that 
all women are powerless, but powerful women stand out as exceptions because 
male dominance is the norm. The benefits that males derive, as a group, from 
patriarchy will be considered in the discussion of masculinities in Chapter Two 
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where it will be related to the gendered expectations that create the conditions 
in which domestic violence occurs. 
 
 
Overview of Thesis and Review of Existing Literature 
 
A body of literature has grown over the past thirty years which has brought 
domestic violence to the foreground of academic and legal discussion. 
However, an examination of all the main legal remedies applicable in England 
and Wales which examine reasons for their limitations, rather than just where 
the limitations occur, has not been attempted before. The first two chapters will 
build support for the argument that domestic violence needs to be seen first and 
foremost as a social problem, rather than one caused by the deviancy of 
particular individuals or relationship dynamics. Identifying and evaluating the 
root causes of domestic violence are thus a key consideration of this thesis. 
These causes will be shown to be located within society. Chapter One will use 
the period of European history characterised by state-legitimated witch hunts to 
demonstrate the role of violence against women in the creation of an 
increasingly male-dominated society. The witch Hunts that began in the mid-
sixteenth century, therefore, are taken as a key historical starting point. Here 
can be seen the strongest evidence of developing gender disparity and the 
oppression of women can be identified more strongly than in any previous 
historical epoch. Chapter Two will then build on this by claiming that the 
gendered expectations placed upon males and females, and the structure of the 
family, further help to sustain the patriarchal system and provide the context in 
which domestic violence, as a way of creating and recreating these 
expectations, occurs.  
Previously, the most prominent enunciation of the causes and social 
context of domestic violence was that of the Dobashes in Violence Against 
Wives: A Case Against Patriarchy.74 Their work provided an extensive analysis 
of the context and underlying causes of this type of abuse, situating it firmly in 
the context of the marital-type relationship and the gendered expectations 
placed upon women within this type of relationship. A later study, again by the 
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Dobashes, (The Violent Men Study)75 developed further early understandings of 
the causes of domestic violence by supporting claims that it is men’s sense of 
privilege and authority that provides part of the justification for domestic 
violence.76  
The analysis provided by the Dobashes based on these early studies 
thus needs updating and directly applying to the legal responses to domestic 
violence found in the English and Welsh legal system. The gendered 
expectations placed upon males and females – i.e. being masculine or feminine 
– particularly those typical of the marital-type relationship, will  be shown to be 
put into the contemporary and related to domestic violence in the work of Evan 
Stark.77 His findings into the impact of gender stereotypes and expectations on 
the occurrence of domestic violence claim that domestic violence as coercive 
control is a gendered phenomenon. He sets domestic violence in the context of 
‘women’s newly won equality,’78 asserting that men engage in these behaviours 
as part of a strategy of behaviour patterns which attempt to redress the balance 
due to higher levels of ‘formal equality’ for women in the public sphere, which in 
turn has led men to need to control the individual women in their lives. Stark 
finds the core tactics of coercive control are targeted at domestic activities and 
childcare – things that are already often consigned to women and are reflective 
of their subordinate status. He concludes that coercive control has evolved out 
of other forms of violence against women with the control tactics centering on 
‘gendered enactments’79 which means the tactics are easy to confuse with ‘the 
range of sacrifices women are expected to make in their roles as homemakers, 
parents and sexual partners’. However, as Madden Dempsey has noted, 
insights from social science research into domestic violence, such as that of 
Stark, have had little impact on legal understandings.80 This is something that 
this thesis will seek to redress, particularly in Chapter Seven when the 
appropriate conceptualisation of the harm of domestic violence is considered 
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and arguments are made for how the legal responses could more appropriately 
conceptualise it. 
In light of the argument that domestic violence occurs in part occurs as a 
result of the gendered expectations placed upon males and females in the 
context of the marital-type relationship, Chapter Three will go on to demonstrate 
the role that pornography, and the pornographic representations of women 
found in more mainstream media and culture, have in continuing to sustain 
these gendered expectations. It will be claimed that pornography plays a 
significant role in supporting male dominance and violence. The chapter will 
analyse the understanding of the harm of pornography found in its statutory 
regulation in England and Wales from a position situated in the context of the 
landmark studies concerning the harms and regulation of pornography.81  
Chapter Four will follow with an analysis of the extent to which the legal 
system itself contributes to the creation of the conditions in which domestic 
violence occurs, primarily through the examination of judicial constructions of 
the appropriate roles and behaviours for men and women. This is something 
that has not been fully done before in the context of domestic violence; it 
appears that the literature to date either exposes the ways in which the legal 
system fails, or is aimed more generally at demonstrating that the legal system 
is gendered.82 This has led to a situation where the limitations of the legal 
system in responding to issues of concern to women, such as domestic 
violence, are recognised in theory but this recognition is not necessarily applied 
to the more practical critique of where and how the legal system is failing. It has 
not always been considered that the legal system, as it currently operates, may 
not be responding to domestic violence effectively because it constitutes part of 
the problem. There are of course exceptions to this83 but not in terms of an 
extensive body of research addressing all the possible legal remedies for 
abused women.  
Chapters Five and Six will then analyse the various legal responses to 
domestic violence in England and Wales to assess the extent to which they fail 
to recognise domestic violence as a social problem, and how this affects its 
effectiveness. Whilst there already exists a wealth of literature evaluating the 
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operation of the domestic legal system with regard to domestic violence, the 
majority focuses more upon how the system works in practice,84 and appears to 
advocate the view that merely tinkering with the definitions contained in 
legislation and policy documents and calling for improvements in practice will 
help to overcome the pervasiveness nature of domestic violence. The research 
will thus attempt to redress this perceived oversight by analysing the limitations 
of the legal response on the basis that it operates without an understanding of 
the causes and social context of domestic violence. If this is found to be the 
case, it will support the argument that it is insufficient to simply expose where 
the legal remedies are not working without linking this to the underlying causes 
of the abuse (as described in this thesis) in the first place, and the ways in 
which government and judicial understandings of domestic violence constitute a 
failure to appropriately conceptualise and address the problem.  
Chapter Five will analyse the limitations of the implementation of the 
existing civil law remedies for domestic violence through examination of 
legislation, judicial utterances and survey data into practitioner attitudes. In 
particular, there will be an examination of the extent to which the persistence of 
stereotypical attitudes concerning the roles of men and women are apparent 
and seen to be preventing adequate protection being offered to victims. The 
response of the criminal justice system to domestic violence will be assessed in 
Chapter Six. The starting point for this critique will be the fact that the criminal justice 
response attempts to criminalise domestic violence on a model derived from 
stranger violence.  Thus there will need to be an analysis of the limitations that 
emerge from this model due to its failure to understand the unique aspects of 
violence that occurs within an intimate relationship and whether the way in which the 
legislation requires the violent act to be abstracted from its social context further 
prevents consideration of the broader social context of the abuse.  
 If the analysis of these two justice systems does illustrate that they are 
limited because they fail to fully take into account the social context and 
functional nature of the abuse, it will provide the basis for the second central 
argument of this thesis; that the failure to engage with root causes of domestic 
violence leads to a focus on physical violence when providing protection for 
victims. Therefore, these chapters will also serve to highlight where the 
remedies focus solely, or primarily, on physical violence. In doing this the 
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foundations for Chapter Seven will be laid which will use theoretical and 
empirical insights relating to domestic violence taken from sociological and 
psychological research to argue that this focus on physical violence is 
misplaced.  
Chapter Seven will use the existing literature on the dynamics of abusive 
relationships to support the claim that the focus on physical violence within the 
legal responses to domestic violence is misplaced.  This will involve an 
exploration of the dynamics of the non-physical aspects of domestic violence. 
The claims in this context will be situated within the major foundational studies 
provided by Lenore Walker, although her work will be seen to retain the primary 
focus on physical violence which this thesis is challenging. Stark’s proposal that 
the term ‘coercive control’ is a more accurate definition of what takes place in 
abusive relationships than the term domestic violence will be explored in detail 
as well. Alternative conceptions of the harm of domestic violence will be used to 
show the inaccuracy of the some of the assumptions common to legal and 
societal understandings. 
One of the most commonly held views about domestic violence is that 
women would leave the abusive relationship if they really wanted to, and 
therefore they are responsible for the violence and abuse that is inflicted if they 
choose to stay. This will be shown to be a grave misconception. In order to 
understand the potentially damaging nature of this erroneous contention, it is 
necessary to look to literature from psychology and sociology studying the 
impact of this type of abuse on victims’.85 However, to date none of these 
insights has been directly and extensively applied to the legal system, 
especially the system of international human rights law, which remains very 
much on the periphery of our understandings still.  
  Chapter Eight will follow with an analysis of the treatment of 
women who kill their abusers when they come before the criminal courts. In 
examining the application of the potential defences available for these women, 
the implications of the arguments contained in this thesis can be assessed. If 
the arguments contained in this thesis are a true reflection of the difficulties 
inherent to the legal system in its attempts to address domestic violence, it 
would have a serious impact upon its ability to respond to abused women who 
kill in a way that takes account of the social context and dynamics of the abuse.  
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Following the anticipated conclusion that the legal system does not 
respond to domestic violence appropriately because it does not conceptualise it 
in a way that reflects its true context and dynamics, Chapter Nine will then 
evaluate the application of international human rights law to domestic violence 
with the aim of assessing whether it seems any better able to respond to 
domestic violence with an understanding of the causes, context and impact of 
ongoing abuse than the national legal system. Research into how international 
human rights law has been held to apply to domestic violence tends not to focus 
on the underlying causes of the violence, or on the dynamics of abusive 
relationships, but more on critiquing the practical aspects of the law. McQuigg86 
has extensively evaluated the current and potential future efficacy of 
international human rights law in terms of addressing domestic violence and 
Edwards87 has assessed how international human rights law could be used to 
tackle all forms of violence against women, rather than a specific focus on 
domestic violence. There is literature in the field of women’s human rights that 
does take a more theoretical approach,88 highlighting the masculine nature of 
international law and how it has traditionally excluded women’s concerns, 
primarily as a result of the operation of the public private dichotomy in the 
international arena, but it has not been applied directly to the practical operation 
of the various mechanisms. The concluding chapter will then provide a 
synthesis of the key findings of this research. This will enable the identification 
of the reasons for the limited effectiveness of the legal remedies and responses 
to  domestic violence in England and Wales. There will also be a consideration 
of the limitations of this research, and recommendations for further research in 
this field. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE ROLE OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN 
ESTABLISHING MALE CONTROL 
 
In the introduction, the characteristics of a patriarchal society to be used for 
present purposes was outlined as being one that is male-dominated, male-
centred, male-identified and centred around an obsession with control and 
power.1 It was further claimed that many scholars believe evidence shows that 
the unequal gender relations characteristic of a patriarchal society are still in 
existence in England and Wales. It is anticipated that the analysis of the legal 
responses in England and Wales will prove consistent with this claim. This 
chapter will claim that gendered violence is a symptom of, and device for 
maintaining, the unequal gender relations that are integral to the maintenance 
of patriarchy. This will be supported primarily through an analysis of some of the 
reasons patriarchy as a social system may have developed, and its relationship 
with violence against women.  
The period of European history dominated by witch hunts (the mid-
sixteenth to mid-eighteenth centuries) will be used to emphasise both the 
integral nature of violence against women in creating and sustaining the 
patriarchal system and the Church and the states apparent interest in 
perpetuating this system. The claim will be made that the purpose of the 
persecution of the witch hunts was to destroy women whose actions challenged 
the patriarchal social order2 and to send a symbolic message to all women 
about men’s ultimate control over them. Male domination and violence against 
women existed prior to this period, but the witch hunts are one of the main 
periods of recent human history when violence and misogyny against women 
can be seen as systemic and purposeful, reflecting the perceived need to 
control women’s sexuality and reproductive function in the interests of 
sustaining the patriarchal social order. The mechanisms used in the witch hunts 
confirm that it was not a spontaneous process because such high levels of 
official organisation and administration were required,3 thus supporting the 
claim that the state, the Church and the legal system played a key role in 
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 See Johnson: 2005 and the introduction for a full explanation of the ways in which patriarchy can be seen to operate in 
contemporary society. 
2
 It will be shown below that women who were deemed to be witches were typically those who challenged the 
patriarchal order by refusing to marry, having sex out of wedlock, or controlling women’s reproductive function. 
3
 Federici: 2004 p. 166 
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legitimating the violence and misogyny. It will be argued in later chapters that 
this legitimation continues today in the context of domestic violence. 
Part One will examine the role of violence against women in sustaining 
the patriarchal social order. Part Two will then examine the witch hunts which 
took place in Europe from 1560-1760 to assert that they demonstrate the social 
function of violence against women and state and Church legitimation of 
misogynistic beliefs and practices. In Part Three will be an analysis of the 
reason why the desire to control women’s sexuality and reproductive function 
through violence seen in the witch hunts is necessary to maintain the patriarchal 
state. The claim that differences between the sexes and biologically masculine 
traits are the reason for male supremacy, dominance and aggression need to 
be challenged before fully claiming that violence against women is integral to a 
patriarchal system. 
 
 
Male Supremacy: Refuting Gender Differences 
 
The theory that it is men’s greater physical strength and greater aggressiveness 
that led them to become hunters and providers of food – thus making them 
more valued than women4 - has had a powerful explanatory and reinforcing 
effect on contemporary ideas of male supremacy, thus relieving modern-day 
men of any responsibility for male dominance. Despite the ways in which this 
theory has been undermined by anthropological evidence concerning hunting 
and gathering societies, and despite the fact that feminist anthropologists have 
challenged the earlier generalisations that male dominance is virtually 
universal,5 this out-dated theory is still often used to justify the subordination of 
women and male dominance, aggression and violence.6 The current 
hierarchical gender order and system of male dominance and privilege is 
typically defended on the basis that patriarchy is rooted in the natural order of 
things, thus merely reflecting the ‘essential’ differences between men and 
women based on biology or genetics. However, this ignores much of what has 
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 Some of this can be attributed to the differing physical strength of men and women, although this is a contentious 
issue with some studies indicating that the differential treatment received by males and females from birth means their 
bodies develop in different ways, for example through different levels and types of physical activity. See Johnson: 2005 
and Fine: 2010. 
5
 See Rosaldo: 1974 pp. 16-42, Silverblatt: 1978 pp. 37-61 cited by Lerner: 1986 
6
 This theory can still be seen to justify, implicitly and explicitly, the differential treatment of men and women in society, 
especially under the legal system, as will be revealed in subsequent chapters. 
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been revealed about gender differences based on empirical studies and other 
research; ‘[e]ssentialism… can’t account for the enormous variability we find 
among women and among men, or the similarities between men and women in 
similar situations’.7 Many studies have found that there are actually more 
differences between groups of men or groups of women than between men and 
women, and expectations of how the sexes are expected to perform on certain 
tasks has also been found to influence how well the tasks are performed.8 For 
example, women who were told that ‘recent research has shown that there are 
clear differences in the scores obtained by men and women in logical-
mathematical tasks’ themselves then listed twice as many negative thoughts 
about the maths test. They subsequently did not perform as well as the control 
group (who had been told that there are no differences between men and 
women performance on these tasks).9 In addition, essentialism is unable to 
explain why so much coercion is needed to keep patriarchy going; if male 
privilege were rooted in some male essence then it would not follow that many 
men experience such pain, confusion, ambivalence and resistance during their 
training for patriarchal manhood and their lives as adult men. If women were 
naturally subordinate, it would also be hard to explain the long history of women 
resisting oppression and learning to undermine and counteract male 
dominance.10  
 
 
Part One 
The Role of Violence Against Women in the Maintenance of Patriarchy 
 
Marital violence can be seen to have an ancient history and, as Davidson 
writes, ‘to find a time in history when wifebeaters did not enjoy having custom 
and the law on their side, it is necessary to go back more than 2000 years to… 
pre-Biblical times’.11 To the extent that violence against women is tied to 
domestic arrangements, the work of Engels suggests that the key institutions of 
civilized society – family, private property and the state – were non-existent in 
prehistoric life, suggesting that social institutions are not eternal or unchanging 
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8
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9
 Cadinu et al: 2005 p. 574 
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 Johnson: 2005 p. 53 
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 Davidson in Roy (ed): 1977 p. 4 
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but have ‘come into existence at certain periods of history due to specific 
socioeconomic conditions’.12 Engels further claims that the institution of the 
family is no exception to this; prior to property ownership the key institutions of 
the state and the patriarchal family were not needed and therefore did not 
exist.13  
 
 
Violence Against Women in the Middle Ages  
 
Patriarchal and misogynistic attitudes toward women existed earlier but can be 
seen to have been more fully and consistently condoned and supported by the 
state and the Church in the Middle Ages. During this period it was believed that 
a husband’s right to beat his wife derived from God’s command and the Church 
approved this as a method of keeping women in subjection. The performing of 
infibulation14 on men’s wives and the sewing up of the labia over the vaginal 
opening was commonly practiced, revealing an attempt at ensuring chastity and 
fidelity in order for male lineage to be traced. Elements of this concept of 
women as a form of property to be justifiably controlled by their husbands or 
male partners persists today and infidelity continues to be used as justification, 
within the legal responses and public understandings, for violence against wives 
and female partners. The use of instruments of torture and punishment in the 
Middle Ages against strong women who spoke their own minds15 demonstrates 
the role of violence in keeping women under male control. The public 
chastisement of women deemed to be angry troublemakers would have had an 
impact on all women in terms of reminding them of their place, what was 
expected of them, and that they should defer to the power of their husbands 
and other males. Indeed, it was not until 1967 that the Common Scold Law was 
declared obsolete in England by the Criminal Law Act16 and even since this time 
the imagery of the provoking wife has remained ‘a powerful justification and 
rationalisation for the physical punishments and degradations meted out by 
husbands in private’.17 There have been instances of leading social figures 
                                                          
12
 Evelyn Reed’s introduction in Engels: 1972 p. 8 
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 See Engels: 1972 and Lerner: 1986 on the development of patriarchy 
14
 The practice of fastening together the labia majora by means of a ring, buckle of padlock 
15
 Women during this time were convicted as ‘nagging wives’ or ‘scolds’ for breaking the peace –  a crime that only 
women could commit. 
16
 Section 13(1)(a) Criminal Law Act 1967  
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 Dobash and Dobash: 1979 p. 59 
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reflecting a perpetuation of these views that it is women’s provoking and 
nagging behaviour that causes men to be violent against them.18 Women’s 
‘nagging’, infidelity, and failure to conform to the expectations of femininity or 
fulfil the role required of a wife or female partner can thus be seen to continue to 
operate as an excuse that justifies violence perpetrated against a woman by her 
husband or male partner. However, as suggested above, the process of the 
witch hunts clearly show the systemic and purposeful nature and the level of 
state and Church legitimation of violence against women required for the 
continuation of patriarchy. Elements of this will be later shown to persist in the 
current day. 
 
 
Part Two 
The Witch Hunts: State Legitimation of Misogyny and 
Violence Against Women 
 
The main period of the witch hunts in Europe ran from 1560-1760 when it is 
estimated that 100,00019 women were killed, and many more were brutally 
tortured, for being heretics and witches. The witch hunts can be conceived as a 
campaign directed against those holding views considered to be unorthodox or 
a threat to society. The process of the witch hunts claimed to uncover 
subversive activities but appeared to be used to harass and undermine those of 
differing views. They developed into a rigorous campaign to round up or expose 
dissenters on the pretext of guarding the welfare of the public. State 
authorisation and control over the witch hunts is shown by Parliament passing 
the Witchcraft Act in 1542 which defined witchcraft as a crime punishable by 
death. This first Act was repealed in 1547 but restored by a new Act in 1562, 
when the trial of witches was transferred from the Church to the ordinary courts. 
In 1736 Parliament passed an Act repealing the laws against witchcraft, but 
imposing fines or imprisonment on people who claimed to be able to use 
magical powers.20  
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 See the operation of the old provocation defence p. 90-1 and Re H (A Child) (Contact: Domestic Violence) [2006] 1 
FCR 102 where the trial judge described the wife’s treatment of the husband as ‘autocratic and domineering’ (para 30) 
and stated that this provocation explained the violence he used against her (para 44). 
19
 Barstow believes the numbers killed have been wildly overestimated by previous historians who claim that millions 
were killed and her research demonstrates that 100,000, a still significant number, is a much more accurate estimation. 
20
 http://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/transformingsociety/private-lives/religion/overview/witchcraft/ 
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This part of the chapter will analyse the aims and ideology behind the 
witch hunts apparent in the text of the Malleus Maleficarum. Translated as ‘The 
Witch Hammer,’ this was a book on witchcraft published by the Catholic Church 
in 1484 and was the leading authority on how to conduct a witch hunt for 200 
years.21 Through this analysis of the text itself emerge three linked themes. The 
first is its implicit misogyny, defined as a dislike of, contempt for and ingrained 
prejudice against women. There had probably existed ancient and perhaps 
unconscious misogyny before this time, but this is when it becomes fully evident 
that the establishments of the Church and the state practices this misogyny.22 
This implicit misogyny reveals a great deal about the motives and purpose 
behind the witch hunts. Second is an obsession with women’s sexuality and the 
sexual nature of the witch trials themselves,23 and third can be seen a 
preoccupation with the continuation of life. These latter two are linked and will 
be analysed in Part Three of this chapter to support the claim that central to the 
witch hunts was the need to control women’s sexuality and reproductive 
function to ensure that sexual intercourse only took place within marriage for 
procreation purposes and women’s reproductive function could not be 
controlled by midwives. This helps to explain why it was predominantly women 
who were found guilty of witch craft.24 
It will be contended that witch burning (together with other oppressive 
measures against women) enabled the Church and the state to challenge the 
control women had over their sexuality and reproductive function in order to 
further embed the developing patriarchal social order. The analysis will be 
based on the view that the witch hunts played an integral part in the economic 
and political transition from the feudal system to the developing system of 
capitalism during this period.25 This is based upon an analysis of the purpose of 
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 There have been many translations of the different Latin versions of the original text. The one used here was 
translated by P. G. Maxwell-Stuart in 2007 and is translated from the 1588 Frankfurt edition. Maxwell-Stuart states that 
the Malleus Maleficarum is often, misleadingly, referred to as a ‘manual’. Instead it is best understood as an 
idiosyncratic compilation reflective of Insitoris’s personal preoccupations. He also explains that it gained pre-eminence 
among demonological and witchcraft treatises because it provided a  pattern for future generations of writers and 
scholars to understand what witchcraft was (Maxwell-Stuart: 2007pp. 31-2). 
22
 Maxwell-Stuart asserts that an earlier translation by Montague Summers gives the impression of a text more targeted 
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English-speaking consciousness almost inevitably produces the image of a female (Maxwell-Stuart: 2007 p. 38). 
However, it is notable that Insitoris uses the feminine pronoun whenever he designates the offender (Maxwell-
Stuart:2007 p. 34). 
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 Women’s ‘sexual relations with evil spirits lie at the heart of their willingness to act as agents for Satan’s plans to 
overthrow humanity’ (Maxwell-Stuart: 2007 p. 32). 
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 The text of the Malleus Maleficarum takes it as a given that there are ‘more workers of harmful magic found in the 
female sex… than among men’ (Maxwell-Stuart: 2007 p. 74). 
25
 For a brief historical account of how capitalism – defined as an economic and political system in which a country’s 
trade and industry are controlled by private owners for profits, rather than by the state – developed out of the feudal 
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the witch hunts provided by Federici which suggests that missing from Marx’s 
analysis of the proletariat is the integral nature of the witch hunt to the 
exploitation of women. She claims that this in turn played a central function in 
the process of capitalist accumulation because of women’s role as the 
producers and reproducers of ‘the most essential capitalist commodity: labour 
power.’26 For capitalism to be successful, there needed to be a continual source 
of new labour and it can be argued that this was what primarily dictated the 
changes that arose in the social position of women; the power of women under 
the feudal system had to be challenged.27 The witch hunts coincided with the 
enclosure28 of the commons and, prior to this time, the commons served a 
particularly important social function for women29 and this ‘web of cooperative 
relations… crumbled when the open-field system was abolished and the 
communal lands were fenced off’.30 Federici claims that there is ‘no doubt that 
in the “transition from feudalism to capitalism” women suffered a unique process 
of social degradation that was fundamental to the accumulation of capital and 
has remained so ever since’.31 The devaluing of women as workers,32 and their 
loss of autonomy with respect to men, demanded their subjection to an ‘intense 
process of social degradation’33 and the witch hunts were an integral part of this 
process, signifying a ‘turning point in the history of women in Europe’.34 The 
ability of witches to control nature in undesirable ways – such as through 
inducing miscarriage – and the threat they posed to the ideal of sexual 
intercourse within marriage for reproduction purposes will be argued to have 
                                                                                                                                                                          
system see Marx and Engel’s Communist Manifesto of 1848, available at 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Manifesto.pdf 
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 Federici: 2004 p. 8 
27
 Federici: 2004 pp. 21-22, 69. Federici’s explanation therefore adds to Marx’s concept of ‘primitive accumulation’ by 
uncovering the development of a new sexual division of labour which subjugated women’s labour and reproductive 
function to the reproduction of the work force and led to the construction of a new patriarchal order based upon the 
exclusion of women from waged work and their subordination to men, and led to the transformation of women’s bodies 
into a machine of production for new workers (Federici: 2004 p. 12).   
28
 ‘Enclosure’ is a technical term used to describe a set of strategies used by English lords and rich farmers to eliminate 
communal land and expand their holdings. It involved the abolition of the open-field system, the fencing off of the 
commons, and the pulling down of the shacks dwelt in by poor cottagers who had no land of their own but who could 
survive due to having access to customary rights. (Federici: 2004 pp. 69-70). 
29
 This was due to women having less title to land and less social power which made them more dependent on them for 
subsistence, autonomy and sociality (Federici: 2004 p. 71). Noteworthy is that in the regions of England where land 
privitisation had not occurred and was not on the agenda there is no record of witch hunting, and in Essex, where most 
of the English witch trials occurred,  the bulk of the land had been enclosed by the sixteenth century (Federici: 2004 p. 
171). 
30
 Federici: 2004 p. 72  
31
 Federici: 2004 p. 75 
32
 From the end of the seventeenth century all female work done in the home – even if it was done for others and 
payment was received for it, was defined as ‘housekeeping’, and even when it was done outside of the home it was paid 
less than ‘men’s work’ and was never enough for women to live on. This led to a massification of prostitution and the 
view that marriage was women’s true career, with women’s inability to support themselves becoming a taken for granted 
reality (Federici: 2004 p. 94). 
33
 Federici: 2004 p. 100 
34
 Federici: 2004 p. 164 
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been perceived by the Church and the state as undermining the growth of state-
condoned male control and the power of the patriarchal state.  
Accused ‘witches’ have been portrayed as social failures in some of the 
literature,35 rather than an understanding of the purpose for their persecution. 
This led to a tendency to blame them for incurring persecution, thus failing to 
see that the charges of female sexual transgressions such as illegitimacy 
promiscuity and sexual voracity, are the ‘stuff of which misogyny is made’.36 
More recently, it has been shown that the witch hunts were systemic attacks 
aimed at destroying the power of women in general.37 A lack of awareness of 
traditional misogyny and the oppression of women led some historians to 
conclude that the accused witches were to blame for their own misfortune. 
Therefore, Federici claims that although it is ‘generally agreed that the witch 
hunts aimed at destroying the control that women had exercised over their 
reproductive function and  served to pave the way for the development of a 
more oppressive patriarchal regime,’ and that it has previously been argued that 
the witch hunts were ‘rooted in the social transformations that accompanied the 
rise of capitalism,’ the ‘specific historical circumstances… and the reasons why 
the rise of capitalism demanded a genocidal attack on women have not been 
investigated’.38 It is here argued that the social order felt threatened by 
nonconformist women and that women were accused ‘primarily by men, tried by 
male juries, examined by male searchers, sentenced by male judges, tortured 
by male jailers, [and] burned to death by male executioners’.39 Williams and 
Williams highlight the salient point that ‘the story of witchcraft continues to blind 
writers to its most sensational aspect, the mass killing of women, in part, at 
least, as a way of denying women political and economic power’.40  
 
  
The Misogynistic Nature of the Witch Hunts 
 
The misogyny of the Malleus Maleficarum almost certainly reflects the 
misogynistic nature of the society for whom it was written, it certainly suggests a 
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striking hostility: women ‘have a lewd, slippery tongue, and have difficulty 
concealing from fellow-women those things they know by means of their evil 
skill,’41 To denigrate women in this fashion would assist a social objective of 
subordinating women to male power and control. The text offers circular 
arguments in which assumptions about women’s inherent nature are used to 
explain why it is predominantly women that practice harmful magic. Certain 
aspects of women’s ‘nature’ are assumed, rather than proved, and then used to 
justify the assertion that women are more likely to practice harmful magic than 
men. For example, the credulous nature of women makes them inclined to leak, 
and this renders it easier for individual spirits [spiritus] to make an impression 
upon them’; also, ‘because they do not have physical strength, they find it easy 
to assert themselves in secret through acts of harmful magic’. In the text it is 
taken as a given that ‘this type of betrayal of God [is] found more in women than 
in men.’42 
The power of the Church and the state was deployed to identify the 
range of women who would be accused of witchcraft – midwives, ‘adulteresses’, 
‘fornicators’, and the ‘mistresses’ of rich and powerful men.43 It was then stated 
that they had the traits that make them a witch; ‘these women apply themselves 
to acts of harmful magic more than anyone else because, much more than all 
the others, they are given over to those [particular] vices’.44 Alongside this, in 
Part III of the Malleus Maleficarum where the judicial process is described, it is 
stated that the house is to be searched and ‘if she has the reputation of being a 
witch, then there is no doubt that various pieces of [magical] apparatus will be 
found, unless she has already hidden them’45 indicating that they cannot fail to 
accuse her; the trial is being conducted on the basis of her reputation, 
regardless of how that came about. The use of institutional violence was a 
norm; the male judge used torture to find tricks and signs that enabled him to 
recognise a witch such as whether she can shed tears; if she was a witch she 
would not be able to shed tears despite trying ‘hard enough’,46 thus revealing 
the ways in which this form of gender violence was legitimated by the state and 
the Church in order to support the developing status quo. This was seen as an 
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‘absolutely reliable sign, based on long-standing information from worthy 
men’,47 revealing a privileging of male testimony and knowledge over that of 
women. Therefore, it can be argued that the misogyny of the Malleus 
Maleficarum reveals a great deal about the motives behind, and purpose of, the 
witch hunts because it portrays women as untrustworthy, overly-sexualised and 
willing to harm other women and their children for personal gain. 
These assumptions are also reflective of much Christian belief, where 
the concept of Original Sin can clearly be seen to be a misogynistic 
interpretation of other creation myths used to subjugate women to the authority 
of the Church, the state and men.48 Eve’s responsibility for destroying paradise 
illustrates to men the dangers of listening to their wives, whilst women are 
punished for Eve’s misdemeanour for all eternity by being made subject to the 
rule of their husbands. The Adam and Eve story has been ‘twisted into the 
rationalisation for much of the Christian world’s mistreatment of wives. It aided 
and abetted the view of woman as inherently evil’49 which is further apparent in 
the conducting of the witch hunts where the role of the Church and the state in 
legitimating misogyny and violence against women becomes visible, as 
substantiated by the nature of the text of the Malleus Maleficarum. 
 
 
Part Three 
Establishing Control over Female Sexuality and 
Women’s Reproductive Function 
 
The Malleus Maleficarum displays a preoccupation with women’s sexuality and 
uses the supposed sexual nature of the female witch, implied (by the absence 
of mention of male sexuality) as being in opposition to men’s nature,50 to explain 
why they were predominantly the ones that practiced harmful magic. The 
original text states that women were more likely to be witches because they are 
‘more given to fleshly lusts than a man, as is clear from her many acts of carnal 
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filthiness’.51 Women are held to be ‘unfinished’ because they were ‘formed from 
a curved rib’ and it is concluded from this that ‘she is always… deceptive’52 and 
her ‘fleshly lust… is never satisfied’.53 Men, by contrast, are preserved – by God 
– ‘from so great a disgrace’.54 The type of women held to be ‘infected’ were 
those ‘who are hot to fulfill their corrupt lusts’55 – ‘adulteresses’, ‘fornicators’ and 
‘mistresses’ – and it can be seen that these women were the ones perceived as 
a threat to one of the key institutions of patriarchy; the family. Federici notes the 
huge effect it must have had on women to see their neighbours, friends and 
relatives being burned at the stake and to realise that ‘any contraceptive 
initiative on their side might be construed as the product of demonic 
perversion’.56 The Malleus Maleficarum states that women being burned had 
stated that their masters (i.e. evil spirits) had ‘enjoined them to use every effort 
to bring about the downfall of holy virgins and widows’57 which indicates the 
preference for women to be ‘pure’ and married; those accused of witchcraft can 
be seen to be those undermining this preferred way for women to live. It is 
argued here that views about female sexuality were actually used to justify the 
promotion of monogamous marriage (at least on the part of the woman) and to 
challenge – by accusing them of witchcraft – any woman who appeared to 
undermine this institution; ‘[f]emale witches were, in effect, adulteresses. They 
formed a bond with someone other than their husbands – entered, in fact, into a 
private contract with the devil’.58 For patriarchy to be sustained, the preferred 
state of affairs is monogamous marriage because this enables lineage to be 
traced through the man. This analysis enables the suggestion that part of the 
purpose of the witch hunts was to control women’s sexuality in order to maintain 
control over their reproductive function and ensure that they did not have sex 
outside of marriage. This was done by putting fear into all women – not just 
those accused – of what would happen to them if they had sex out of wedlock. 
Sections of Part II of the Malleus Maleficarum explaining how the crimes 
are committed display a fascination with the sexual acts supposedly performed 
by the witch and the incubus, for example when the text discusses whether or 
not the incubus is visible; ‘witches themselves have frequently been seen lying 
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on their backs in fields or woods. They have removed their clothes as far as the 
navel and, in accordance with what is required by that act of filthiness, they get 
their limbs (their shins and shanks) in the right position and stimulate 
themselves. As far as people standing around are concerned, they are doing 
this in conjunction with incubi who are invisible while it is taking place’.59 
According to the original writer, Insitoris, detailed questions relating to a 
woman’s sexual behaviour were essential because witches tended to be 
sexually promiscuous and so evidence of this would assist the court in 
determining whether the woman being interrogated was a witch’.60  
The sexual component of the witch hunts, then, is essential in 
understanding the patriarchal control and misogyny that led to this form of 
violence against women. The ‘sexual sadism displayed by the torture reveals a 
misogyny that has no parallel in history’61 and all members of a community had 
to attend the execution, including the children of the accused; the daughters’ of 
the accused would often be whipped in front of the stake on which their mother 
was being burned alive. The concept of the ‘devil’s teat’, a mark that could be 
found anywhere on a woman’s body in the form of a teat from which animals or 
demons sucked, is clearly an inversion of the female function of providing 
breast milk.62 As Barstow points out, locating the ‘devil’s teat’ extended across 
all female anatomy and some of the most basic negative imagery of witch lore 
was taken from the female anatomy.63 Making women appear as sexually 
voracious provides a means to justify controlling their sexuality, thus helping to 
create a sense of shame that could be manipulated to ensure women only had 
intercourse within marriage for procreation purposes (thus enabling the 
traceability of male lineage for property and inheritance  purposes). 
Therefore, key elements of the Malleus Maleficarum provide further 
support for the analysis linking violence against women to the patriarchal 
system because the text reveals a preoccupation with the continuation of life – 
something integral to the continuation of capitalism because a new generation 
of workers needs to be provided. In the introduction to his translation, Maxwell-
Stuart suggests that the attacks on female fertility may be explained as being 
due to the rage of post-menopausal women against younger, child-bearing 
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women,64 and in this way the witch hunts are being set in the context of women 
against other women, thus turning it into a personal attack, rather than a public 
attack that supports the social order desired by the state. The text indicates that 
women of child-bearing age in particular were identified as those able, and often 
willing, to harm the next generation65 and the vitriol expressed towards 
midwives further supports this analysis; ‘what of midwives who surpass all other 
women in wickedness?’.66 Midwives were held to prevent women from 
conceiving, make women miscarry, and devour children or offer them to evil 
spirits; those who are ‘indisputably witches are accustomed, against the 
inclination of human nature…, to devour and feast on young children’.67 
Notably, only one ‘eyewitness’ account is offered in support of this claim.68 Thus 
midwives were perceived as able to control nature by influencing women’s 
reproductive capacities, and thus their persecution reflected the need to 
challenge women’s control over their reproductive capacity.69 
 
 
State Legitimation of Violence Against Women 
 
For patriarchy to be sustained, Federici views the witch hunts as the beginning 
of ‘the transformation of female sexual activity into work, a service to men, and 
procreation… [Therefore], central to this process was the banning, as anti-social 
and virtually demonic, of all non-productive, non-procreative forms of female 
sexuality’.70 Central to the control over women’s sexuality and reproductive 
function were the severe legal penalties imposed against contraception, 
abortion and infanticide and the new forms of surveillance that were adopted to 
make sure women did not terminate their pregnancies during the mid-sixteenth 
century.71 The rise in laws restraining sexual conduct and women’s control over 
reproduction and their own bodies, such as adultery, bearing illegitimate 
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children, abortion, incest and infanticide, parallels the sexual content of 
witchcraft prosecution; charges of sex crimes and witchcraft often overlapped.72 
It can be seen that the witch hunts not only ‘condemned female sexuality as the 
source of every evil’ but also enabled ‘a broad restructuring of sexual life that, 
conforming with the newly emerging capitalist work-discipline, criminalised any 
sexual activity that threatened procreation, the transmission of property within 
the family, or took time and energies away from work’.73 Federici asserts that 
the significance of the ‘criminalisation of women’s control over procreation… 
cannot be overemphasised… [in terms of] its effects on women and its 
consequences for the capitalist organisation of work’.74   
The statistics are ‘sufficient to document an intentional mass murder of 
women.’75 Married women learned that the safest route was ‘to mind one’s 
business and obey one’s husband’76 and this lesson has clearly carried through 
to the present day, when women are still punished and violated for disobeying 
their husbands, disregarding their wishes and failing to fulfil the role expected of 
them.77 Mary Daly argues that the enforced active/instrumental role of children 
in the trials has carried the lessons of the witch hunts down through the 
centuries into the present day. She believes that for a daughter to remember all 
her life that she had been used to accuse and condemn her mother to death, 
effectively matricide, would have given the girl an unimaginable burden of self-
loathing and this self-hatred would have been branded upon their own 
daughters and on following generations.78 Whether or not these effects have 
been overstated in her account, the witch hunts do serve to illustrate the 
developing need for male control over the female body and freedom of action. 
The legal regulation of marriage79 and reproduction continues to this day; the 
Ellenborough Acts of the 19th century made abortion punishable by the death 
penalty, under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (OAPA) abortion or 
trying to self-abort punishable carried a sentence of life imprisonment, in 1929 
the Infant Life Preservation Act created a new crime of killing a viable fetus (28 
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weeks) in all cases except where the mother’s life was at risk, and in 1967 the 
Abortion Act de-criminalised abortion but only under certain conditions.80 
Therefore, the witch hunts were ‘instrumental in the construction of the 
newly developing patriarchal order where women’s bodies, their labour, their 
sexual and reproductive powers were placed under the control of the Church 
and state and transformed into economic resources’.81 The state clearly had an 
interest in this control of women for economic purposes. Through the witch 
hunts, the state brought an end to the use of the methods women had 
developed to control procreation, thus institutionalising the state’s control over 
the female body, itself a precondition for the subordination of the female body to 
the reproduction of labour-power.82 Witches were women who avoided 
maternity, promiscuous women, or any woman who exercised her sexuality 
outside the bonds of marriage83 and procreation.  
The witch hunts also resulted in the murder of thousands of wise women 
which led to the ‘virtual elimination of female healers and left the way open for 
the creation of a new male medical profession’.84 Therefore emerged a new 
medical practice where the life of the fetus (the ‘new worker’ required for 
patriarchal capitalism) was prioritised over the life of the mother and led to the 
marginalisation of the midwife. Thus women lost control over procreation and 
were reduced to a passive role in child delivery.85 Male doctors took over the 
role of midwives and between the late 1700s and late 1800s became known as 
gynaecologists.  
 
 
Hysteria and Medical Justifications for Misogynistic Treatment of Women 
 
It can be seen, therefore, that the central themes drawn out from the text of the 
Malleus Maleficarum reveal much about not only the position of a woman in 
society at the time of the witch hunts, but also about the purpose her position 
served in facilitating the development of a patriarchal system. The themes can 
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be seen to continue into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when doctors 
viewed menstruation, pregnancy and menopause as physical diseases making 
women ‘intellectual liabilities’ in need of expert care and rendering them 
incapable of certain roles and positions in society. The desire to control 
women’s sexuality and the idea that women should not enjoy sex but only 
engage in it for procreation86 - to preserve male lineage – was continued during 
this period, with clitoridectomy being practiced to cure female hysteria, 
nymphomania and masturbation.87 Thus the continuance of the control of 
female sexuality that was particularly apparent during the witch hunts can 
clearly be seen. Doctors noted that hysteria was likely to appear in rebellious 
young women who were more independent and assertive than ‘normal’ women. 
Thus further instances of women who disobeyed their husbands and other 
important males in their lives, and were not happy to be subordinated and 
controlled, being subjected to misogynistic and harmful practices are apparent 
here. Elaine Showalter writes that ‘during an era when patriarchal culture felt 
itself to be under attack by its rebellious daughters, one obvious defence was to 
label women campaigning for access to the universities, the professions, and 
the vote as mentally disturbed, and of all the nervous disorders… hysteria was 
the most strongly identified with the feminist movement.’88 Ehrenreich and 
English explain how society ‘assigned affluent women to a life of confinement 
and inactivity, and medicine justified this assignment by describing women as 
innately sick. In the epidemic of hysteria, women were both accepting their 
inherent “sickness” and finding a way to rebel against an intolerable social role. 
Sickness… became a rebellion, and medical treatment, which had always had 
strong overtones of coercion, revealed itself as frankly and brutally 
oppressive’.89 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented arguments in support of the theory that violence 
against women is deeply ingrained in our past and the foundations of current 
Western society and culture. The intention behind this argument is to show the 
state has an ongoing interest in controlling women’s behaviour, sexuality and 
reproductive function. Examination of the Malleus Maleficarum shows much 
about the importance of this control over women. Significantly in this text, and 
other records of how the trials were conducted, can be seen the 
institutionalisation of violence against women in a very overt way. This theme 
will be more fully developed in the following chapter as the gendered 
stereotypes of male and female roles and behaviours will be analysed in 
support of the claim that gendered expectations are integral to the maintenance 
of one of the primary patriarchal institutions; the family. 
Therefore, examination of the misogynistic nature of the witch hunts 
confirms them as primarily a campaign against women, thus revealing their 
rationale; to provide the state and the Church with a means of controlling any 
women perceived as a threat to the patriarchal social order. This can be seen to 
have occurred directly, through the accusation of witchcraft, or indirectly, as a 
result of the symbolic message sent to all women. The very public nature of the 
persecution and execution of accused witches seems to indicate that they were 
a chief sixteenth century device for ‘teaching both sexes about men’s ultimate 
control over women’.90 . The desire to control women’s sexuality could be seen 
to embed the ideology that sexual intercourse should only occur in marriage, 
which in turn would mean patriarchal lineage i.e. inheritance and property, could 
be traced through the male line.  
Presenting the social function of the unequal gender relations integral to 
patriarchy and asserting that violence is often a necessary way of maintaining 
these relations, provides support for the first central argument of this thesis; 
domestic violence is primarily a social problem, not one that can be attributed to 
deviant individuals or problematic relationship dynamics. This material leads to 
the conclusion that neither a full understanding of domestic violence, nor the 
provision of solid foundations for solutions, are possible without recognising the 
continuing social function of this type of abuse and why it is predominantly 
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women that are its victims. If the analysis contained in this chapter is correct, it 
carries the implication that legal reform alone will not be sufficient to address 
the problem. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE IMPACT OF MASCULINE AND FEMININE IDENTITIES 
ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
 
The material analysed in this chapter aims to show the expectations placed 
upon men to be masculine and women to be feminine are one of the root 
causes of domestic violence. It will be claimed that the gendering of essentially 
human qualities is central to the maintenance of patriarchal systems; it is only 
through establishing that the characters and behaviours of men and women are 
in opposition that male privilege and domination over women can be justified. 
An analysis of gender role stereotypes and expectations, particularly in the 
context of dating and marital-type relationships, is intended to support the claim 
that domestic violence, as a central mechanism in sustaining the current social 
order, is thus primarily a social problem. This claim can be used to challenge 
individualistic discourses pertaining to domestic violence. These discourses 
suggest the problem is attributable to the deviance of particular individuals or 
relationship dynamics and thus that solutions can be found by focusing on 
treating the pathologies of those involved.  
The perspective taken will be that gender is socially constructed and thus 
distinct from biological sex, making masculine and feminine identities not the 
‘natural’ products of being sexed as either male or female. This argument is 
made in order to refute the claim that men’s ‘natural’ aggression gives them 
their place as the dominant sex. Part One of this chapter will examine the 
gender roles that are constructed for men and women and the contribution that 
expectations of appropriate masculine and feminine behaviour have on the 
occurrence of domestic violence. It will be contended that it is women’s identity 
first and foremost as wives or female partners that places them in a role that 
allows them to be beaten, abused and controlled. An examination of masculine 
gender identities is also necessary because, through the study of masculinities,1 
feminism has been alerted to the limitations of focusing on just women’s lives to 
explain phenomenon surrounding gender. As Bibbings contends, if feminists are 
concerned with the treatment of women in society, ‘they need to understand 
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what it is about men that make them oppress women’.2 Analysing the roles and 
expectations placed upon men within a patriarchal system indicates that we 
cannot understand the abuse of women by focusing simply on femininity; a 
more holistic understanding of gender norms and expectations is required.  
Part Two will then advance the argument that it is the expectations 
placed upon appropriate roles within the marital-type relationship that provide 
the context in which violence and abuse occurs. Research into young people’s 
experience of abuse will then be used to claim that the same dynamics and 
inequalities can be seen in dating relationships. This will be shown to indicate 
that ‘essentialist ideas about gender remain dominant in young people’s 
understandings’3 therefore the gendered expectations that support the 
patriarchal social order are persisting in current times.  
 
 
Part One 
The Social Construction of Gender Roles 
 
Within current Western culture, great significance is attached to the 
identification of people with their gender, i.e. being male or female, and there is 
a strong demand to behave in ways that are appropriate to our biological sex.4 
This emphasis on masculine and feminine identities begins before babies are 
even born and has an overwhelming influence on the roles and positions that 
men and women envisage for themselves in the future. It is common for 
humans to divide people into groups and, whilst these groups can be divided on 
the basis of race, age, religion and so on, the most widespread divide is gender 
groups. This process is both ‘habitual and automatic;’5 usually the ‘first thing we 
determine when meeting someone new, is their gender’.6 However, this division 
of the world into two groups leads to a tendency to ‘consider all males similar, 
all females similar, and the two categories of “males” and “females” very 
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differently’.7 This ignores that there is at least considerable overlap in terms of 
the characteristics commonly attributed to each gender; ‘gender polarisation 
often creates an artificial gap between women and men’8 and this polarisation of 
gender has created, and continues to create, gender roles which endure.  
According to Connell,9 efforts to maintain strong divisions between the 
sexes, for example statements made by the law, in the media and in 
advertising, give strong evidence of the instability of the boundaries. She 
highlights a whole industry of popular psychology telling us that men and 
women are naturally opposites in their thinking, emotions and capacities. These 
accounts tell us: women and men communicate in different ways; boys and girls 
learn differently; hormones make men into warriors; and our ‘brain sex’ rules our 
lives. Connell points to a mass of research evidence showing these claims to be 
‘complete nonsense’ and asserts that the ‘popular psychology doctrine of 
natural difference is harmful to children’s education, to women’s employment 
rights and to all adults’ emotional relationships’.10 She concludes that the idea of 
character dichotomy is commonly used in popular psychology to link bodily 
differences and social effects, with women assumed to possess one set of traits 
and men another. Most often, though not always, these work to the advantage 
of men because the traits they are held to possess are those that are more 
useful and more highly valued under a patriarchal system. In fact, studies have 
shown no significant sex differences in many areas of brain anatomy and 
functioning, and where there are differences they may be caused by different 
behaviours, rather than causing them.11  
Despite this, the need to conform to gender norms is great, and it can be 
argued, as Butler does, that because human existence is always gendered 
existence, to ‘stray outside of established gender is in some sense to put one’s 
very existence into question’.12 In contexts where gender norms are well 
entrenched the corresponding norms function prescriptively, providing the basis 
for judgements about how people ought to act and be. This prescriptive force is 
backed up by social sanctions and then, significantly, conformity to gender 
norms becomes internally motivated as opposed to being socially enforced.13 
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The prescriptive role of gender norms is seldom acknowledged and instead it is 
often concluded that the sex difference is natural or inevitable and woman is 
‘essentially’ feminine.14 However, as Haslanger asserts, particular traits, norms 
and identities, considered in abstraction from their social context, have no claim 
to be classified as masculine or feminine. Any classification is derivative and 
depends on prior social classifications.15  
The next two subsections will argue that in Western patriarchal societies, 
the roles that are allocated to each gender support and strengthen one of the 
institutions fundamental to the continuation of the patriarchal hierarchy; the 
family. It will be claimed that this is achieved through the continuation of 
gendered expectations making women’s identity depend upon being a good 
wife and mother and enabling the domination of men, achieved through the 
creation of a firm masculine identity against which men’s adherence can be 
measured and evaluated. Theoretical support and empirical evidence will be 
provided for the assertion that the root causes of domestic violence, often 
overlooked by legal authorities and policy makers, are the gendered 
expectations placed upon men and women, particularly in relation to how they 
‘ought’ to behave in intimate relationships. It will be claimed that many women, 
even young girls and teenagers, derive their sense of self from being in an 
intimate relationship and that this expectation leads many women to become 
unable to leave an abusive relationship.  
 
 
Women’s Identity as Wives and Female Partners 
 
Despite numerous changes in the status of women over the last 100 years and 
the fact that some women are able to break out of this confining role and 
choose not to become a wife or mother, these roles are still marks of legitimate 
womanhood. Departures from this norm typically need internal or external 
justification. For the majority of women being married and settling down is their 
ultimate goal in life and there seems to be a much stronger negative social 
stigma attached to being a spinster than being a bachelor. Fairy tales and 
stories still teach young girls they need only wait for a handsome prince to come 
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along to be ‘assured of true love and living happily ever after’16 and these tales, 
whilst allegedly only stories, are powerful influences on young girls. They 
contain strong subliminal messages perpetuating views of marriage as the end-
point in a woman’s life and show her located within the  domestic world of 
cleaning, cooking and taking care of others.17 These stories continue to be an 
‘enormously influential part of our culture’ and, according to Cosslett they can 
be seen to cause women to take on certain beliefs about their cultural role, or at 
least reinforce what culture is already telling them in other ways.18  
There has been little change in the patriarchal ideals and hierarchical 
nature of family organisation based upon a father as the head with a wife and 
children; the same beliefs are taught to children and the control husbands have 
over their wives and female partners continues to be institutionalised and 
legitimated in various ways. Female children still tend to be given baby dolls to 
mother, playhouses, miniature vacuum cleaners, irons, pots and pans, bride 
outfits to dress up in and are generally encouraged to imitate the behaviour and 
attitudes of married women. On the other hand little boys are given toys to 
encourage them to think of themselves in terms of work and to foster 
independence; they are not actively socialised to become husbands or fathers, 
but individuals.  
Research conducted by Belotti, indicating that this conditioning 
‘represents a “forced” integration of all children into the cultural mould of sex-
linked identity’,19 provides support for the claim that children are gendered right 
from birth. She asserts that the hierarchy of worth of individuals, based on what 
they will become as adults, is marked by an overwhelming preference in society 
for male children; mothers indulge little boys and even submit happily to their 
assertions of authority, shaping the behaviour of boys by reacting to them ‘in the 
same tolerant, compliant, accomplice’s attitude which [they maintain] towards 
adult men. Alternatively, a woman will shape her daughter in accordance with 
the image of females approved by men’.20 This is further evidence currently in 
the pages of most toy shop catalogues, with toys grouped into ‘boys toys’ 
(adventure, science, discovery, construction and so on) and ‘girls toys’ (baby 
dolls, miniature kitchens and cleaning sets, fairy and princess costumes) 
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continuing to perpetuate gender stereotypes. Some toy shops have reacted to 
criticisms of the division by removing overt labelling, but there only needs to be 
‘blue’ and ‘pink’ displays and packaging for children – and parents – to know 
where the appropriate toys for each gender will be found. In addition, the forums 
of many online websites for mothers contain frequent discussions along the 
lines of ‘boys will be boys’ and condoning, even relishing, ‘typical’ boys’ 
behaviour, whilst worries abound about girls not being feminine and ladylike 
enough when they are small; ‘such effort is put into ensuring that girls become 
wives that by a very early age many of them find it almost impossible to think of 
themselves in any other way’, effectively robbing them of their ability to 
conceive of themselves in the future as an autonomous individual.21 
Looking at the historical development of the status of women within both 
the public and private sphere, it can be argued that the sentimentalising of the 
institution of the family ‘provided a new rationale for the subordination of 
women’.22 By examining the rise of the family and the rationale for its setup 
entrenched by political theorists such as Locke and Hobbes, Moller Okin 
identifies the rationale behind organising society on the basis of family units as 
initially being ‘predominantly pragmatic and instrumental’ with the chief reason 
for entering being the rearing of children, rather than love or companionship.23 It 
wasn’t until the mid-seventeenth century that the ‘sentimental nuclear family’ 
began to develop24 and the family type that began developing among the gentry 
and bourgeois classes by the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries 
was much closer to the family as we know it - it was based on love rather than 
(or as well as) practical considerations and was higher in affect and 
psychological commitment. In addition it was ‘separated much more clearly from 
the outside world, valuing its privacy and cherishing its inward-turning and 
intimate sphere of domesticity.25 Domestic privacy and psychological intensity 
and intimacy were becoming the ideal, even if not so often the reality’.26  
The point that Moller Okin intends to make is that this did not, as some 
have argued, lead to an ‘improvement in prevalent conceptions and attitudes 
toward women’ because in reality women’s spheres of dependence and 
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domesticity were actually divided from the outside world more strictly, women 
were increasingly characterised as creatures of sentiment and love (meaning 
they did not possess the rationality needed for citizenship). The legitimation of 
male rule within and outside the family was thus reinforced on the grounds that 
the interests of the family are always united, based only on love, and husbands 
and fathers can therefore be trusted with the power within the household and to 
represent the family’s interests in the political realm. In Rousseau’s philosophy 
can clearly be seen ‘the effects of the sentimental, but still clearly patriarchal, 
family working to legitimise and justify the exclusion of women from social, 
political, legal, and economic equality’.27 As will be seen in Chapters 4 and 6, 
this is reflected in judicial attitudes to motherhood and women’s roles. 
Expectations of love and the provision of caring can be just as oppressive as 
the more overt forms of oppression as they still constitute the gender 
stereotyped expectations that provide the context in which domestic violence 
occurs. 
Following on from this, the portrayals of women’s lives found in the 
majority of mainstream culture (soap operas, romantic comedies, ‘chick lit’, and 
most popular romance, as well as other less obvious forms such as the huge 
range of relationship advice books targeted at women) can be seen to both 
contribute to and reflect dominant norms and the pervasive ‘ideology of 
romantic love teaches [women] that [their] life can be meaningful and significant 
through devoting [themselves] to finding and keeping a man’.28 The power 
dynamic in love relationships can be hard to identify because it works 
‘insidiously through shaping the subjectivity of the less powerful so that they see 
their disadvantaged position as normal and natural’.29 Inequality is typically 
sustained by hidden power ‘reflected in everyday understandings and 
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legitimation of the status quo’.30 The claim that the focus on romantic love 
merely reflects our emotional responses can be countered through an 
understanding that, however real our emotions are, they are still ‘socially 
ordered, linguistically mediated and culturally specific’,31 meaning that our 
emotions are still a response to the cultural and social expectations placed upon 
us. Jackson draws attention to the narrative of romantic love to justify this claim;  
 
‘We can identify with love stories not because they record some pre-
existing emotion, but because our cultural tradition supplies us with 
narrative forms with which we begin to be familiarised in childhood and 
through which we learn what love is. Narratives are not only encountered 
in novels, plays and films – they are very much part of everyday cultural 
competences. We constantly tell stories to ourselves and others and we 
continually construct and reconstruct our own biographies in narrative 
form. Hence subjectivity is in part constituted through narrative.’32  
 
The predominant hetero-normativity of romance in its popular manifestations is 
also very clear with the construction of love relationships between men and 
women being portrayed as the ‘natural’ way to find fulfilment. These beliefs can 
be seen to contribute to the predominant view of heterosexuality as a 
‘compulsory’ way of life, a theme that will be taken up again in Chapter Four in 
relation to the ways in which the legal system constructs gender norms. Under a 
patriarchal system, cultural ideals of masculine manhood and feminine 
womanhood are organised on a heterosexual model. What is commonly 
assumed to be ‘normal’ human sexuality is actually a set of cultural ideas about 
sexuality and how we think about heterosexuality is key to patriarchy because 
ideas about gender are at its core, with heterosexuality and gender being 
defined in terms of each other. This makes a ‘real man’ someone who can ‘act 
out core patriarchal values by orienting himself to the task of controlling sexual 
access to women’.33 Johnson defines the problem with patriarchal sexuality as 
being the merging of sexuality with control, dominance, and, therefore, violence 
as the means for achieving both. Under a patriarchal system, violence can be 
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seen to be about power and sex. Patriarchal culture defines mainstream 
sexuality in terms of power and male privilege, and power and male dominance 
are routinely conceived in sexual terms.34 Langford concludes that romantic 
love is clearly a patriarchal narrative which implicates women emotionally in a 
system of relationships which disadvantages them.35 The emphasis on 
heterosexual romantic love portrayed in most popular media and culture is a 
crucial way in which the expectations placed upon girls to enter into the marital-
type relationship as the ‘end-point’ of their life and main way of attaining 
fulfilment still continues to operate clearly and pervasively in current times. This 
theme will be explored further in the following chapter when pornography and 
degrading portrayals of women in popular culture are analysed. 
 
 
The Role of Masculinities and Male Identity in Domestic Violence 
 
As stated above, it is not sufficient simply to examine the expectations placed 
upon females under a patriarchal system to understand how gender-role 
stereotypes contribute to the conditions sustaining domestic violence; the 
expectations placed upon males are as important. ‘Masculinity’ and ‘femininity’ 
are inherently relational concepts; one only exists in contrast with the other and 
there cannot be a concept of ‘masculinity’ without treating men and women as 
polarised character types.36 Masculinities is a plural term, and, by accepting the 
existence of multiple masculinities, feminist understandings can be improved; 
‘[w]hat has been critiqued as essentialist when considering women as a group 
has been accepted with respect to men’.37 Although there are multiple 
conceptions, there is still a dominant set of norms of masculinity - referred to as 
‘hegemonic masculinity’ - which exist at the top of the hierarchy of masculinities. 
Whilst ‘few men meet the definition of hegemonic masculinity… most men 
benefit from it by reaping the patriarchal dividend’.38  
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Men often pay a price individually for this privilege as their mental and 
physical health is often affected by the demands of masculinity and the 
masculine refusal to seek care. However, the patriarchal dividend, as the 
benefit all men have from the dominance of men in the overall gender order, 
empowers all men as a group. ‘Hegemonic masculinity’ is so pervasive that it 
goes largely unnoticed – it is taken-for-granted oppression – and although it is 
not equally enjoyed by all men, as a group all men draw on that power. In 
addition, the two most common defining elements are the negative imperatives 
not to be a woman and not to be gay, involving a lifelong rejection of all things 
female. Masculinity is as much about men’s relation to other men as it is about 
their relation to women – it is a process of comparison, putting all men against 
each other with the constant challenge to meet the standard of masculinity.39 In 
this climate, men are powerful but often feel powerless, and cannot endorse the 
core claim of feminism – that males have a superior status and inequality is 
caused by males having more power in relation to females; it – does not ring 
true for most men,40 which would explain any masculine resistance to the 
descriptions of their power. 
The sense of powerlessness reflected in ‘hegemonic’ masculinity’s desire 
for control – to a large degree masculinity is about fear, shame and emotional 
isolation – has a clear impact upon the methods of coercive control that typically 
characterise an abusive relationship. Notions of manhood centre around many 
things – a desire for control, strength, aggressiveness, assertiveness and so on 
– but amongst these can be found a ‘will to hurt’.41 The giving and taking of pain 
that is central, in many men’s minds, to the notion of manhood is a social 
construction; men teach each other about hurting and they structure their lives 
in ways that allow them to express this behaviour. This willingness to inflict pain 
affects men’s relationships with other men as much as it affects women.  
Violence against women must be seen against the background of male-
to-male relations because these are also organised around man’s willingness to 
hurt. This will is not random but relies upon a set of rules or circumstances 
under which it can be expressed, so that pain is given in directed ways and 
under finely practiced justifications. Any pleasure, power or profit thus derived 
must be hidden because otherwise it will reveal a potentially dangerous truth 
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about men and hurting. This truth, according to Kuypers, is that pleasure in 
giving pain is not an isolated experience for a few men – animal hunting, 
pornography, ‘slasher’ movies, playing soldiers and war games (as distinct from 
the role of being a real soldier) all require that pleasure is achieved through the 
infliction of pain. As a result of the silence surrounding men’s will to hurt, and 
the fact that it is only used on ‘deserving victims’42 or for moral reasons, the use 
of violence and other methods of inflicting hurt seem so obvious that they 
become almost natural. Masculinity can be seen to be created, through a 
process of gender socialisation, in the same way as femininity is. In terms of 
hegemonic masculinity, one of the losses is the expression of emotion (unless it 
is anger or rage) and the underdevelopment of empathy due to the association 
of these things with femininity.43 Members of the hegemonic masculine group 
pay a huge emotional cost for this, and because the core elements of this 
dominant masculinity are negative – not being a girl, not being gay – members 
of the subversive or subordinate groups, such as homosexuals, also pay a huge 
price. Homophobia is a powerful part of the construction of masculinities 
because it is linked to the need to avoid being feminine in order to meet the 
norms of hegemonic masculinity. This is expressed by avoiding men who are 
perceived as feminine, homophobic harassment and violence, and avoiding 
characteristics and behaviours that would identify them as feminine and gay.44 
It can also be claimed that the term ‘hegemonic masculinity’ refers to 
particular collections of characteristics which signify what is truly male or 
appropriately masculine at a specific point in time and are the standard against 
which men are measured.45 Currently it includes traits such as aggression, self-
sufficiency and a sense of competitiveness; ‘normal manliness is constructed as 
being aggressive and violent; violence is both a proof and an expression of 
being a man’.46 The ‘perpetration of and participation in violent encounters are 
equated with masculinity, regardless of the outcome; even the scars and 
wounds of “the loser” may be useful for display and status conferring’.47  
Although violence perpetrated by men against women has a different 
cultural meaning and does not affirm personal identity in the same way as 
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violence between men, Bibbings argues that the acceptability of certain types of 
inter-male violence has a definite impact on levels of violence against women.48 
The risk is that the effect of this continued condoning by communities of a 
certain type of inter-male violence in some spheres is likely to carry across to 
incidents of male violence against women. It is also likely to affect the 
perceptions of male perpetrators of violence within the criminal justice system, 
as will be explored in Chapter Four. 
 Walker’s research found that a high risk factor for a woman experiencing 
future abuse was marrying a man with more traditional attitudes towards 
women’s roles. She also found that traditional attitudes go along with the 
patriarchal sex role stereotyped patterns that rigidly assign tasks according to 
gender. As well as this, her research found that men who were violent towards 
their wives or female partners tended to be insecure and highly dependent on 
their female partners whilst at the same time adhering to the traditional notion 
that it is a sign of weakness for them to express their emotions.49 It appears that 
these men are adhering to the expectations of hegemonic masculinity and that 
this is contributing to the violence and abuse they inflict on their partners. Men 
who exhibit dominant behaviour are insecure, vulnerable, dependent and also 
unreasonably jealous of anything or anyone that takes their partner’s attention 
away from them, including other men, family, friends and interests outside the 
home.50 Many abusers have very traditional ideas about male superiority and 
the stereotypical sex roles. Hence, the roles and expectations of femininity can 
be seen to be insufficient on their own to create conditions in which domestic 
violence is a likely outcome, in the patriarchal system. The demands placed 
upon men to conform to the standards expected of them are also key 
contributing factors. It seems that an understanding of masculine identities 
under patriarchy, as well as feminine ones, are integral to understanding the 
reasons domestic violence occurs. The sources of violent conflict within marital-
type relationships will be explored next, with the intention of showing that the 
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internal and external pressure to conform to these roles does actually lead to 
male abuse within relationships. 
 
 
Part Two 
Gender Role Expectations in Marital-type Relationships 
 
As well as the expectations upon women and men to enter into marriage or 
heterosexual partnerships, there are also expectations placed upon them to 
behave in certain ways once they have done so. An early study in the 1970s 
conducted by the Dobashes comparing the social life of couples, separately and 
together, before marriage with their social life once married found an emerging 
pattern which was ‘not random or subject to a great deal of variation between 
couples’ and which was reflective of ‘widely held cultural expectations about the 
appropriate spheres of husbands and wives’.51 The negotiation of daily life and 
allocation of resources takes place within the home and is thus usually seen as 
a private matter, but the wider social context of the roles identified for husbands 
and wives and the marital hierarchy influences these negotiations and allows 
the husband to determine the allocation of the majority of the family’s resources 
and the determination of the amount of free time allowed each partner.52 This 
change can be attributed to ideals about married life, especially the husband’s 
ideals, and it can be further asserted that ideas about the acceptable or 
appropriate behaviour of husband and wife were based upon a patriarchal 
model which included issues of differential authority, dependence, responsibility 
and individuality. Financial support was traditionally seen as the only absolute 
commitment to marriage that a husband should make and, because of the way 
they ‘represent’ the family in the economic world, authority, independence and 
freedom of movement were all thought to be appropriate. Entertainment was 
viewed as a necessary release from, and reward for, wage work outside of the 
home, leading to the belief that it was the man’s prerogative to carry on with his 
separate social life after marriage. On the other hand, the ‘exclusive 
commitment that a woman must make to marriage underlies the initial 
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curtailment of her social life and movements and not, as is often stated, the 
demands of domestic duties’.53  
These values are still predominant in the twenty-first century despite 
larger numbers of women working for a wage outside the home. Recent surveys 
on the differences in paid work and the share of household chores and 
childcare indicate that things remain relatively unchanged since the Dobashes 
study in 1979, despite the appearance of higher formal equality for women 
within the public sphere. Whilst it must be acknowledged that many women 
claim to have chosen to focus on child-rearing rather than their jobs or careers, 
some statistics serve to demonstrate the continuing impact of women’s 
disproportionate responsibility for childrearing. A 1990 survey estimated that 
women in the UK lose around half their lifetime earning potential compared with 
men due to their continued primary responsibility for looking after infants.54 A 
survey in 1994 indicated that less than one in five mothers with preschool-age 
children were working whereas four in five fathers were.55 The same study 
found that 80% of British respondents living in a couple deemed it was usually 
or always the woman’s job to do the laundry. Interestingly in Sweden the results 
for both the latter two studies were similar,56 despite the country being thought 
of as ‘pioneering advances in sexual equality’. Figures from the Office for 
National Statistics uncovered that ‘at the end of 2012 there were just over 6000 
more full-time, stay-at-home dads looking after babies and toddlers than there 
were 10 years ago, yet in the same period, around 44,000 women have stopped 
being stay-at-home mothers. The gap this has created has been filled by 
childcare and grandparents, not fathers.’57 This indicates that men are still not 
sharing childcare. In fact, a third of men don’t take the fortnight’s paid paternity 
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leave they are entitled to58 and, although fathers have had a right to a share of 
26 weeks of paid parental leave since April 2011, 40% of fathers said they 
would not take it and almost 90% of men say they wouldn’t take more paternity 
leave if it was offered to them.59 Even when they are not working, surveys 
indicate men are not doing anywhere near an equal share of baby and toddler-
care with ‘only a third of couples… taking it in turns to get up for a new baby 
during the night… [and] one in three dads [not] regularly changing nappies, and 
a third [not] bathing their babies’.60 These figures indicate that the appropriate 
gendered roles and behaviours of men, particularly in heterosexual 
partnerships, that have developed throughout history persist in the current day, 
and as will become clear in the following section, it is these roles and 
expectations, as part of a set of wider cultural practices, that continue to create 
the conditions in which domestic violence occurs today.61 
 
 
Sources of Violent Conflicts within the Marital-Type Relationship 
 
Research demonstrates that the general themes of conflict typically leading to 
violence in marital-type relationships are: men’s possessiveness and jealousy; 
disagreements and expectations concerning domestic work and resources such 
as money; men’s sense of the right to punish ‘their’ women for perceived 
wrongdoings and the importance to men of maintaining or exercising their 
power and authority.62 This provides support for the claim that the expectations 
placed upon being masculine and feminine, particularly within the marital-type 
relationship, provide the context in which domestic violence occurs. The primary 
findings from a 1996 study in which a large sample of abusive husbands were 
interviewed support this claim as it was found that men did not believe that 
women have the same right as them to argue, negotiate or debate. Behaviour of 
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this kind was seen as a nuisance and a threat to their authority and thus 
violence was often used to silence any debate, reassert male authority and 
deny the woman any say in the affairs of daily life. Nagging, ‘going on and on’ 
and failing to ‘shut up’ were frequent reasons given for the violence and the 
exact nature and context of the conflict were often ignored or forgotten, 
indicating that violence was used to establish control and domination. Some 
examples of men’s responses to the question ‘Why did you hit her?’ also prove 
revealing in this context: ‘I was wanting to show her who was the boss’63, 
‘[b]ecause she knows how to wind me up, basically. Sometimes she doesn’t 
take “no” for an answer. Sometimes she’ll go on and on and on about different 
things’.64  
The responses to questions around the issue of what the men were 
hoping to get out of being violent also serve to illustrate that the men were not 
angry and ‘out of control’ when they used violence; it was instrumental to their 
aim of establishing control over their female partner.65 In addition, when 
questioned on what their wife or partner could have done to stop the abuse, 
participating men answered ‘[k]eep her mouth shut’,66 ‘[stop] doing things I don’t 
want her to,’67 ‘[s]hut her mouth’68 and one particularly revealing response; ‘I’ve 
battered her that many times she should know when to stop her crap’,69 
providing further support for the claim that violence is used to reassert male 
authority, and that men believe they are the one who should dominate and 
control the relationships. The findings from this study can be used to illustrate 
that the idea that it is necessary for a man to have authority over his wife or 
female partner was still thriving at this time and was used to justify men’s need 
to be in charge, even if that requires the use of violence.70 Stark’s findings, 
based on work with abused women, can be used to update the analysis 
provided by the Dobashes and show that these gendered expectations still 
operate as the context and justification for domestic violence.  
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Stark’s theory of domestic violence as coercive control71 will be 
examined fully in Chapter Seven. For present purposes, it can be noted that he 
has found coercive control to be “gendered” in its construction, delivery, and 
consequences, due to its focus on ‘imposing sex stereotypes in everyday life’.72 
His work identifies the core tactics of coercive control as consisting of rules and 
demands relating to practices that are determined by gender norms in 
relationships73 or target devalued activities to which women are already 
consigned, like cooking, cleaning, and child care.74 This means the control 
tactics can easily be confused with the expectations placed upon women in their 
traditional, stereotypical roles and are thus often seen as normal or acceptable. 
Furthermore, the ‘regulatory strategies are often disguised as expressions of 
affection’75 and love; many of men’s demands seem benign with the only clue 
that something is wrong being the victim’s sense that it is dangerous to refuse 
the request.76 The effect of this is that those who experience or witness abusive 
strategies may be unable to discern whether they are being loved or controlled. 
The next section will further consider this idea of the difficulty of distinguishing 
between love and control tactics in the context of young people’s dating 
relationships. 
 
 
Young People’s Relationships: Romantic Love or Control? 
 
In analysing the findings from empirical studies that seek to investigate the 
dynamics of dating and marital relationships, further support can be provided for 
the assertion that the root cause of domestic violence - the gendered 
expectations placed upon girls and boys and men and women within a 
patriarchal society – persist in modern times, despite appearances of greater 
gender equality.  It is still very much the case that adolescent peer norms ‘often 
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teammates, Cheryl, would “fall apart.” Cheryl’s teammates interpreted Jason’s gesture as caring. But to Cheryl, the 
message was that she had violated an agreement not to make him jealous. The sweatshirt was his warning that, 
because of her infraction, she would have to cover up her arms after he beat her. Cheryl’s “mistake” was to draw 
attention to herself by striking out the opposing batters. She quickly corrected this fault by falling apart.’ (Stark: 2009 p. 
229). 
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“require” that a young woman have a boyfriend’.77 As a result of this 
“requirement”, girls, in particular, begin to derive their sense of identity and self-
esteem from the perceived success of the relationship.78 Evidence also 
suggests that abused women tend to have very traditional ideas about what 
constitutes an achievement for a woman and base their feelings of self-worth on 
how they view their capacity to be a good wife and home maker.79 It then also 
follows that, because girls and women derive their primary sense of self-identity 
from their status as a girlfriend, wife or partner, they will attempt to justify or 
rationalise any abuse or violence that they suffer at the hands of their male 
partner in an attempt to minimise what is happening and avoid questions over 
why they remain in the relationship. This can then make it difficult for women to 
name what is happening to them as abuse or domestic violence.80  
Studies seeking to understand violence in young people’s relationships 
indicate that views on appropriate feminine and masculine roles and behaviours 
remain relatively unchanged in current times and are contributing to, if not 
causing, violence in intimate relationships to occur as an acceptable – albeit 
unpleasant – part of relationships for the next generation of men and women. 
Looking at the findings of a study conducted by Chung, it becomes clear that 
taking on ‘gendered heterosexual identities as girlfriend or boyfriend… signifies 
to peers progress towards adulthood which is associated with the successful 
performance of masculinity and femininity’.81 In order to maintain the dominance 
of hegemonic masculinity (see below), boys and men are expected, by other 
men, to behave in particular ways to their intimate partners. For example, 
Levy’s study found that peers ‘expect a “boyfriend” to be sexually aggressive in, 
domineering in, and controlling of all aspects of the relationship’.82  
As discussed above, the institution of romantic love dominates in western 
society, making it inescapable for young women, and Chung’s study found it 
has ‘a powerful influence on how young women attribute meaning to their 
experiences of dating relationships’.83 A young girl, and even a more mature 
woman, ‘may not see her relationship as abusive… [because] she may interpret 
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the violence as a sign of jealousy’ and view it as ‘a sign of love’.84 Interviews 
conducted by Chung with young people show how ‘various aspects of romantic 
love are used to divert attention away from behaviours being interpreted as 
male control of women and instead being interpreted as signs of love and 
commitment,’ for example policing of behaviour and clothes, or jealousy. 
Behaviour like this was seen as a sign of his love, not as behaviour aimed at 
control. Indeed, young men’s use of the term ‘ownership’ in relation to his 
girlfriend was not considered to indicate that he saw her as his property.85 
Violence then becomes ‘a normal way to express love’.86 In addition, the 
expectations placed upon girls and women to be the emotional caretakers of 
their relationships makes them feel ‘responsible for the success of the 
relationship and dependent upon the boyfriend for social acceptance and self-
esteem’.87  
The same individualistic discourses that are a common part of legal 
understandings of domestic violence88 can also be seen as a barrier to young 
women identifying their relationship as violent, abusive or coercive, in part 
because ‘the individualistic discourse encourages young women to understand 
violence and abuse as a problem of the individuals involved. Acknowledging a 
boyfriend was violent would represent her personal failing and inability to 
choose a suitable partner’.89 This can be attributed to an ‘unintended legacy of 
feminism that disguises and displaces the power relations that continue to 
shape young people’s intimate heterosexual interactions’ as the discourse of 
equality that young people use to explain their sexual relations.90 In addition, 
this individualistic discourse means that if a woman remains in an abusive 
relationship it is her ‘choice’ because she is an individual with free will,91 and 
this is a significant barrier to adequate legal responses to domestic violence.92 
The social context of the prevailing gendered power relations is not taken into 
account, suggesting that just as in adult relationships characterised by abuse, 
control and violence the victim is often seen to remain out of ‘choice’, the same 
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is true of young people and therefore these messages are continuing to be 
passed down through the generations. Gender inequality is hidden by the 
individualistic discourse, leaving gendered power relations that characterise the 
majority of intimate relationships relatively intact.93 
Studies such as these build support for the claim that the differing 
gender-role expectations placed upon males and females in intimate 
heterosexual relationships (as a way of maintaining a patriarchal social order) 
also underlie young people’s dating relationships. The implication of this is that 
the same cultural beliefs and social conditions uncovered by researchers such 
as the Dobashes in the 1970s and 1980s as generating the context for domestic 
violence are persisting in current times.  
  
 
Conclusion  
 
At the beginning of this chapter it was asserted that the gender role 
expectations placed upon masculine and feminine identities are one of the root 
causes of domestic violence. It was claimed that the polarisation of men and 
women, and their appropriate roles, is socially constructed and necessary for 
the sustaining of the patriarchal social order. It is not possible to have a 
dominant group without having a group seen as different and thus controllable. 
In particular, it was suggested that these gender roles support one of the key 
institutions of the patriarchal state; the family. Gendered expectations affirm 
women in their place as wife and mother and these become internalised to form 
a sense of identity. The sentimentalising of the family as a place of safety and 
security, and the ideal of romantic love, become less benign-seeming when 
they are taken as the context in which domestic abuse occurs. The expectations 
of hegemonic masculinity – for men to be strong, aggressive, assertive and in 
control – alongside expectations for women to be good wives and mothers 
through supporting men in their dominant role, legitimates male rule in the 
public and private sphere. This was seen in the analysis of the expectations of 
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dating and marital-type relationships as the context in which domestic abuse 
occurs. Heteronormativity, through the presentation of heterosexual 
relationships as ‘normal’ and desirable, is a central way of maintaining the 
institution of the family that is necessary for the continuation of a patriarchal 
society.  
Moreover, Chung’s data indicates the ways in which these gender role 
expectations serve to individualise and minimise relationship violence and 
abuse. The implication of this is that the construction of the gender role 
stereotypes that enable domestic violence to occur must be seen as integral to 
the patriarchal state, rather than explanations being offered for this type of 
violence which look to deviant or pathological individuals or family structures. 
Analysis of the dynamics and impact of domestic violence in subsequent 
chapters will challenge the prevailing views that emphasise the deviant nature 
of domestic violence94 and the pathological nature of the women who stay in 
abusive relationships. If violence in marital-type relationships is seen as a 
random deviance from the norm then everyday social life does not need to be 
addressed, only those cases that deviate from it. As will be seen in Chapters 
Five and 6, this is reflected in the legal responses to domestic violence in 
England and Wales. The existing civil and criminal justice remedies are only 
able to respond to the symptoms of domestic violence by addressing its 
occurrence in individual relationships. In Chapter 6 there will be an exploration 
of the ways in which legal responses abstract the violent relationship from its 
social context. This leads to a failure to recognise the abuse as resulting from 
the nature of the family within patriarchal society and the expectations placed 
upon the wife or female partner within this institution. Instead of being seen as a 
reflection of recurrent social relations, domestic violence then becomes seen as 
an individual problem.  
The following chapter will analyse the portrayals of women and men 
contained in pornography and pornographic representations found in more 
mainstream media and culture to assess their impact on the creation of the 
stereotypical views of appropriate masculine and femininity that it has been 
claimed are necessary for the continued maintenance of a patriarchal system. 
Pornography will be demonstrated to be legally regulated in England and Wales 
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in a way that overlooks its potential harm to women thus providing further 
support for the claim that the state acts to preserve patriarchal interests. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
PORNOGRAPHIC PORTRAYALS AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
 
Feminists have targeted pornographic representations of women as ‘symbols of 
patriarchal ideology’ and this focus has ‘served to highlight the media, and 
pornography in particular’ as a crucial site of explanation for both patriarchal 
attitudes and (sexual) violence against women’.1Though debates continue as to 
the putative harm(s) caused by negative (including overtly pornographic) 
representations of women, this chapter will claim that such images contribute to 
the maintenance of the societal and cultural conditions which enable domestic 
violence to occur.  
Part One of this chapter will provide an analysis of the conception of the 
harmful effects of pornography understood through the approach to its legal 
regulation in England and Wales. It will be seen that the legal response 
continues to be based on an obscenity standard which focuses on harm to the 
consumer, thus overlooking the harm to women as a group that results from the 
negative portrayals. Part Two will then build on the critique of this 
conceptualisation of harm and examine alternative arguments relating to the 
harmful effects of pornography on women. It will be argued that, regardless of 
whether there is a direct causal link between exposure to pornography and 
violence against women, there is still little doubt that pornography contains 
damaging messages about what it means to be a female which impact upon 
domestic violence. These messages will be seen to contribute to the polarised 
and stereotypical views of masculinity and femininity that it has been claimed 
are necessary for the continued maintenance of patriarchy. Thus, the failure to 
legally regulate pornography on an appropriate conception of harm will be 
presented as another way in which the legal system contributes to the 
conditions in which domestic violence occurs. The chapter will conclude that a 
new distinction between material considered  to be pornography and material 
held to be erotica would enable a new conception of the harm of pornography 
without reverting to arguments that see the danger of certain materials as 
resulting from their explicitness, rather than the damaging messages about 
women they contain. This distinction would also avoid siding either with 
feminists who see all sex under patriarchy as bad for women, or with 
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conservative and religious opponents whose arguments against pornography 
themselves are typically based on patriarchal views about women’s role in 
society. 
Therefore, rather than drawing a distinction between representations of 
women that are overtly pornographic (due to being highly sexually explicit) and 
images that ‘merely’ objectify, subordinate and degrade women in a sexual way 
(such as those seen in advertising and popular culture), it will be claimed that all 
sexualised images portraying women in an objectified and subordinate way fall 
on a spectrum when harm to women is assessed, regardless of the level of 
explicitness. The availability of the female body, and its compliance and 
submissiveness, pervades advertising and other forms of media and popular 
culture, and therefore ‘hard pornography’ is ‘but a variation on this theme’.2 The 
effect of all the forms of detrimental feminine imagery that infiltrate 
contemporary society is to maintain the acceptability of viewing women as 
inferior and as objects who exist for the purpose of sexual titillation.’3 They also 
promote the perception that male violence, of both a sexual and non-sexual 
nature, is acceptable – a justifiable part of men’s masculine status. Eckersley 
has emphasised that redirecting attention to so-called ‘soft-core’ pornography 
and the everyday images of women in the media enables pornography to be 
examined as a signifying practice sharing many characteristics with other more 
everyday representations of women.4 Viewing pornography as a ‘social and 
ideological construct’5 carries the implication that pornography can be ‘treated in 
the same way as any other representation in the media’6 because they all 
structure the way men look at women, meaning ‘so-called hard and soft 
pornography are not generically different’.7  
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Part One 
The Legal Approach to Pornography in England and Wales: 
The Obscenity Standard 
 
This part will examine the legal regulation of pornography under the Obscene 
Publications Act 1959 (OPA), the amendments to the Video Recordings Act 
1984 (VRA) introduced by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 
(CJPOA), and the criminalisation of the possession of ‘extreme pornography’ 
under the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (CJIA).8 Analysing the 
conceptualisation of the harm of pornography under English and Welsh law will 
reveal a continuing focus on ‘obscenity’ as the harm of pornography, rather than 
harm to women. It is acknowledged that legal regulation is not necessarily the 
best tool to use to overcome the prevalence of pornographic and degrading 
representations. Censorship under a patriarchal state can cause more harm 
than good.9 However, the failure to appropriately conceptualise and address the 
harm of pornography evident in the legal regulation of pornographic materials 
can be seen as a significant way in which the state itself contributes and 
sustains the social conditions in which domestic violence continues to thrive. 
 In taking an obscenity approach to the regulation of pornography, the 
OPA attempts to enforce certain morals through the prohibition of sex that some 
men (typically those in the ruling classes) find offensive. This focus on offence 
to consumers renders the actual women depicted and the view of women it 
perpetuates entirely invisible.10 Historically, under English and Welsh law, 
pornography has come to be associated, even defined as interchangeable with, 
‘all that is considered immoral.’11 Even the new measures dealing with ‘extreme 
pornography’ under the CJIA 2008 lapsed back into standards of obscenity and 
disgust,12 losing the opportunity to move toward a harm-based standard.13 
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The OPA only targets those who produce and disseminate obscene 
materials and does not cover possession for private use. Obscene material is 
defined in terms of a tendency to ‘deprave and corrupt persons who are likely, 
having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter 
contained or embodied in it’.14 This focus ‘clearly highlights the moralistic nature 
of this regulation’15 and there is no requirement to ‘demonstrate harm (other 
than (presumably) moral harm to the consumer)’.16 The US judge Justice 
Stewart’s famous description of his obscenity standard – ‘I know it when I see 
it’17 – was criticised by liberals as exposing that the obscenity standard is 
relative, partial and sounds insufficiently abstract. For MacKinnon, the problem 
is that his view permits an obscenity standard built on what the male standpoint 
sees. She claims that pornography is also built on this male standpoint.18 
Obscenity is sex that makes male sexuality look bad, not sex that harms women 
– obscenity law has never even considered pornography to be a women’s 
issue.19. 
The relativity of the obscenity standard is apparent in the test’s 
consideration of ‘likely’ readers or viewers;20 whether or not material is judged to 
be pornographic is relative and subjective because it is only obscene in relation 
to those ‘likely’ to come across it.21 The heart of this difficulty is that the test 
focuses on the mind of the consumer, and his morals, and makes invisible 
those who are violated in the making of the materials, as well as those who are 
injured and subordinated by consumers acting upon the messages contained 
within them.22 Obscenity is judged on community standards, i.e. what it is 
thought most people would find offensive. However, the people (men) who 
decide what these community standards are and how they should be applied 
are those with power under a patriarchal state and thus the standard applied is 
open to question.23 The legislation is designed to suppress, not eradicate, and 
                                                          
14
 Section 1(1) OPA 1959. Under the common law of obscenity, the harm of pornography is its tendency to 'deprave and 
corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands publications of this sort may fall' 
(R v Hicklin [1868] LR3 QB 360). 
15
 McGlynn and Rackley: 2009 p. 246 
16
 McGlynn and Rackley: 2009 p. 246 
17
 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 [1964] 
18
 MacKinnon: 1987 p. 148 
19
 MacKinnon: 1987 p. 175 
20
 See R v O’Sullivan (1995) 1 Cr App R 455 
21
 Edwards: 1996 p. 122. Lord Wilberforce in DPP v Whyte [1972] AC 849; [1972] 3 WLR 410 states that an article 
‘cannot be considered as obscene in itself: it can only be so in relation to its likely readers’ (para 17) 
22
 MacKinnon: 1994 p. xi 
23
 Carse: 1995 p. 158 
76 
 
does nothing to hold pornographers accountable for promoting aggression, 
discrimination and the subordination and objectification of women.  
The most that obscenity law does is address the public visibility of 
pornography. It does nothing about the harm of its production and consumption; 
the concern is virtue and vice, not women and children. The Williams 
Committee on Obscenity and Film Censorship's report24 (1979), following in the 
wake of the Wolfenden Report25 (1957), supported the liberal principle that the 
main concern of the law should be the prevention of identifiable harms. The 
report of the Williams Committee rejected the argument that pornography acts 
as a stimulus to sexual violence. The only harm it identified was the possible 
offensiveness of some materials to many people and so – in order to guarantee 
individual rights and at the same time prevent this harm – it recommended that 
items whose 'unrestricted availability is offensive to reasonable people’26 should 
be confined to special shops with blank windows, large warnings and restricted 
to those aged 18 years and above.27 By stating that the purpose of the OPA 
was to ‘prevent the depraving and corrupting of men's minds by certain types of 
writing’28 Lord Wilberforce’s judgment in DPP v Whyte29 impliedly excludes from 
its objectives the effect of hard-core pornography on the likelihood of 
commissioning rape and violence towards women. This supports the claim that 
using obscenity as the standard against which explicit material is measured 
results in the legislature and the judiciary entirely missing what the actual harm 
of pornography is argued to be. 
The CJPOA 1994 made some minor amendments to the existing 
provisions under the VRA 1984 but, as Edwards emphasises, pornography is 
still viewed as a question of morality, not harm to women, because the test is 
still the potential the material has to deprave and corrupt.30 Edwards does 
identify a development in the construction of harm under the CJPOA 1994 
where, in respect of film certification,31 the recognition of harm is given ‘statutory 
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authentication’.32 Under this legislation, harm to the viewer or consumer is 
recognised as resulting from viewing violence or pornography if certain, albeit 
unspecified, ‘behaviour’ arises from this viewing.33 Unfortunately, due to 
difficulties with interpretation of the resultant harm, the amendments to the VRA 
1984 under the CJPOA 2008 have had ‘little bite’ in practice.34 
The new offences contained under the CJIA 2008 relate directly to 
pornography, but continue to rely upon the ‘language of disgust and obscenity’35 
found under the OPA 1959; an image is ‘extreme’ if it is ‘grossly offensive, 
disgusting or otherwise of an obscene character’.36 This provision was added 
during the final stages of the parliamentary process and maintains an express 
link to the OPA by ensuring that ‘only material that would be caught by’ the OPA 
falls within the new Act.37 Using obscenity as the standard by which 
pornography is regulated reflects the contributions made by Christian interest 
groups who hold that pornography portrays a distorted and selfish view of 
sexuality due to its promotion of promiscuity. They claim that this entails a threat 
to society, thus maintaining Devlin’s 1957 commentary on the Wolfendon 
Report which inextricably links the English law with questions of morality and 
faith.38 In Part Two, conceptualisations of the harm of pornography will be 
considered and objections to using an obscenity approach to understanding the 
harmful impact of pornography will be considered in more detail. 
Despite the potential for the CJIA to ‘move from the OPA’s disgust and 
offence-based terminology toward a harm-based standard’, this approach has 
been lost.39 McGlynn and Rackley suggest that when first introducing the 
proposals in 2005, the Government appeared keen ‘to emphasise that extreme 
pornography may contribute to a cultural context in which violent sexual activity 
is encouraged or legitimated’. However the Government later came under 
pressure and ‘lost sight of the nature of the harm it was seeking to legislate 
against and reverted to the weakest possible justification for action, disgust’.40 
This is seen in Section 63 (6)(b) which defines an ‘extreme image’ as one which 
‘is grossly offensive, disgusting or otherwise of an obscene character’. The 
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original argument found in the proposals was that whilst no ‘definite 
conclusions’ could be reached as to the ‘likely long term impact of such 
materials generally,’41 extreme pornography ‘may encourage’ an interest in 
‘violent or aberrant sexual activity’42 and thus contribute to a climate in which 
sexual violence is not taken seriously.43 This concept of harm moves beyond 
arguments of immediate cause and effect to a recognition that the harm of 
pornography can be found in terms of the unequal view of women that it 
promotes. In later reverting to arguments concerning direct harm, the legislation 
reveals a return to liberal arguments and the demand for evidence of direct, 
causal links, thus ultimately ignoring feminist conceptions of the harm of 
pornography as being the harm to society resulting from the view of women 
contained within the materials.44 
In addition, to fall within the new legislation, the pornographic image must 
portray in an ‘explicit and realistic way’ an act which, among other things,45 
either threatens a person’s life,46 results, or is likely to result, in serious injury to 
a person’s anus, breasts or genitals.47 McGlynn and Rackley state the 
requirement for life-threatening and serious injury ‘reveals much about the 
legislative process’ because the Government originally proposed taking action 
against ‘serious violence in a sexual context’ and ‘serious sexual violence’48 but 
amended its proposals, apparently on the basis of the imprecision of what 
would be included within these categories.49 As a result of this amendment to 
the original proposal, excluded from these measures are pornographic pro-rape 
websites such as rapedbitch.com and rapepassion.com. Some ‘violent’ rapes 
may be covered – and McGlynn and Rackley question what a ‘non-violent’ rape 
is – if they involve weapons or result in serious injury to the anus, breasts or 
genitals, many pornographic rape images are excluded.50 This exclusion is 
concerning because, as will be claimed below, representations of rape arguably 
contribute to the perception of women as objects available primarily for the use 
of men. 
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Following on from the above argument, Part Two will consider alternative 
conceptions of the harm of pornography, both as a basis for legal regulation and 
social condemnation, which are not based on an obscenity approach. This will 
illustrate continuing difficulties with claiming that pornography is harmful to 
women due to a lack of proof of a direct causal link between exposure to 
pornography and incidents of violence against women. A conceptualisation of 
the harmful impact of pornography will be offered that contends that the 
existence of a direct causal link is irrelevant, the harm of pornography is its 
perpetuation of the damaging messages about women that bolster the 
patriarchal state and enable domestic violence to occur.  
 
 
Part Two 
The Harm of Pornography 
 
Understandings of the harm of pornography can be categorised into three 
distinct areas; the conservative-moral argument (seen above in relation to the 
legal regulation of pornography in England and Wales) that pornography is a 
threat to society due to the impact it has on consumers as a result of the 
abhorrent and ‘obscene’ view of sexuality that it promotes; radical feminist 
arguments that pornography directly causes violence against women, or is, in 
itself, violence against women; and a more general feminist argument that, 
whilst it may not be possible to prove a direct causal relationship between the 
consumption of pornography and violence against women, pornography 
contributes to a negative view of women reflective and constitutive of their 
inferior, subordinated and objectified status. Difficulties with the conservative 
arguments against pornography and the Dworkin-MacKinnon Anti-pornography 
Civil Rights Ordinance51 which formed an alliance with these arguments will be 
examined first, followed by an analysis of the causal relationship, if any, 
between pornography and violence against women. Arguments will then be put 
forward to support the claim of this thesis that pornography, and more 
mainstream pornographic images of women, contribute to the stereotypical 
perceptions of appropriate masculinity and femininity which it is suggested form 
the root cause of domestic violence. 
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Traditional Conceptions of the Harm of Pornography  
 
The debate over pornography has traditionally consisted of liberal versus 
conservative arguments, with liberals claiming that pornography has value 
because it satisfies a well-defined interest52 and needs to be protected as free 
speech. Conservatives disagree that pornography has value; ‘value is derivative 
of virtue, not interests, and pornography is an assault on virtue’ because it 
publicises things that should be private and violates norms of ‘decency’. It does 
this through the promotion of impersonal and pleasurable sex, thus promoting 
infidelity and undermining traditional family values.53 However, both agree that 
pornography is ‘victimless speech that satisfies a particular sexual interest or 
preference and constitutes an offensive assault on a traditional conception of 
sexual virtue’.54 However, as West has argued, this conceptualisation of the 
debate depends upon the male experience of pornography; the harm 
pornography does to women is very different from the harm pornography has 
been thought to cause men.55 The view that pornography promotes the 
oppression and victimisation of women was propounded by Dworkin and 
MacKinnon in the 1980s when their Anti-Pornography Civil Rights Ordinance56 
formed the basis for new legislation in the US State of Minneapolis. An 
acceptance of their conception of the harm of pornography can be inferred from 
the conclusions of the Meese Commission Report.57 However, before moving 
on to examine feminist arguments about the impact of the objectification 
inherent in pornographic representations of women, a brief exploration of the 
objectification contained within gender-role norms and their impact on the 
objectification of women is warranted. 
 
 
Gender Norms and Objectification  
 
The gender norms integral to patriarchy dictate that men should be strong, 
active, independent, rational and handsome, whereas women should be 
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passive, nurturing, emotional, cooperative, submissive and pretty. In contexts 
where gender expectations are well entrenched the corresponding norms 
function prescriptively, providing the basis for judgements about how people 
ought to act and be. This prescriptive force is backed up by social sanctions 
resulting in conformity to gender norms becoming internally motivated as 
opposed to being socially enforced.58 Despite this, the prescriptive role of 
gender norms is seldom acknowledged and instead it is concluded that the sex 
difference is natural or inevitable and woman is ‘essentially’ feminine59. 
However, particular traits, norms and identities, considered in abstraction from 
their social context, have no claim to be classified as masculine or feminine; any 
classification is derivative and depends upon prior social classifications.60 Itzin 
argues that because women are conditioned to conform to stereotyped images 
of femininity and womanhood they are often unaware that they are 
misrepresented and mistreated; the oppression becomes internalised.61  
Sexuality is both socially constructed and at the same time constructing62 
and MacKinnon argues that the relations constituting gender are, by definition, 
hierarchical; relations of domination constitute the categories. Gender relations 
are defined by and in the interests of men, and gender is ‘sexualised’;  
 
‘sexuality is gendered as gender is sexualised… feminism is a theory of 
how the eroticisation of dominance and submission creates gender, 
creates woman and man in the social form in which we know them. Thus 
the sex difference and the dominance-submission dynamic define each 
other. The erotic is what defines sex as an inequality, hence as a 
meaningful difference63’.  
 
For MacKinnon, a person is a man ‘by virtue of standing in a position of 
eroticised dominance over others [and] a woman by virtue of standing in a 
position of eroticised submission to others... [It is] not necessary that one be 
anatomically female to be a woman or anatomically male to be a man,64 
                                                          
58
 Haslanger: 1993 pp. 89-90 
59
 Haslanger: 1993 p. 90 
60
 Haslanger: 1993 p. 90 
61
 Itzin: 1992 p. 62 
62
 MacKinnon: 1987 p. 49 
63
 MacKinnon: 1987 p. 50 
64
 This point is evidenced by Donovan et al’s 2006 survey comparing domestic abuse in same sex and heterosexual 
relationships. The findings indicated that this abuse is experienced in very similar ways by both groups, suggesting that 
82 
 
though… this is the norm’.65 Furthermore, because dominance/submission is 
eroticised, ‘the submissive participant must be viewed, at least by the dominant 
participant (though often by both participants), as being an object for the 
satisfaction of the dominant’s desire… [leading to] her submissiveness to him, 
and his domination of her [being presented as] erotic’.66 If social arrangements, 
such as legal institutions, are structured in order to accommodate the different 
‘natures’ of men and women,67 this will merely reinforce existing gendered 
social roles and sustain the social arrangements whereby men dominate and 
women submit. This makes the subordination in gender inequality invisible and, 
by seeing as natural something that is actually produced by power relations, 
‘the harm that has been done will not be perceptible as harm – it becomes just 
the way things are’.68  
 
 
Objectification in Pornography and Popular Culture 
 
One of the key ways in which male dominance and female subordination is 
eroticised is through the representations contained within pornography. 
MacKinnon asserts that the recent recognition that male sexual violence against 
women is pervasive, alongside recognition that there is a distinctive pattern of 
men holding power over women in society, means that sexual violence is no 
longer able to be characterised and hidden as violence, not sex. Acts of this 
type are enjoyed sexually by men; it is sex for them.69 MacKinnon questions 
what sex is except that which is sexual and claims that understandings of sex 
must extend beyond simple recognition of a purely physiological response. Her 
argument is compelling; ‘[w]hen acts of dominance and submission, up to and 
including acts of violence, are experienced as sexually arousing, as sex itself, 
that is what they are... Violence is sex when it is practiced as sex’.70 The 
recognition that pornography represents domination and violence, that it is 
power implemented through the sexual control of women, means that sexual 
liberals focus on the arousal aspect of pornographic materials can be 
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challenged.71 The work of Stoltenberg echoes that of MacKinnon and can be 
used to argue against the liberal conception of pornography as promoting 
sexual freedom. He asserts that sexual objectification has a crucial relationship 
to male supremacy; domination and subordination – the very essence of 
injustice and unfreedom – have become culturally eroticised.72 The concept of 
sexual freedom that liberals believe is epitomised through pornography can 
then be challenged on the basis that pornography has really been about 
maintaining men’s superior status, men’s power over women, and about 
sexualising women’s inferior status. ‘[S]exual freedom has been about 
preserving a sexuality that preserves male supremacy,’73 rather than being 
about sexual justice between men and women. 
In recognising that pornography institutionalises male supremacy, it can 
thus be seen as one of the main ways in which the patriarchal state, and 
therefore the social and cultural context in which domestic violence takes place, 
is maintained. In relation to the internalisation of gender roles and expectations 
that objectify women, the hyper-sexualisation of women that is now prevalent in 
Western society74 can be seen to negatively transform the individual and 
collective identity of females. This occurs as a result of constant exposure to 
images that sustain the sexual objectification of women; the growth and 
accessibility of the sex industry – through pornography – has allowed it to 
infiltrate within various realms of society – media, advertising, fashion and so 
on. ‘The culture of pornography has been introduced and has unfortunately 
secured its home in today’s popular culture’.75 It then follows that one of the 
main ways that women know what is required of them to be successfully 
feminine is through representations and images that present women in a sex-
stereotyped way as these are a fundamental part of the conditioning.76 
Women’s magazines and advertisements are both an important source of 
images and information on femininity and, for Itzin, act as ‘agents of 
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socialisation with implications for how the gender characteristics of females are 
acquired and how the position of women in society is determined’.77  
Therefore, it is claimed that the images of women contained within 
pornography do not just express subordination, they in part constitute it; 
pornography objectifies women and makes their purpose for men; ‘women are 
sexual objects for the titillation and sexual gratification of men: objects of men’s 
lust and desire’.78 For MacKinnon, ‘pornography makes hierarchy sexy,’79 a 
sentiment echoed by Stoltenberg.80 In pornography the objectification is an act 
which subordinates women, and this same act is found in many representations 
of women within other forms of popular culture where women are portrayed as 
passive, servile, servicing men sexually, and linked with domestic servitude.81 
Pornography and other forms of sex-objectified, sex-stereotyped presentations 
do not just construct female sexuality, they are also one of the main ways in 
which normal masculinity is constructed and thus help to maintain the whole 
system of male power. As discussed in Chapter 2, masculinity is also coercively 
conditioned and hegemonic masculinity depends upon men conforming to these 
stereotypes.82 
 
 
The Causal Nexus between Pornography and Violence Against Women 
 
A difficulty in the anti-pornography movement has always been that any feminist 
who objects to pornography is immediately challenged to demonstrate the 
causal relationship between exposure to pornography and violent, misogynistic 
behaviour. Anyone who doubts the existence of that relationship is under 
pressure to concede that pornography is not a problem.83 Cornell questions the 
‘appropriateness of the causal model which traces rape as the direct effect of 
pornography’ because ‘social-scientific studies are inconclusive as to the 
relationship between pornography and rape’.84 The issue is more complex, 
however, than a simple causal connection between pornography and violence, 
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including rape; Cameron and Frazer point out, ‘causal accounts are completely 
inappropriate to explain any kind of human behaviour'.85  
Furthermore, research conducted by Diana Russell provides strong 
support to advocate a perspective which accepts that whilst pornography does 
not directly cause violence against women, it contributes to the overall 
objectified status of women as inferior and available to be violated. Studies can 
be used to support the view that pornography increases attitudes and 
behaviours of aggression and other discrimination by men against women.86 
During the hearings for the Ordinance drafted by MacKinnon and Dworkin, 
women spoke of being made to watch pornography and duplicate the acts 
exactly and psychologists who had worked with survivors spoke of the role of 
pornography in sexual torture. Laboratory experiments have shown that 
pornography which portrays sexual aggression as pleasurable for the victim 
increases the acceptance of the use of coercion in sexual relations, that 
acceptance of coercive sexuality appears related to sexual aggression, and that 
exposure to violent pornography increases men's punishing behaviour toward 
women in the laboratory.87 
 
 
A Multi-Causal Theory 
 
The conclusions of Diana Russell (reached through her own and other 
researchers’ findings) provide extensive support for a theory of the causative 
role of pornography that differs from the idea of simple causation.88 Although 
her research focused specifically on sexual violence, she believes the same 
conclusions apply to domestic and other forms of violence against women. She 
suggests that many factors may predispose a large number of men to want to 
rape or assault women sexually;89 in order for rape to occur a man must not 
only be predisposed to rape, his internal and social inhibitions against acting out 
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his rape desires must be undermined. Her theory differs from simple 
causation90, under which pornography clearly does not cause rape because an 
unknown percentage of pornography consumers do not rape women and many 
rapes are unrelated to pornography. However, the concept of ‘multiple 
causation’ provides a strong case for there being some link between 
pornography and (sexual) violence against women. Under multiple causation, 
'various possible causes may be seen for a given event, any one of which may 
be a sufficient but not necessary condition for the occurrence of the effect, or a 
necessary but not sufficient condition.91 Russell’s arguments in relation to the 
role of exposure to pornography in terms of objectifying women, acceptance of 
interpersonal violence and desensitising males to rape are important to 
consider. Feminists have frequently emphasised the role of objectification in the 
occurrence of rape92 and other (sexual) violence against women. Russell notes 
that 'the dehumanisation of women that occurs in pornography is often not 
recognised because of its sexual guise and its pervasiveness… It is important 
to note that the objectification of women is as common in nonviolent 
pornography as it is in violent pornography’.93 This again supports the idea that 
the proposed distinction between erotica and pornography should be taken on 
board, because nonviolent pornography is as damaging as violent pornography 
in terms of the objectification of women. The multi-causal theory lends further 
support for the contention that even if pornography does not directly cause 
violence against women, its consumption does contribute to a cultural climate in 
which objectification and violence against women are sexualised and 
normalised. 
 
 
Pornography: Recognition of Indirect Harms 
 
The conception of the harm of pornography contained within the Meese 
Commission Report of 1986 can be seen to blend the differing conceptions of 
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harm advanced in ‘feminist anti-pornography rhetoric’ and conservative 
ideology’.94 The Commission was asked to ‘review the available empirical 
evidence on the relationship between exposure to pornographic materials and 
antisocial behaviour’.95 Imputed in their conclusions is MacKinnon’s causal link 
between exposure to pornography and rape. For both MacKinnon and Dworkin, 
pornography is violence against women. MacKinnon asserts that ‘in 
pornography the violence is sex.’96 By challenging the classic liberal argument 
that pornography must be protected in the interests of free speech in a 
democratic society and asserting that pornography must be seen as violence, 
inequality and objectification, MacKinnon is challenging the label of 
pornography as being about sex. This enables some feminists to emphasise 
that pornography has been disguised as being about something other than it 
really is.97 This type of feminist analysis has been influential in terms of shifting 
the emphasis away from morality and obscenity to reconstituting pornography 
as an issue of women’s rights.98  
However, a key difficulty with the work of MacKinnon and Dworkin is their 
view that all heterosexual sex is subordinating and objectifying. Strossen has 
argued that the pro-censorship feminists assertion – that sexually explicit 
expression perpetuates demeaning stereotypes about women – itself 
perpetuates demeaning stereotypes. The most significant of these being ‘that 
sex is inherently degrading to women’ and that there is a ‘mutual inconsistency 
between a woman’s freedom and her participation in sexual relations with 
men’.99 This is not a position consistent with the end of women’s repression and 
degradation. Cornell also challenges the assumption that all heterosexual sex is 
subordinating and asserts that anti-pornography feminists such as MacKinnon 
and Dworkin ignore the way that we are all sexual beings and that, whilst not 
always recognised as such, sex and sexuality are unique and formative to 
human personality.100 In contrast to MacKinnon, Cornell emphasises 
‘unleashing the feminine imaginary,’101 rather than constraining men. It is 
anticipated that the reconstituted boundary between the erotic and the 
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pornographic proposed below will enable the free expression of women’s 
sexuality in a way that is compatible with their equality. 
 
 
The Meese Commission Report 
 
Whilst the Meese Commission Report concluded that there is a causal 
relationship between exposure to many forms of pornography and harmful 
effects including increased levels of violence against women, an analysis of the 
conclusions of the report reveals several key difficulties. The Commission’s 
reliance upon arguments that making sex public and commercial, depicting sex 
outside of marriage and love, and depicting certain acts of sex that may be 
condemned by society, could be harmful to the moral environment of society 
demonstrates that it is the conservative conception of the harmful impact of 
pornography, rather than feminist conceptions that are relied upon. In their 
individual statements, the commissioners can be seen to make all the traditional 
conservative arguments against pornography: pornography publicises that 
which should be kept private;102 it violates norms of ‘decency;’103 it promotes 
promiscuity;104 it promotes sex-for-pleasure instead of sex-for-reproduction;105 it 
constitutes an assault on family and marriage;106 and it legitimates 
irresponsibility, hedonism, laziness, impersonal sex, and infidelity.107 West 
claims that the report results in a feminist-conservative argument against 
pornography that is ‘neither feminist nor conservative but a peculiar blend of 
both’.108 This alliance could be seen as a positive move for those working to end 
violence against women because it enables the recognition that, whilst 
pornography is an attack on virtue, it is also ‘a threat to women’s physical safety 
and integrity’109 and thus incorporates feminist objections to pornography in 
mainstream understandings. However, whilst the report ‘adopts much of the 
argument and rhetoric of the feminist anti-pornography movement,’110 the 
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Commission’s final analysis defines actionable pornography ‘by reference to a 
traditional obscenity standard, not a feminist subordination standard’.111  
Therefore, it is suggested that this alliance is actually more concerning 
than promising to the feminist anti-pornography movement because the 
conservative-religious ideology is one of the central mechanisms of female 
oppression and subordination due to the messages it perpetuates about 
appropriate masculine and feminine behaviour and its privileging of 
heterosexual marriage. Allying with this movement means the goals of the 
feminist anti-pornography movement will ‘become identified in the popular mind 
with conservative goals and conservative ideology, rather than with feminism 
more largely conceived’. Anti-pornography feminists are concerned about 
pornography because it oppresses women, not because it is an ‘assault on 
institutions that conservatives regard as essential to the maintenance of social 
virtue – the family, marriage, monogamy, and heterosexuality’.112 It is imperative 
that women’s physical security does not become linked with sexual virtue, 
marriage and the family because the gender-role stereotypes implicit in this 
conception of women’s place and value provides the social and cultural context 
in which domestic violence flourishes. There needs to be a way of 
conceptualising the harm of pornography without also bolstering patriarchal 
ideology concerning gendered expectations and the appropriate roles and 
behaviours of women under this social system.  
Alongside this are further concerns about the nature of the material that 
the Meese Commission Report deems to be actionable; all 92 
recommendations call for greater restrictions on sexually explicit material. 
However, Linz, Penrod and Donnerstein contend that much research 
demonstrates that it is sexually violent material, rather than sexually explicit 
material that results in violence against women.113 These depictions are 
‘pervasive in the mass media’ and ‘need not be sexually implicit to have a 
negative impact’.114 Linz, Penrod and Donnerstein suggest that ‘the level of 
sexual explicitness need not attain a level anything like that which would be 
judged "obscene" or "pornographic" in order to find harmful effects’.115 This 
indicates that the focus of the anti-pornography movement is misplaced, and 
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lends support to a new distinction between erotica and pornography and for the 
recognition that society is inundated with images and representations that 
degrade and objectify women, with pornography being just one of the fora in 
which this occurs. 
 
 
Pornography’s Harm: Perceptions of Women 
 
The debate over pornography has traditionally been fought in terms of the issue 
of offence and obscenity, and this is clearly still the case even with the new 
offences relating to ‘extreme pornography’ under the Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Act 2008 (CJIA) (examined above). The argument here is that, 
whether or not there is a direct causal link between exposure to pornography 
and violence against women, it is essential that the emphasis shifts to an 
understanding of the issue as being one of harm to women, not harm to 
consumers and the ‘moral fabric of society’.116 ‘Harm’ should be seen in broader 
terms, extending ‘beyond direct physical injury and coercion to the contempt for 
and degradation of women collectively, as women’.117 When considering 
whether pornography impacts upon women in a way that threatens their status 
as independent and equal, the possible impact that the use of pornographic 
materials has on attitudes and behaviour in our society must be examined. It is 
contended that the harm of pornography is the role it plays in ‘sustaining the 
social conditions through which women’s liberty and equality are undercut’.118 
When taken from the perspective of the mainstream conception of harm, the 
harm of pornography is generally misunderstood or its true nature is 
overlooked.  
It has been argued that the ideas contained within pornography and 
other representations of women in popular culture are one of the main 
mechanisms by which human sexuality has been constructed. At the heart of 
pornography is the fantasy of dominating and totally controlling another, and the 
users of pornography (‘millions of normal men’119 ) take this fantasy as integral 
to their self-identity as ‘real men.’ According to Ramos, human sexuality 
                                                          
116
 Carse: 1995 p. 165 
117
 Carse: 1995 p. 165 
118
 Carse: 1995 p. 155 
119
 Jones: 2000 p. 116 
91 
 
researchers have clearly established what individuals find arousing is almost 
entirely learned and culturally influenced.120 To deny the relationship between 
pornography and attitudes, and attitudes and behaviours, is to deny the 
standard conceptions of learning.121 Even without empirical proof, it is widely 
accepted in a range of circumstances122 that there is a causation, or at least a 
correlation between an act and certain types of behaviour.123 Due to 
pornography’s influence on mainstream culture, it will impact sexuality even 
without direct consumption.124 It can also be seen to impact on women’s 
desires; when women’s sexuality is represented in pornography it is in terms of 
their pleasure at fulfilling male desires, not their own.125 Humans are 
conditioned and shaped by the expectations put upon them, and the things they 
may be persuaded that they want, need and desire, for example through media 
and advertising. It therefore follows that women’s responses are likely to be 
conditioned by what society tells them they should find arousing,126 which could 
explain why some women may appear to embrace the messages about 
sexuality contained in pornography.  
In addition, women will be conditioned by other forms of popular culture 
such as advertising, women’s magazines and books, music videos and so on. 
Women’s magazines contain ‘a meaning of femininity that is tied to the 
everyday activities and beliefs of women that bring this meaning into being and 
thereby sustain it’.127 The advertisements, articles and stories that appear in 
women’s magazines can be characterised as ‘vehicles of women's socialisation 
into subordinate roles’128 because they ‘affix meanings to our everyday 
experiences as women that support patriarchal and capitalist interests in the 
subordination of women’.129 Gender and sexuality, viewed as social constructs, 
are ‘situated in and shaped by patriarchal cultural myths as articulated in 
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popular culture’.130 Currie’s study into young girl’s perceptions of femininity in 
advertisements reveals that they assess what womanhood is and how they 
match up to it through representations such as these. Their definitions of 
femininity are shaped in this way; girls ‘become women naturally through 
domestic and sexual roles’.131 The young girls in the study associated 
happiness with motherhood and being married, an association previously 
highlighted as providing part of the social context in which the gender-role 
stereotypes that enable domestic violence can occur. Cultural images of 
femininity, masculinity and female-male relationships have an enduring nature. 
As a result, ‘the portrayal of men as powerful and women as powerless and 
constantly trying to entertain, please gratify, satisfy and flatter men’132 or their 
portrayal as decorative objects in traditional and stereotypical roles,133 remain 
consistent themes. Pornographic representations embody and encourage a 
distinctive way of “seeing” women, both reflecting and fostering an ojectified 
view of women134 that can be seen to be held by both men and women in 
contemporary society. 
 
 
A New Distinction between Pornography and Erotica 
 
Anti-censorship feminists, such as Cornell, wish to counter the dangers 
associated with sex not by censoring images of women as sexual objects but by 
challenging the central assumptions about sexuality which determine sexual 
ideology in our culture. Women should be free to be sexually expressive, they 
should not have their sexuality repressed.135 Feminists arguing against 
censorship wish to challenge the equation of sexual arousal with degradation 
and many of them believe that the only lasting road to women's liberation is the 
general strengthening of the position of women in society. Feminists arguing for 
censorship are opposed to pornography per se because of the messages about 
women it contains and the harm that this causes. As seen above, calls for 
censorship have led to limited and potentially dangerous alliances with 
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conservatives and religious groups who oppose pornography for very different 
reasons. When the contribution that pornographic images of women makes to 
domestic violence is considered, this debate causes problems. This is because 
viewing pornography as unproblematic ignores the impact it has on perceptions 
of women more generally, but calling for pornography to be banned can be 
seen as a refusal to recognise the importance of sexuality to human growth and 
development.  
Therefore, at present, there seems to be a lack of recognition that it is 
possible to condemn pornography without calling for censorship of all sexually 
explicit imagery. The social construction of gender discussed earlier involves a 
denial of the feminine aspects of human nature in order to be a ‘real man’. This 
suggests that the sexual objectification and violence inflicted on women in 
pornography expresses hatred and contempt for a denied component of the 
males own soul – the natural, feminine component.136 Griffin sees ‘true 
eroticism’ as the answer to the denial of feminine qualities in men and vice 
versa. Her understanding is that eros, represented through erotica, enables the 
masculine and feminine components of the soul to be fused in harmony.137 
Pornography has been argued to be a direct denial of the power of the erotic; it 
represents the suppression of true feeling and emphasises sensation without 
feeling. The word ‘erotic’ comes from the Greek word ‘Eros’, meaning the 
personification of love in all its aspects. There are frequent attempts to equate 
pornography and eroticism but they are two diametrically opposed uses of the 
sexual.138  
It is suggested that calling for a new distinction between pornography 
and erotica, which recognises that erotica is sexually explicit material which 
embraces equality between the sexes and true sexual freedom would be a way 
to overcome these difficulties.139 The new distinction would not be based on 
sexual explicitness per se, but on whether the material contains representations 
that degrade, subordinate and objectify women in a sexual context. Crucial to 
the designation of material as “pornographic” would be that the abuse or 
degradation depicted is also, even if only implicitly, endorsed or 
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recommended’.140 Erotica would encompass all ‘sexually suggestive or arousing 
material that is free of sexism, racism and homophobia and is respectful of all 
human beings being portrayed.’141 The implication of this would be that much 
material generally held to be ‘pornography’ could be included within the 
definition of ‘erotica’. This would avoid lending support to conservative and 
religious opponents of pornography who object to it based on sexual 
explicitness and obscenity, rather than harm to women. The acceptance of 
erotica would enable material that contributes to the creation and maintenance 
of the gender-role stereotypes that are integral to the maintenance of patriarchy 
to be condemned without supporting patriarchal messages about the need to 
repress women’s sexuality and promote monogamous heterosexual 
relationships as the only acceptable expression of sexuality. Sexualised images 
and representations of women found in more mainstream media and advertising 
that objectify and degrade would be condemned as pornography if they 
contained damaging messages about women, regardless of sexual explicitness. 
Elements of sexually explicit material to eradicate would be those that bolster 
the hostile, misogynistic elements of male sexuality, leaving risqué material that 
enhances people’s lives through the positive promotion of free and equal sexual 
expression free from condemnation and legal regulation. Calling for a new 
conceptualisation of the distinction between erotica and pornography enables 
true sexual liberation to be attained by calling for an end to the imagery which 
conveys damaging messages about women but not on the basis of sexual 
explicitness per se. 
There would clearly be difficulties with this definition because no sexual 
imagery can be given one universal meaning; individuals must interpret and 
respond to material in order for it to have meaning for them, and this by its very 
nature will always be subjective.142 However, with the more extreme forms of 
pornography, for example where violence against women is portrayed and 
endorsed, this will be less problematic, and even if there are sometimes 
difficulties over where a particular type of depiction fits, it is submitted that 
overall the new categories would enable a more successful and positive 
conceptualisation of the harm of pornography. 
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Conclusion 
 
The argument being developed in this chapter was that the difficulties inherent 
in the legal approach to the regulation of pornography in England and Wales 
constitute one of the ways in which the conditions which enable domestic 
violence to occur are perpetuated by the state. Part One demonstrated that 
legal regulation continues to be on the basis of whether the materials are 
‘obscene’, assessed on the basis of whether they are offensive, not whether 
they harm women. The moralistic approach taken in the OPA was seen to still 
be evident in the most recent attempt to regulate pornography under the CJIA. It 
was argued in Part Two that this conceptualisation of harm overlooks the impact 
that the availability of pornography has on discrimination and violence against 
women. The harm of pornography was then considered from the perspective 
that it causes increased levels of violence against women. Harm was presented 
as likely even in the absence of a direct causal link; exposure to pornography is 
likely to lower men’s inhibitions against perpetrating violence against women. 
This direct link does remain questionable but it was then contended that this 
does not mean pornography should be regarded as victimless; regardless of 
whether a direct or indirect causal link can be proved, it is asserted that 
pornography is damaging to women as a group. This is clearly the case due to 
the patriarchal messages it contains concerning women’s value and status as 
compared to men. These message encourage the further polarisation of men 
and women and their appropriate roles, bolster sex role stereotypes, and 
present women as the appropriate victims of male power and control. These 
messages support the continuance of domestic violence as they support the 
gendered expectations that underpin the continuation of the patriarchal state.  
In conceptualising the harm in terms of obscenity, rather than harm to 
women, the legal response itself continues to perpetuate the same type of 
potentially damaging messages that are contained in pornography. The focus 
on obscenity and offence renders the harm to women invisible, in the same way 
that the objectification of women in pornography becomes invisible because it is 
seen as based on ‘natural’ differences between the sexes. The need to avoid 
allying with anti-pornography proponents who themselves perpetuate damaging 
messages about women is evident; the condemnation of pornography must not 
be based upon the notion that it undermines the institutions of family and 
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marriage. The expectations placed upon these are in themselves damaging to 
women. It is suggested that the new distinction between erotica and 
pornography proposed would enable the harm of pornography to be 
conceptualised in a more appropriate way and form a better basis for legal or, in 
light of potential difficulties with legal regulation, societal regulation. This could 
go some way toward reducing the negative messages pornography perpetuates 
about women.  
The following chapter will present an analysis of the ways in which the 
state further contributes to the creation and maintenance of polarised images of 
men and women. This will be done through the examination of statutory and 
judicial constructions of human beings as gendered, and the roles and 
behaviours assumed appropriate to each sex. This analysis will thus support the 
claim that one way in which gendered expectations are created and sustained is 
via legal understandings, and will provide the basis for the discussion of the civil 
and criminal justice remedies for domestic violence in subsequent chapters. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF GENDERED EXPECTATIONS 
 
It has been shown that domestic violence continues to play a role in maintaining 
the cultural and social arrangements that sustain patriarchy. As a result of this 
social function, it is suggested that the legal system of England and Wales, as 
one of the key institutions that sustains the current social order, is one of the 
main contributors to the causes of domestic violence itself, insofar as it 
perpetuates the norms and expectations placed on masculinity and femininity 
that create the context in which domestic violence occurs. Therefore, exploring 
and analysing judicial statements in relation to the treatment of men and women 
will provide further support for the claim that the legal responses are not simply 
ill-equipped to seriously address domestic violence, this inadequacy is actually 
functional; when viewed as part of the patriarchal state, the legal system’s 
overall response to domestic violence can be seen in terms of promoting the 
values that maintain the current status quo. Thus legal responses do not simply 
fail to adequately address domestic violence, they can also be seen to 
contribute to the norms and understandings that create the conditions for this 
type of abuse to occur in the first place.  
Support for this assertion will first be provided by examining the 
construction of human beings as gendered beings found within judicial 
statements, and the gendered stereotypes that persist in understandings of 
appropriate feminine and masculine behaviour. An analysis of legislation and 
case law will then follow, revealing a heteronormative stance and a continuing 
preference for particular family types – those that sustain a patriarchal system. 
The final section of this chapter will reveal the continuing assimilation of 
womanhood with being a wife and mother found within legal understandings of 
appropriate gender roles. All these factors help to perpetuate the acceptance of 
the expectations placed upon women to enter into the marital-type relationship 
and to take on certain roles and exhibit certain behaviours once they have done 
so. The law is a very powerful normative discourse and thus its construction of 
the ideal Woman as a wife and mother, its promotion of monogamous 
heterosexual marriage and its normalisation of the nuclear family, all have a 
clear influence on internal motivations to conform to imposed gender norms. 
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Regulation of the family is a major concern of the state,1 despite its 
protestations that this is a site free from legal and political regulation and 
interference. Policies ‘in areas which impinge on the family and which are 
expressed in legislative, judicial and administrative provisions construct a 
particular family form. The nuclear family… is an expression of these policies’.2  
 
 
Part One  
Gender Stereotypes: The Law’s Construction of Gender Differences 
 
It was argued in Chapter Two that the social construction of gender differences 
based upon biological sex create gendered expectations concerning 
appropriate masculine and feminine behaviour. It was further claimed that these 
expectations constitute the conditions in which domestic violence can occur. 
This section will use judicial constructions and interpretations of the law found in 
the appellate courts to support the assertion that these are one of the main 
ways in which these gendered stereotypes persist. The focus is on the appellate 
courts as these are the only places where there is a full record of the judgment 
(apart from when the appeal judge quotes the trial judge) but it is likely that the 
same or similar attitudes are held by juries and judges in trial courts. 
 Despite a number of legal and policy changes aimed at reducing gender 
discrimination in recent decades – for example the replacement of the common 
law partial defence of provocation with loss of control3 and new guidelines in 
place for the judiciary on the use of gender stereotypes4 – some elements of 
such discrimination suffuse legal culture and are thus particularly resistant to 
eradication. The gendering of human characteristics as being either male or 
female, and the persistent prevalence of views that men and women’s different 
natures determine which roles they take on and which characteristics they 
exhibit, is evident in a number of cases which will be examined  below.  Gender-
norms promote behaviours and attributes which appear to the individual subject 
to underpin their social acceptance and allow them to excel in these sanctioned 
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gender roles.5 As Smart states, the law may not malevolently confirm women in 
their discursive place as women – the argument presented is that it does, 
intentionally or not.6 When these gender norms and expectations stop being 
seen as the natural and desirable role for women, and instead are taken as the 
context in which domestic violence occurs, the assumptions made about gender 
roles and characteristics evident in judicial statements can be seen to play a 
central role in the perpetuation of this type of abuse even whilst purporting to be 
trying to deal seriously with the issue.  
Despite the fact that training provided by the Judicial College now 
explicitly warns against the use of sexual stereotypes because ‘it is important to 
be aware of the wide diversity of women’s experiences’,7 it is clear that ‘senior 
judges in England and Wales do indeed still at least sometimes employ crude 
and problematic sexual stereotypes in their judgements or overlook the use of 
such stereotypes by trials judges’.8 The overt use and continuing acceptance of 
these stereotypes as unproblematic may indicate that when judges avoid using 
them they are merely paying ‘lip service to “correct” forms of behaviour or use of 
language while not accepting that such forms or language have any valid 
basis’.9 It then becomes ‘inevitable that stereotypes will surface in their speech 
or writing from time to time’10 which may in turn indicate that ‘these sexual 
stereotypes are seen as unproblematic at a wider level within at least certain 
leading elements of the legal profession in England and Wales’.11 This means 
that sexual stereotypes based on men and women’s assumed biological 
differences may still be permeating judicial decisions and influencing the 
outcomes, even when politically correct forms of speech are used. Legal 
institutions are positioned on the ‘hierarchy of knowledge’ and are thus a 
powerful discourse with a strong influence on social roles and behaviours.12 A 
stereotype ‘does not need to be widespread in order for it to be important if the 
person wielding it is in a position of power over others, and appellate judges are 
clearly in this position’.13 
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Thirty years ago the use of crude sexual stereotypes was more 
widespread within the judiciary, for example Lord Denning’s notorious statement 
that ‘you cannot alter the fact that women are quite different from men. The 
principal task in the life of women is to bear and rear children… He is physically 
the stronger and she the weaker. He is temperamentally the more aggressive 
and she the more submissive. It is he who takes the initiative and she who 
responds. These diversities of function and temperament lead to differences of 
outlook which cannot be ignored’.14 Although this statement was made over 30 
years ago, it will now be shown that beliefs pertaining to the different natures of 
men and women, based on assumed biological differences, persist to this day 
and permeate the responses of the legal system.  
Whilst stereotypes can be problematic because they lead to 
discrimination against people who are perceived as failing to conform to them,15 
the intention here is to demonstrate the ways in which the legal system, through 
influential judicial statements, constructs men and women in accordance with 
assumed masculine and feminine characteristics, thus providing support for the 
claim that the law is one of the key institutions creating the expectations of 
gender roles that are integral to the context of domestic violence. Elements of 
the judgments from four key cases from the last 15 years suggest that the law 
continues to construct masculinity and femininity based upon commonly 
accepted inherent biological differences. The first is R v Smith (Morgan),16 a 
case concerning the old partial defence of provocation,17 where Lord Hoffman 
made a sweeping generalisation that the ‘hormonal development of male 
adolescents is different from that of females’ implying that girls develop 
emotional maturity earlier than boys and can thus be expected to have a higher 
standard of self-control than boys. This aspect of Lord Hoffman’s speech, at 
least, still represents the law.18 It may be that the claim is supported by scientific 
studies, but he does not refer to any, and ‘the matter is not clear-cut and Lord 
Hoffman does not appear to see anything problematic about making a sweeping 
assertion about hormonal differences between boys and girls’.19  
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Also on the issue of the level of self-control expected of the reasonable 
man, Lord Nicholls in Attorney General for Jersey v Holley,20 stated that the 
‘powers of self-control possessed by ordinary people vary according to their age 
and, more doubtfully, their sex’.21 The Holley decision ‘is premised upon the 
notion that there are significant differences between males and females as a 
group in terms of their powers of self-control’22 thus enabling the jury to apply 
any preconceptions they might already have with regards to gender and to use 
any sexual stereotypes that they deem appropriate when reaching their 
decision.  
The trial judge in Bonser v UK Coal Mining Ltd23 also made a statement 
based upon the supposed biological differences between men and women; 
‘[b]earing in mind that… she was a woman and the rest men, I would expect the 
reasonable man to have said: ‘If this continues she will crack up,’24 thus 
indicating that he ‘partially reached his decision upon the basis of a perceived 
inherent biological difference between men and women’25 as a result of the 
assumption that women are more likely to “crack up”. The trial judge did not 
mention power differentials between the sexes and therefore his reference to 
the sex of the Claimant was purely due to supposed biological differences.26 
In a statement reminiscent of Lord Denning’s famous 1980 utterance in 
Ministry of Defence v Jeremiah27 that ‘[a] woman’s hair is her crowning glory, so 
it is said. She does not like it disturbed: especially when she has just had  a 
‘hair-do’,28 in DPP v Smith29 Cresswell K’s judgment included the statement that 
‘[t]o a woman her hair is a vitally important part of her body’.30 This ‘invokes the 
notion that women are obsessed with their hair’31 and further implies that this is 
not necessarily the case for males. His failure to qualify his remarks (by saying 
‘some’ or ‘many’ women) indicates that he was ‘confident enough to make a 
sweeping generalisation about women, as if the matter were unproblematic’.32  
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These judgments demonstrate that ‘certain senior judges are still willing 
to openly employ questionable sexual stereotypes in their judgments or [are] 
reluctant to challenge the use of these stereotypes [and] there may be many 
more judges who are willing to covertly use these sexual stereotypes in their 
legal decision-making’.33 Through the continuing use of sexual stereotypes 
about the inherent differences between men and women, it can be seen that the 
judiciary and other influential legal figures are contributing to the creation of the 
perception of human beings as gendered; English legal culture continues to 
work on the assumption that terms such as ‘femininity’, ‘gender’ and ‘sexuality’ 
(social and legal constructs which are not fixed and immutable) are fixed,34 thus 
playing a key role as a dynamic constructing force in understandings of these 
central terms. 
 
 
Sexual Stereotypes and the Acceptability of Male Violence  
 
Chapter Two explored conceptions of masculinity and the impact that these 
have on the occurrence of domestic violence. This impact was claimed to be in 
part due to the expectations placed upon men, through hegemonic masculinity, 
and its promotion of male aggression and dominance as normal and natural. It 
was further highlighted that it is not just the acceptability of male violence 
against women under a patriarchal system that is problematic, but the 
acceptability of certain levels of male-on-male violence generally. One of the 
ways in which hegemonic masculinity can be seen to be maintained is through 
the legal construction of masculinity apparent within the criminal justice 
system’s response to male violence.35 Analysing judicial understandings of 
inter-male violence indicates a widely held belief that certain types of male 
behaviour, including violence in some situations, is an expected and acceptable 
aspect of manhood. By effectively allowing men to be violent in some 
circumstances, the criminal law replicates and produces social conceptions of 
masculinity by constructing male violence as normal and natural.36 Bibbings 
argues that the general legal condoning of male violence may affect the 
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outcomes of cases and sentencing decisions for violent offences and, within the 
appellate courts, may impact upon judicial constructions of the law itself.37 
This judicial construction can be seen in the category of ‘horseplay’ as an 
exception to the general legal principle that consent is not a defence to the non-
fatal offences.38 The very existence of this category as a defence to the infliction 
of harm indicates the view that a certain level or type of male violence is to be 
expected. In R v Jones39, the appellants were charged with causing grievous 
bodily harm when two boys were thrown into the air and seriously injured upon 
landing. It was held that they were entitled to have the defence of horseplay left 
to the jury so that the jury could acquit them if they thought that the appellants 
had been ‘merely indulging in “rough and undisciplined play” with no intent to 
injure, and in the genuine belief that the victims were consenting’.40 Although 
the court felt that the jury in Jones might have rejected the idea that the boys 
had merely been indulging in ‘rough and undisciplined play’ in the present 
context,41 the decision, and the use of the word merely, implies ‘that schoolboys 
are assumed to accept a certain degree of risk as a result of their status as 
boys.’42 This effectively makes the question of consent legally irrelevant 
because the focus is exclusively on whether the perpetrator believed there was 
consent.  
A similar argument was successful in R v Aitken,43 a case involving three 
appellants and G who were RAF officers at a party where there was heavy 
drinking and some ‘horseplay’ which included setting light to the fire resistant 
suits of two officers. When G decided to go to bed, the appellants set fire to his 
fire resistant suit, severely burning him. The appellants were charged under 
Section 20 OAPA and the judge directed the court that the action would be 
unlawful if it went beyond the horseplay that was normal on such occasions.44 
Their appeals were allowed because G had taken part in the horseplay and 
other activities during the evening and it was therefore ‘possible that G’s 
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continued presence was an acceptance that such an activity might be 
perpetrated on him and an indication that he consented to such an action.’45 
Again, it was held on appeal that the question for the jury should have been 
whether the appellants genuinely believed that G was consenting, again 
rendering his actual consent legally irrelevant.46 The notion of a normal and 
acceptable level of violence that amounts simply to horseplay reveals much 
about conceptions of appropriate, or at least acceptable, masculine behaviour. 
These cases indicate the type and level of male violence the courts appear 
unwilling to criminalise, even when there is no proof of the victim’s consent.47 In 
Jones there was evidence that both boys resisted48 and in Aitken it was noted 
that G tried to resist but could only do so weakly because of his drunken state49 
and yet it was held that there was implied consent as a result of the context in 
which the violence occurred.  
Contrasting these cases with R v Brown50 where it was held that consent 
was not a defence to charges under Sections 20 and 47 OAPA in the context of 
a group of men engaging in sado-masochistic activities, reveals a privileging of 
certain types of masculinity within judicial constructions. The tone of the 
judgments in all three cases suggest that, whilst horseplay ‘was assumed to be 
a quintessentially male activity’51 that was normal, even ‘manly,’ for boys and 
men to engage in, gay sado-masochistic activity was unnatural and not in the 
public interest.52 The implication of these cases is that extreme levels of male 
violence are to be expected and are allowed,53 provided they take place within a 
context which supports appropriate, or hegemonic, masculinity. The implication 
of this for the judicial treatment of domestic violence is that, as long as male 
violence is constructed in judicial understandings as normal and to be expected, 
the acceptability of male violence per se will not be challenged. This enables 
the persistence of assumptions that men are naturally violent, thus continuing to 
undermine attempts to change legal attitudes towards men who are violent 
towards women.54 
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Part Two 
Legal Promotion of Hetero-normativity: the Privileging of Marriage 
 
In continuing to focus on the legal system’s implicit sustaining of a patriarchal 
system, cases and legislation will now be examined in relation to the claim that 
the legal system is based upon a privileging of heterosexual marriage, 
something that can be seen to contribute to the maintenance of the patriarchal 
state, of which domestic violence has a primary function. This privileging will be 
shown firstly through the legal regulation of cohabitation, secondly through the 
regulation of artificial reproduction, and finally by the way lesbian and gay 
couples are treated in legislation and by the judiciary.  
Barlow and James have noted that whilst the social acceptance of 
heterosexual cohabitation has been achieved almost universally, the legal 
vulnerability of cohabiting families continues to be addressed only through ad 
hoc, piecemeal reforms which have left the law in this area in a state of 
uncertainty and complexity.55 They suggest that the most obvious problem with 
this area of law is that ‘whilst heterosexual cohabitation may in certain situations 
confer legal rights, there is no universal definition of cohabiting relationships 
which confer legal status. Broadly speaking, inclusion has been reserved almost 
exclusively… for the most marriage-like relationships, where a man and woman 
are living together ‘as husband and wife’’.56 A classic case demonstrating this 
legal privileging is Burns v Burns57 which, despite being heard in 1984, still 
represents good law. In this case, even after 19 years of unmarried cohabitation 
during which time she raised two children, worked part-time and paid some of 
the household bills, Valerie Burns was unable to establish either an express or 
inferred ‘common intention’ which could found a constructive trust under which 
she and her partner shared ownership of their family home. She was therefore 
left without beneficial interest in the home which was under her partner’s name 
and there was no legal redress available to her. This is in direct contrast to 
spouses, where ‘family assets may be redistributed on divorce whether or not 
there are minor children, and largely regardless of the original ownership of 
assets’.58 
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The difficulties encountered in recent years as a result of new technology 
enabling artificial reproduction (so that it is not a straightforward case of 
pregnancy and childbirth making a woman a mother) and the Parliamentary 
debates and provisions of the legislation concerning the issue, serve to further 
illustrate the privileging of particular family types over other, less conventional 
forms. The Parliamentary debates concerning the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990 (HFEA) demonstrate a clear hetero-normative stance on 
sexuality and relationships. Originally, Ann Winterton proposed that single 
women should not be inseminated unless they could bring forward a man to 
stand as a social father. Although the proposal to criminalise the treatment of 
unmarried women was defeated in the House of Lords, this was only a narrow 
defeat, and the 1990 Act made concessions to this viewpoint in that artificial 
insemination was restricted to ‘deserving couples’ who fitted the stereotype of 
the nuclear family. The original Act included the requirement that the welfare of 
any potential child be considered prior to treatment, ‘including the need of that 
child for a father,’ 59 and although this was amended in the 2008 Act so that the 
provision now requires consideration of the need for ‘supportive parenting’60 
(alongside recognition that this does not necessarily include the need of a father 
figure),61 the original wording and Parliamentary debates that led to the creation 
of the Act betray a clear belief held by those involved with the drafting of the 
legislation that a child needs a father figure.62 Alongside this belief runs the 
assumption that mothers need husbands or long-standing partners and thus 
affirms heterosexuality as the norm.  
Beresford identifies a less obvious assumption underlying these debates; 
women should be heterosexual, or at least live a heterosexual lifestyle, and the 
report produced by the Committee of Inquiry which led to the original Act does 
reflect clear concern over what assisted reproductive technologies would mean 
for the ‘traditional family’. The Committee’s report stated ‘[a]s a general rule it is 
better for children to be born into a two-parent family, with both father and 
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mother’.63 This carries the implication that motherhood is not just about the 
relationship between the woman and her child, but also about the woman’s 
relationship with her husband or male partner. McCandless and Sheldon 
conceptualise the original text of Section 13(5)64 as a ‘refusal of single 
motherhood and a desire to link women to men.’65 ‘Law is therefore unable to 
perceive mothers as being separate legal beings from the husband or male 
partner’.66 McCandless and Sheldon believe the Parliamentary debates and 
original text of the Act ‘suggest that parliamentarians were less concerned with 
the need to ensure a financial provider or hands-on (male) carer than they were 
with the symbolic value of ensuring children were born into (quasi) marital 
units.’67 
The amendments to the 1990 Act in this context that were introduced by 
the 2008 Act must be acknowledged, but it also must be recognised that the 
Parliamentary discussions that took place prior to its introduction indicate that 
the ideology underlying this issue remains the same. As McCandless and 
Sheldon suggest, ‘the reworded section does not represent a significant break 
from the previous law as it had been interpreted in practice’.68 This is perhaps 
because clinics were generally ‘reluctant to use Section 13(5) as a convenient 
way to withhold treatment from certain people, it could have been assumed that 
‘the deletion of the “need for a father” from Section 13(5) was a matter of 
nothing more than updating the legislation to bring it in line with clinical 
practice’. In reality, it proved highly controversial which is itself revealing about 
persistent ideas of appropriate family types and the need for father figures, 
particularly on the part of those involved in legislative reform in the UK. 
Members of the Joint Committee discussing the proposed amendment 
recommended that the phrase be replaced with the requirement of 
consideration of the “need for a second parent”69 and although they held that 
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they were not discriminating against single women seeking treatment, in reality 
it does not seem possible ‘to prefer a two parent family while not thereby failing 
to prefer other family forms’.70 According to the chairman of the JC ‘[i]t must be 
an ideal to bring a child into the world with two supporting parents. Mustn’t it?’71 
Parliamentary debates saw reference being made to the ‘naturalness’ of 
families with two parents; ‘Children flourish when nurtured in a family with two 
parents of the opposite sex who work together and complement each other. 
That is God’s design and intention. We see from research that the pattern that 
God has laid down for fatherhood is necessary,’72 and ‘The law as it stands 
provides an important safeguard for the unborn child, [by] recognising and 
promoting the generally accepted notion of the ideal family unit – the one 
designed by nature, that of a mother, father and child,’73 and ‘it is a natural thing 
for a family to consist of a man and a woman who have children’.74 Despite the 
Governments proposal for the 2008 Act to require consideration of the need for 
‘supportive parenting’, Parliaments concern with the ‘symbolic message… sent 
out by this reform’75 is highly revealing. McCandless and Sheldon suggest that 
the new section ‘reflects the same kind of anxieties about the shape of the 
family and the role of men within it as were in evidence in the late 1980s’.76 The 
debates over this section of the Act indicate that the law’s conception of the 
appropriate family type as consisting of two heterosexual partners is still very 
much in existence and is still a powerful influence on norms and expectations.77  
On appeal, in the case of C v C (Custody of Child)78, a case concerning 
the custody of a child born within a marital relationship but whose mother 
entered a lesbian relationship after the subsequent divorce, the way in which 
the judges deal with the lesbian relationship is particularly revealing in the 
context of the privileging of heterosexuality within legal understandings. It was 
held that ‘it was axiomatic that the ideal environment for the upbringing of a 
child was the home of loving, caring and sensible parents: the mother and 
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father’.79 The use of the term ‘axiomatic’ gives the impression that this is ‘a truth 
about which there is no need to explain or justify, despite the fact that this ‘truth’ 
is challenged factually by the increasing diversity of family forms’.80 When this 
ideal could not be maintained due to separation, the court recognised their role 
in deciding which of two possible alternatives was preferable for the child’s 
welfare and that they had to choose the alternative closest to the ‘ideal’.81 They 
held in this case it was the home of the father and that the lesbian relationship 
of the mother needed to be taken into account when determining what was best 
for the child; ‘[i]f her home was to be with the father, it would be normal by the 
standards of society’. Balcombe LJ stated that it was ‘undesirable that this child 
should learn or understand at any age the nature of her mother’s relationship82’ 
and that in our society it is still the norm that children are brought up in a home 
with a father, mother and siblings (if any) and, other things being equal, such an 
upbringing is most likely to be conducive to their welfare’.83  This case clearly 
demonstrates that a same-sex relationship ‘remains a factor which must be 
explained away or overcome.’84  In B v B (Minors) (Custody, Care and 
Control)85 a lesbian mother was seen to wish for her son to be brought up on a 
heterosexual basis, perhaps because she was aware that this would work in her 
favour when it came to the decision over custody. Judge Callman stated the 
importance of distinguishing between mothers who were ‘private persons’ who 
did not believe in advertising their lesbianism, and those who were militant, 
implying that those who did not advertise their lesbianism were less likely to end 
up with homosexual children. Apparently expert evidence was regarded as 
necessary, and was accordingly adduced, to show that there is ‘no systematic 
evidence to suggest an increased incidence of homosexuality among the 
children of homosexual parents’.86 Thus heterosexuality was affirmed as the 
norm, homosexuality as deviant.  
These cases demonstrate ‘the power that the idea, if not the reality, of 
the heterosexual nuclear family continues to hold in English custody law’.87 
Although they were decided more than twenty years ago, more recent case law 
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indicates that, despite the possibility of Civil Partnerships and Marriage for 
same-sex couples,88 the privileging of the heterosexual marital relationship and 
the gender roles that constitute this type of relationship continue. For example, 
in the joined appeal cases of Re G; Re Z (Children: Sperm Donors: Leave to 
Apply for Children Act Orders)89 sperm donor or biological fathers were granted 
leave to apply for contact despite the wishes of the lesbian mothers who were 
the legal parents. Despite the fact that Parliament had decided, through the 
HFEA 2008, to provide explicitly that men in circumstances like these should 
not be treated as parents,90 the judges held that, due to their relationship with 
the children, the sperm donors could apply for contact. This decision seems to 
indicate that, despite legal reform and increased societal acceptance of 
‘alternative’ family types, there is a continuing privileging of the nuclear family 
type and the ideology that children need involvement from two parents of 
opposite sexes.  
 
 
Part Three 
 The Natural Role of Women: Wives and Mothers 
 
Legal understandings, particularly those within legislation and the judiciary, can 
be seen to play a central role in creating the expectations – internal and 
external – that girls are ‘born’ to be ‘wives’ and mothers.91 Beresford highlights 
that since at least the eighteenth century women’s chief vocation has been 
defined as ‘motherhood’ with the words ‘mother’ and ‘woman’ becoming 
synonymous. These gendered expectations have been presented as forming 
the context in which domestic violence occurs, and thus legal constructions of 
women as mothers, and understandings of the traits of a ‘good’ mother, can be 
analysed through a series of cases to provide support for the argument that 
legal understandings play a central role in the creation of the conditions in which 
domestic violence occurs. 
Recent judicial understandings of the appropriate roles of men and 
women can be traced back to Lord Denning’s statement in Watchel v Watchel 
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(No. 2)92 that ‘[w]hen a marriage breaks up there will thenceforward be two 
households instead of one. The husband will have to go out to work all day and 
must get some woman to look after the house - either a wife, if he remarries, or 
a housekeeper, if he does not. He will also have to provide maintenance for the 
children. The wife will not usually have so much expense. She may go out to 
work herself, but she will not usually employ a housekeeper. She will do most of 
the housework herself, perhaps with some help. Or she may remarry, in which 
case her new husband will provide for her. In any case, when there are two 
households, the greater expense will, in most cases, fall on the husband than 
the wife’.93 Thus women are affirmed in their natural place as homemakers and 
domestic servants who, in return, are provided for by their husbands. In C v C 
(discussed above), the trial judge commented that ‘there are differences 
between a mother’s relationship with a child and a father’s relationship with a 
child’ which verges on ‘invoking a maternal presumption, rather than looking to 
the actual relationship’94 between C and the father and mother.  
Lord Millett’s dissenting judgement in MacFarlane v Tayside Health 
Board95 (a case on wrongful conception) and the academic analysis that follows 
is illuminating with regard to the attitudes of the judiciary and much of legal 
academia about the ‘naturalness’ of pregnancy, birth and motherhood. In this 
case, a woman became pregnant after a vasectomy was negligently performed 
on her husband. The majority of the Law Lords ‘simply argued that the negligent 
treatment to which Mrs McFarlane had been subject had resulted in pain and 
suffering and that was enough on which to base the claim’.96 (The couple could 
not claim for the costs of raising the child and here the court can be seen to be 
imposing its pro-life stance and conception of “the good” by viewing something 
the couple did not want to happen as objectively beneficial).97 Witting, a 
prominent academic (male) has supported Lord Millet’s dissenting position that 
‘the women in wrongful conception cases should not be compensated for pain 
and suffering in relation to the birth because conception and pregnancy is 
“natural”.98 Richardson finds it interesting that an ‘appeal to what is “natural” can 
operate as the basis of an argument that no harm has been done as a result of 
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negligence which produced a result clearly unwanted by the woman’.99 Several 
of Witting’s comments demonstrate the appeal to ‘an image of women as 
defined by natural status and not their own choices’; ‘[i]n McFarlane, the 
mother’s conception was an entirely natural event that her physiological 
constitution was designed to induce and accommodate… Most women are only 
too glad to avail themselves of the opportunity to conceive and give birth at 
some stage in their reproductive lives… Her organs continued to function in the 
way that “nature intended”’.100 Here it can clearly be seen that members of the 
judiciary, supported by legal academics, find it hard to conceive of a woman 
who is not, and does not wish to be, a mother. This perpetuation of a 
stereotypical view of women, supported by appeals to “nature”, serves to 
demonstrate the law’s complicity in sustaining the conditions in which domestic 
violence occurs.  
The JSB guidance on sexual equality issues warns judges not to make 
assumptions about women’s lives101 and yet here there is evidence that these 
types of assumptions are still made. Whilst assumptions such as these may 
help individual women, they ‘draw upon, and reinforce, objectionable notions of 
stereotypical femininity’.102 A further recent case, Re G (Children) (Residence: 
Same-Sex Partner),103 further indicates the acceptance of views about women 
being best placed to care for children, thus continuing to affirm them in this role 
because it is natural. Lord Nicholls held in this case that ‘the court should 
always have in mind that in the ordinary way the rearing of a child by his or her 
biological parent can be expected to be in the child’s best interests’104 and Lord 
Scott held that ‘Thorpe LJ failed to give the gestational, biological and 
psychological relationship between CG and the girls the weight that that 
relationship deserved. Mothers are special’.105 Baroness Hale agreed and 
stated that ‘the fact that CG is the natural mother of these children in every 
sense of that term, while raising no presumption in her favour, is undoubtedly 
an important and significant factor in determining what will be best for them’.106 
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Whilst not always recognised as such, marriage itself is a highly 
controlled legal arrangement in which a woman’s identity and sexuality is further 
defined by the rules which prescribe how it should be done i.e. it is voluntary, for 
life, heterosexual and monogamous.107 In addition, for the marriage to be legal, 
the woman must conform to very strictly prescribed sexual behaviour because 
marriage is consummated108 through ‘ordinary’ sexual intercourse, defined as 
intercourse which is ‘ordinary and complete’ penetration of the woman by the 
man.109 The emphasis on the determination of the validity of a marriage through 
consummation reveals a ‘continuing dependence on notions of ‘proper’ 
sexuality and its function within marriage’ and this ‘reliance and dependence 
upon male penetration of the female demonstrates the narrow judicial 
understandings of the expression of sexual identity’ and ‘a definition of sexuality 
[itself] is [also] implied…. Legal culture prescribes precisely how a woman’s 
sexual identity should be expressed within marriage and it does this by sole 
reference to the male’.110 Within a ‘phallocentric culture’ sexuality is always 
seen to be heterosexual and sex becomes penetration.111 It is submitted that 
this expectation contained within the law is damaging to women because it 
implies that they are only fulfilled in a monogamous relationship where the male 
is dominant. This perpetuates the social pressures on women to be in a long-
term or marital relationship, making it hard for them to see their identity as 
separate from their relationship with their male partner. This enables both men 
and women to continue to place expectations on women in terms of the role 
they must fulfil within the relationship, argued in Chapter Two to be the context 
in which domestic violence occurs. 
The law’s assumption that ‘motherhood’ is automatically linked to 
heterosexuality, and the implications of this in terms of the expectations and 
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demands it places on individual women to be in this type of relationship (as well 
as the assumptions it makes about appropriate roles of each sex in these types 
of relationships), becomes even clearer when the legal perspective on ‘lesbian 
mothers’ is considered; this concept is an oxymoron from the perspective, 
considered above, that ‘real’ mothers are wives, and therefore lesbian mothers 
become legally invisible. The courts preoccupation with the sexual lifestyle of 
the lesbian mother, as seen in the case of C v C where Lord Balcombe stated 
that it would be undesirable for the child to learn or understand at any early age 
the nature of her mother’s relationship,112 reveals a belief underlying the 
operation of the law that women should not be sexual beings unless a man is 
present. Under the law, sexual intercourse is defined as penetration. The 
Sexual Offences Act 1967 contains no mention of lesbianism and there are no 
laws on the age of consent. Therefore, it seems there is an emphasis on 
preventing men from engaging in homosexual sex, indicating the importance of 
men’s heterosexual masculine identity. This desire to protect men from 
homosexuality can be seen in the fact that homosexuality was not 
decriminalised until 1967113 and there was not an equal age of consent for 
homosexual and heterosexual sex until 2000.114 The aforementioned case of R 
v Brown can also be seen to indicate the desire to protect men from 
homosexuality when a majority of the House of Lords chose not to extend the 
list of exceptional categories where consent can be a defence to harm under 
the OAPA to homosexual sado-masochistic activities on the grounds, amongst 
others, that it was not in the public interest and that sado-masochism was ‘cruel’ 
evil, uncivilised and served no social use.115 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
One of the foundational claims this thesis seeks to support is that domestic 
violence continues to perform a key function within the social system of 
patriarchy. Chapter One emphasised the historical perspectives of the socially 
embedded nature of domestic violence and presented arguments for its role in 
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maintaining male domination and control. Chapter Two then explored the social 
construction of gender differences and how the expectations concerning 
appropriate masculine and feminine behaviour, particularly within the marital-
type relationship, provide the context in which domestic violence occurs. 
Following on from these views, this chapter has sought to demonstrate the 
ways in which the legal system itself, as a key institution within a patriarchal 
society, can be seen to contribute to and sustain the underlying causes of 
domestic violence through the construction of appropriate gendered roles, 
informed by a heteronormative stance on relationships and family types.  
  An analysis of judicial constructions of gender stereotypes and 
appropriate masculine and feminine behaviour have highlighted that sexual 
stereotyping and assumptions about typical masculine and feminine behaviour 
are still widespread within the appellate courts. In judicial utterances, legislation 
and Parliamentary debates are also seen explicit and implied approval for 
certain types of family set-ups; those that preserve the interests of a patriarchal 
system. Confirming women in their ‘natural’ place as wife and mother, and 
presenting the two categories as mutually exclusive, was demonstrated as a 
further way that statements made by the judiciary promote heteronormativity 
and appropriate gender roles. This was evidenced not just by the treatment of 
heterosexuals under the relevant legislation and its interpretation by the 
judiciary, but also in conceptions of lesbians and homosexual men. 
The expectations of the roles and behaviours appropriate to each gender within 
the patriarchal family system were identified in Chapter Two as part of the 
underlying cause of domestic violence. It can thus be seen that the legal system 
itself, whilst purporting to protect women from abuse, actually contributes to the 
perpetuation of the conditions necessary for that very abuse due to its role in 
the social construction of gender. The next two chapters will examine the 
remedies available to victims under the civil and criminal justice systems in light 
of this critique of the root causes of domestic violence.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CIVIL LAW REMEDIES FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
 
The second chapter concluded with the suggestion that it is the expectations 
placed upon masculine and feminine identities, particularly in the context of the 
marital-type relationship, that can lead to the conditions in which domestic 
violence occurs. The previous chapter then presented an analysis implicating 
judicial and legislative constructions of gender in the continuation of these social 
conditions. In furthering these arguments, this chapter will analyse the 
understandings of domestic violence found within the civil law remedies (and 
areas of civil law, such as housing and child contact proceedings, where the 
presence of domestic violence impacts upon the application of the law) to 
provide support for the claim that these gendered expectations prevent there 
being an adequate response to domestic violence within the civil justice system. 
It will also be claimed that civil law remedies take an individualistic approach to 
the problem; typically responsibility for taking steps to deal with the abuse is 
placed on the victim, rather than conceiving of the problem in a broader social 
context. Through examination of judicial attitudes concerning male property 
rights and female responsibility for provoking the violence, it will be 
demonstrated that gendered stereotypes, in part constituted by the legal 
construction of ‘appropriate’ femininity and masculinity, persist within the civil 
law responses. The critique of the legal responses to domestic violence 
contained in this chapter and the following one, which examines the criminal 
justice response to domestic violence, will also highlight that legal 
understandings typically rely upon physical violence as the defining feature of a 
relationship characterised by domestic violence,1 rather than understanding the 
range of strategies men typically use in an abusive relationship. This will 
provide the foundation for the claims made in Chapter Seven that this focus is 
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misplaced and occurs, in part, as a result of the failure to see the social function 
of domestic violence.  
 The last 40 years have seen the framework governing the civil law’s 
response to domestic violence undergo many reforms and it is therefore useful 
– in terms of providing an analysis of the reasons its responses continue to be 
limited – to examine historical research findings separately from those 
concerning more recent civil justice measures. This will illustrate that many of 
the old difficulties and misconceptions are still apparent, preventing the reforms 
from having their desired impact in terms of protection and prevention. The 
effectiveness of the legal remedies for this type of violence first began to be 
assessed from the 1980s. Part One will examine the civil law remedies prior to 
the implementation of the Family Law Act 1996 (FLA) and Part Two will 
examine the remedies post-implementation of the FLA, including the 
criminalisation of breaches of civil protection orders under the Domestic 
Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 (DVCVA). Then Part Three will analyse 
understandings of domestic violence found in other areas of the civil law: 
housing provision, legal aid and child contact proceedings. 
 
 
Part One 
The Civil Remedies Prior to the Family Law Act 1996 
 
Prior to the Family Law Act 1996 courts were often reluctant to intervene where 
domestic violence was alleged, especially in terms of excluding the perpetrator 
from ‘his’ home.2 Courts were also reluctant to attach a power of arrest to 
measures under the old law,3 as seen in the case of Horner v Horner4 where 
Lord Ormrod stated that ‘to attach a power of arrest to an injunction is very 
serious because it exposes the husband to immediate arrest’. Hester et al 
suggest this reluctance probably results from the fact that, due to the operation 
of the public/private divide, arrest was seen as a draconian measure involving 
the police unnecessarily in a civil and family matter.5  
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Early studies6 and analysis of case law from this time reveal that the 
accounts of male perpetrators were more likely to be believed than those of 
female victims. A bare denial of allegations was often enough to offer a viable 
defence in contested applications for injunctions, whereas the victim’s claims 
had to be vigorously corroborated and were often trivialised. For example the 
case of Richards v Richards7 where the trial judge found the allegations to be 
“rubbishy” and “very flimsy indeed” and it was stated that, alongside these trivial 
allegations, the fact that ‘she has had a number of affairs in the course of the 
marriage, whereas nothing adverse to the husband has been found,’8 meant 
that she was not in need of protection. It is suggested that the conduct of the 
wife, and conceptions of appropriate feminine behaviour, such as fidelity, was 
one of the considerations influencing whether or not the victim was seen as 
deserving of legal protection.9 Under Radford’s analysis, judges tended to give 
more weight to men’s counter-allegations than women’s corroborated claims 
and a presumption of disbelief shifted the emphasis to the woman’s role as 
precipitator of violence and away from her need for protection. Judges were 
also seen to add to the unsympathetic treatment that women already received 
from their own lawyers in some instances.10 In Barron’s 1990 study, the judges 
interviewed demonstrated little sympathy with victims of violence in many 
cases. They also emphasised the draconian nature of exclusion orders and that 
they would rarely grant them ex parte even though they were allowed to, 
indicating concern for the man’s “right to reply”.11 This made it hard for women 
to obtain occupation orders, with considerations of the perpetrator’s 
accommodation needs12 sometimes resulting in him being given several weeks 
to leave the shared home.13 The needs of victims were also often undermined, 
for example a judge interviewed in Barron’s study stated ‘[i]t’s amazing how 
these women do cope for a week or a bit longer.’ 14 The need for serious 
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physical violence to occur to justify legal intervention was also apparent; 
‘[p]erhaps if she came hobbling in on crutches or something’.15  
Analysis of case law at this time reveals judicial reluctance to exclude 
perpetrators from the family home because this would interfere with male 
property rights.16 This is clearly seen in the cases of B v B (Domestic Violence: 
Jurisdiction)17 and Cantliff v Jenkins18 where injunctions excluding a violent 
male partner from the shared home were discharged due to the male’s right of 
property. These cases were later overruled by Davis v Johnson19 on the 
grounds that preserving violent men’s property rights was contrary to the 
intention of Parliament; the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 
(DVMPA) was introduced for the very purpose of protecting women subjected to 
violence.  
In Davis v Johnson it was held that Section 1 of the DVMPA should not 
be limited to those with a proprietary interest if there was ‘the evil of domestic 
violence.’20 Lord Denning’s sympathy for the woman subjected to violence is 
clear; he described the abuse in detail and, in relation to the shelter she fled to, 
used phrases such as ‘the conditions there are said to be deplorable’ and 
‘[n]othing could be worse for this battered wife and child - or any other battered 
wife for that matter - than to have to take refuge there.’21 However, the focus on 
physical violence as the defining feature of an abusive relationship is clear from 
his statement that the phrase “battered wives” was ‘invented to call the attention 
of the public to an evil... when a woman suffered serious or repeated physical 
injury from the man with whom she lived’.22 Lord Scarman’s judgment in this 
case interpreted molestation as extending beyond physical violence to conduct 
that would make it ‘impossible or intolerable… for the other partner, or the 
children, to remain at home.’23 However, it is submitted that without a judicial 
understanding of the dynamics and impact of domestic violence as being the 
need to maintain control over the victim, and the impact this may have on the 
victim, the conduct of the perpetrator – such as the use of credible threats which 
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have meaning only in the context of the abusive relationship24 – may not be 
understood to be molestation, even under this wider definition. The introduction 
of the DVMPA and the judgment in this case indicates that at this time there 
began to be Parliamentary and judicial concern over domestic violence, but the 
focus on severe physical violence would have left many women without 
recourse to a legal remedy in the form of an order excluding the perpetrator 
from their home.  
In a later case, Horner v Horner,25 menacing letters were held to amount 
to molestation, but when it came to attaching a power of arrest to the non-
molestation order granted under Section 1(a) of the DVMPA, Lord Ormrod held 
that, in accordance with the legislation, a power of arrest could only be attached 
‘if the judge is satisfied that the other party has caused actual bodily harm to the 
applicant, or to the child, and considers that he is likely to do it again.’26 Whilst 
behaviour such as accosting his wife at the railway station, hanging scurrilous 
posters about her on the school railings where she worked, and making 
repeated phone calls to her place of work amounted to a nuisance and was 
‘annoying’ and ‘embarrassing,’27 no power of arrest would be attached because 
it was not violent and did not cause actual bodily harm. The fact that there had 
been violence in the past was not taken into account and the harassment was 
deemed to be ‘personal idiosyncratic behaviour.’28 This indicates a definite lack 
of judicial understanding of the impact of non-physical violence. Alongside this 
can be seen trivialisation and minimisation of the harassment through the use of 
the terms ‘annoying and embarrassing’ and the way it is attributed to 
‘idiosyncratic’ behaviour, rather than termed threatening or menacing.  
The apparent reluctance over exclusion orders can be traced back to 
gender stereotypes of women as passive and dependent on their male partners 
and the time when women had no income or property of their own and were 
seen as the property of their husbands. Domestic contributions and childcare 
were not (and still are not) valued as much as financial contributions to the 
family home and therefore the male was seen to have property rights in a 
shared home because he had financially provided for it. This reluctance also 
clearly reflects the impact of the law’s withdrawal from the private sphere, 
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perhaps for political reasons, which led to – and was reinforced by – the widely 
held view that violence and abuse within the home is ‘a private matter’ which 
the state should not intervene in.  
Despite variation in the background and type of work solicitors 
undertake, it has still been asserted that the legal profession at this time was, as 
a whole, strongly masculine, with both male and female solicitors’ approaches 
being aggressive, assertive, and, critically for domestic violence victims, lacking 
in empathy (traditionally seen as a feminine quality).29 As Finley has argued, 
men of law are taught to think, live and work in a particular way30 and so to be 
part of law women must also be taught to think in this way. Law does not 
become an ‘androgynous language’ just by training women to become adept at 
this way of male thinking, it simply means that women have learned this male 
language, in the same way as people are able to learn a foreign one.31 
Radford’s study in the 1980’s found that solicitors – the ‘gatekeepers’ to the civil 
remedies for domestic violence victims – often discouraged victims from 
pursuing legal remedies and women generally reported very negative 
experiences of their own solicitors.32 She also found a strong presumption 
among solicitors, even those representing the victim, that the victim had done 
something to precipitate the violence, reflecting the long-held beliefs of law and 
society that women are provoking and deserving of the violence. Findings at 
this time also suggested that because the victim’s experience had to be 
translated into legally understandable language, solicitors had to present an 
account relevant to the court. Presenting a ‘good case’ had to take precedence 
over describing the victim’s experience in her own words, and although this was 
often done for the victim’s benefit (and not because they were not believed) it 
still resulted in women feeling undermined and discredited by the court process. 
Women also reported that solicitors were reluctant to apply for injunctions on 
their behalf unless they also took the more irrevocable step toward obtaining a 
divorce by initiating proceedings.33 This illustrates the likelihood that solicitors 
lacked an adequate understanding of the dynamics of domestic violence and 
the risk of post-separation violence.34 
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Part Two 
The Civil Remedies Post-Implementation of the Family Law Act 1996 
 
Part IV of the FLA came into force in October 1997 and remains the main 
legislation providing civil law remedies for victims of domestic violence. It 
provides for two types of civil protection orders: occupation orders35 and non-
molestation orders.36 However, despite new legislation, it seems that the 
judiciary found it hard to break from traditional views that ‘excluding a man from 
his home is a ‘draconian’ solution’37 and that women are in some way 
responsible for the violence perpetrated against them. Most of the issues that 
arose were in association with the implementation of the legislation, as opposed 
to with the actual substantive law. It is thought that the problems identified with 
the civil justice system prior to the FLA continued because the same personnel 
remained responsible for providing protection under the new legislation. The 
embedded nature of the attitudes of those responsible for the implementation of 
the legislation demonstrate the continuing misconceptions and prejudices that 
act as obstacles to victims gaining satisfactory protection from domestic 
violence under the civil law. The role of the solicitor as ‘gatekeeper’ to the legal 
remedies remained as important under the FLA as it was at the time of the 
earlier studies. The quality of legal advice, the level of familiarity the solicitor 
had with the legislation, and practitioners perceptions of domestic violence 
remained vital in terms of victims being able to access the remedies.38 
In light of the fact that it was the implementation of the law that was 
problematic, it would have been unsurprising if the FLA initially brought little 
change; ‘[c]hanging the legal rules does not necessarily mean a change in the 
court culture and values of the legal profession’.39 However, a study by Edwards 
did find some aspects of the new legislation to be more effective, with an 
increase in the number of occupation orders granted and a dramatic increase in 
the use of powers of arrest.40 However, she concluded that the new Act was 
probably not as effective as anticipated with one of the main difficulties being 
the financial cost of seeking an injunction due to changes in public funding 
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criteria at the time the act was introduced.41 Edwards also suggests that judges 
became reluctant to grant non-molestation orders in cases where they would 
have been legislatively required to attach a power of arrest and did not wish to 
do so,42 suggesting that the idea that domestic violence is not a criminal matter 
persisted. Whilst Edwards concluded, from statistical analysis of the granting of 
protection orders since the FLA, that the new measures were more effective 
because they brought all the remedies under one Act,43 the problem remained 
that enforcement depended upon breaches by the perpetrator of the protection 
orders being taken seriously by the police and the judiciary. In addition, the FLA 
does not provide effective remedies for non-physical abuse and, despite the 
definition of molestation being potentially broad44 respondents in a study by 
Burton et al reported difficulties in obtaining orders. They also reported an 
impression given by some solicitors that there needed to be evidence of 
physical injury before they could seek a remedy; ‘the whole range of abusive 
behaviours is little understood by people who advise, but particularly judges and 
magistrates… The whole debate has been kaleidoscoped down to one view, did 
he/she/they hit you and what was the severity of the injury’.45 Solicitors 
themselves stated that they would find it difficult to justify an application for 
public funding for clients who had not experienced some physical violence and 
injury. This view was then reinforced by the Legal Services Commission who 
stated that ‘public funding would not be considered urgent for non-physical 
abuse and that medical evidence would be required to document the fact that 
mental abuse was having a serious impact on the victim’s health’.46 Legal 
personnel appeared to have no understanding of the typical dynamics and 
impact of an abusive relationship; as will be shown in Chapter Seven, physical 
violence is often just one type of behaviour employed to gain power over the 
victim. There is also evidence that the police were not acting appropriately on 
powers of arrest attached to injunctions, perhaps because they were unclear 
which parts of the injunction had a power of arrest attached. It was thought that 
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there would be more clarity in this area following the criminalising of all 
breaches under the DVCVA, considered below.  
Early case law under the FLA reveals a continuing reluctance to grant 
exclusion orders because of a perception that occupation orders remained 
‘draconian’ and were only justified in exceptional circumstances. In Chalmers v 
Johns47 it was held that the trial judge had been right to find that the case barely 
came within the ambit of domestic violence, despite the fact that the police had 
been called to the couple’s home four times in the year before the applicant left 
with her daughter. This misconception meant that it was not appropriate for 
such a draconian order to be made, indicating that initially not enough weight 
was being given to the applicant’s need for protection under the new legislation. 
In B v B (Occupation Order)48 there was serious physical violence to the 
applicant. Even so, the likelihood of harm to the two children involved was more 
influential than the risk to her, despite the Court of Appeal’s protestations that 
the FLA was ‘designed to protect cohabitants from domestic violence and to 
secure their safe occupation of previously shared property; nothing in the 
judgment should be read as weakening that objective.’49  
Lord Justice Ward made it clear in Re Y (Children) (Occupation Order)50 
that ‘the eviction of a co-owner of a matrimonial home is a Draconian remedy. It 
is a last resort and is not an order lightly to be made. That was the position 
before the 1996 Act and it remains the position now, as this court has confirmed 
in the matter of Chalmers v Johns.’51 Then in G v G (Occupation Order: 
Conduct)52 not only were exclusion orders again stated to be ‘draconian and 
only to be made in exceptional cases’53 but the friction between the parties was 
attributed to their ‘incompatible personalities’54 and therefore, as the wife had 
‘not suffered any violence at the hands of the husband’,55 an exclusion order 
was held to be inappropriate, thus overlooking the potential for abuse of a non-
physical violent nature to be occurring.56 The combined effect of Re Y and G v 
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G seems to indicate that occupation orders will be difficult to obtain in the 
absence of serious physical violence. 
The case of Re H (A Child) (Contact: Domestic Violence)57 (discussed in 
more detail in the context of child contact proceedings, below) may have been 
overturned on appeal and heavily criticised by the Court of Appeal, but, as Lord 
Justice Wall himself stated ‘very few cases reach this court, and when one 
does, we have no means of knowing whether it is an aberration or the tip of a 
particular nasty iceberg’.58 Aside from the difficulties this case raises in terms of 
the failure to follow guidelines59 relating to child contact when there has been 
domestic violence, Judge Cockroft – in the court of first instance – can be seen 
to rely upon and invoke many stereotypical assumptions concerning domestic 
violence. His judgment contains stereotypical conceptions of female provocation 
making the victim somehow deserving of violence, obvious bias against the 
mother with disbelief of her allegations against her husband and assertions that 
she exaggerated the violence. In addition Judge Cockroft can be seen to 
minimise and trivialise the violence by asserting that the assault was a one-off 
occurrence because it was the only one for which there was medical evidence. 
This latter point ignores the fact that women typically endure 35 assaults before 
first seeking help.60 The judgment minimises the assault by using the phrase 
‘just an ugly and sustained assault’ and holds the mother responsible for the 
violence inflicted on her; ‘[t]his is not a violent man, it is a man who was driven 
to lose control wholly exceptionally in circumstances that I have outlined, for 
which mother is principally responsible.’61 Although this decision is heavily 
criticised by the Court of Appeal for all the reasons suggested above, it is 
concerning that such extreme prejudicial attitudes and assumptions are 
operating at the lower court level. The privileging of the perpetrator’s evidence 
over that provided by the victim apparent in earlier case law such as Richards v 
Richards is also apparent in Re H; Judge Cockroft dismissed evidence provided 
by the wife, apart from that for which he had medical evidence, and accepted 
the husband’s denials of the other incidents.62 
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Analysis of this case also indicates a lack of understanding about the 
duress and coercion typically imposed upon a  victim of domestic violence; in 
his statement concerning the mother ‘breaking the promise which the father 
made her swear on the Koran not to tell anybody about the assault’ Judge 
Cockroft held that the father was ‘instantly ashamed at what he had done and 
did not want it to go any further, showing proper remorse after losing his temper 
and control.’63 This reveals a failure to appreciate that domestic violence is so 
often a hidden crime and that victims are often coerced into hiding the abuse 
from family, friends, the police and other helping institutions. Judge Cockroft is 
implicitly critical of the mother for breaking the promise and putting her own 
position above her religious duty,64 therefore implying that the mother should 
not have told her family about the abuse because she was bound by her 
promise not to disclose it. 
Furthermore, this reveals concerning attitudes regarding female 
responsibility for the violence inflicted upon them. A failure to understand the 
coercion victims are often placed under not to disclose abuse is also apparent, 
together with views that male violence is often an understandable and out of 
character outburst resulting from provocation, and the view that victims often 
exaggerate the violence inflicted upon them, are all still seen to occur at the 
lower court level. The concern noted above, that the accounts of male 
perpetrators were more likely to be believed than those of female victims, is 
also still a potential problem as seen in Judge Cockroft’s assertion that 
‘although mother's statement dramatically includes a wealth of colourful detail in 
relation to these allegations, there is no reference in that statement to her being 
dragged downstairs by him, when surely there would have been, if it had 
happened. This is confirmation that no such incident took place… It would 
certainly have been convenient for this allegation to be made up.’65 Despite this 
original decision being held to be ‘deeply flawed and plainly wrong,’66 not many 
cases reach appeal and therefore it is not known how widespread these 
misunderstandings and stereotypical attitudes concerning domestic violence are 
within the lower courts. 
 
                                                          
63
 Judge Cockroft quoted by Lord Justice Wall [2006] 1 FCR at para 30 
64
Judge Cockroft cited by Lord Justice Wall [2006] 1 FCR at para 99 
65
 Judge Cockroft judge cited by Lord Justice Wall [2006] 1 FCR at para 24 
66
 [2006] 1 FCR at para 110 
127 
 
The Criminalising of Breaches of Non-Molestation Orders under the 
Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 
 
The criminalising of breaches of non-molestation orders under Section 1 of the 
DVCVA signal that the ‘interface’ between the civil and criminal law is starting to 
be developed, something heralded as important in the Government’s 2003 
Consultation Paper on domestic violence. The aim is to put the victim at the 
heart of the criminal justice system.67 It will be suggested here that, overall, 
traditional attitudes towards domestic violence are still held by those 
responsible for implementing justice under the DVCVA 2004, thus limiting the 
potential effectiveness of the new protective measures.68 Securing protection for 
victims seems to be further hindered by a great deal of confusion and lack of 
cohesion in terms of the scope and enforcement of the new remedy. Despite 
hopes that it would have a significant impact on the method of dealing with 
domestic violence under the civil law, in practice the impact of the new Act has 
been less significant. It has perhaps even proved detrimental to victims due to 
its blurring of the boundaries between the civil remedies and the criminal justice 
responses. This seems to have led to confusion on the part of those responsible 
for implementation and perhaps even reluctance on the part of judges to grant 
and enforce protection orders. Victims have also been found to be reluctant to 
apply for them, perhaps due to their desire to avoid the stigma of criminalisation 
for their partner and their belief that the criminal justice system is not the 
appropriate mechanism for dealing with the violence and abuse they are 
suffering.  
 The positive and commendable reasons for criminalising breaches under 
the DVCVA demonstrate, perhaps, that the legislature at the time had an 
increasing awareness of the severity and impact of domestic violence and the 
need to address the issue through the introduction of new measures. It is 
contended that even though criminalisation does serve the important political 
purpose of conveying the message that the government takes domestic 
violence seriously, the reform may have proved counter-productive for some 
domestic violence victims. Concerns also persist over the poor enforcement of 
civil orders that was seen prior to the DVCVA because the victim is still reliant 
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on the police responding to the breach of the order by the perpetrator. There is 
a higher burden of proof under criminal law, and the victim is required to be a 
witness in breach proceedings even when she may be afraid to do so.69 The 
criminalisation of breaches does extend the available sentencing options to 
include community-based penalties,70 which may be more successful in terms 
of regulating behaviour than imprisonment. Prison sentences may achieve 
short-term protection through incapacitation, but studies show that a short 
prison sentence may actually aggravate the situation.71 It is also unclear 
whether the purpose of this criminalisation is just as a deterrent or rehabilitative 
process, or whether other criminal, as opposed to civil, law objectives such as 
retribution and censure are also being pursued.72 Criminalisation does send out 
a symbolic message about the unacceptability of domestic violence, indicating 
that it is the responsibility of the state to address it so that enforcement of the 
order stops being a matter for the individual victim. The problem is that the 
victim’s interests are ‘supplanted by the wider public interest’ and a victim may 
be punished for not giving evidence to support the prosecution of a breach,73 
regardless of whether they intended or desired this criminal remedy to come 
into being. Despite victims not wishing their partner to carry the stigma of 
criminalisation (often for their own and their children’s benefit and not 
necessarily to help the perpetrator or because they have hopes of 
reconciliation), this section operates to remove the option of pursuing a purely 
civil remedy, something that may have appealed to many victims. In addition, 
victims may be guilty of the offence of ‘aiding and abetting a breach’ which 
dilutes the message of who is responsible for domestic violence and whose 
behaviour the order is intended to regulate. This in turn perpetuates the culture 
of ‘women blaming’ and the misconception that it is always the women’s freely 
made choice if she is living with the perpetrator again.74 
Statistics show an immediate and sharp drop in the number of 
applications for non-molestation orders75 under the FLA since the 
criminalisation of breaches under the DVCVA came into force in 2007, despite 
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the government introducing the measure in the hope that tougher sanctions 
would encourage more victims of domestic violence to seek protection from the 
family courts. The possible reasons for this drop suggest that the government 
introduced new legal provisions without a clear understanding of what would 
really be of benefit to victims in terms of ending the abuse, or what the victims 
themselves are actually looking for from the legal system. The Government 
itself acknowledges that there is serious disagreement over whether the 
criminal or civil route is the most effective in bringing an end to the abuse. A 
major problem highlighted by Judge John Platt76 is the lack of effective 
communication and information sharing between the police and the court which 
granted the original civil injunction. This can lead to situations where neither the 
investigating officer nor the CPS lawyer (whose decision it is whether to charge 
or not) are aware of the evidence upon which the injunction has been granted. 
An incident that appears to be isolated and comparatively minor is often part of 
a much larger and more serious picture. If this is ignored it can lead to incorrect 
charging decisions and decisions merely to caution, echoing problems with the 
way in which the law generally abstracts and isolates incidents from their social 
context. This is something that is particularly detrimental given the often-
overlooked programmatic nature77 of domestic violence. The new domestic 
abuse guidance issued to the police in 200878 does not even mention the need 
to discover the precise wording of any non-molestation order. Yet Section 42A 
of the new Act creates judge-made offences specific to the person against 
whom the order is made. It is therefore important that the investigating officer 
discovers whether the conduct being investigated, even if it is not a serious 
crime under general law, is in fact a serious crime under Section 42.  
It appears that the Government’s stated intention that ‘criminalising 
breaches of non-molestation injunctions will send an important message to 
defendants that the government takes a very serious view of domestic violence 
and offenders may be seriously punished’79 is being undermined because the 
police have been making regular use of cautions to deal with those arrested 
under Section 42A.80 In addition, criminalising the breach of a Section 42 order 
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gives the accused the right to a jury trial; this places a huge administrative 
burden on the police and the CPS. Also, the resulting delay81 provides the 
opportunity for coercive and controlling behaviour, threats, emotional damage 
and blackmail, making it more likely that victims will withdraw their statement 
under pressure. It has been suggested that an additional difficulty is that the 
securing of a conviction by a jury is harder than establishing contempt before an 
experienced family court judge.82 Police officers who were respondents in a 
study commissioned by the Ministry of Justice to evaluate the impact of the 
DVCVA talked about the lack of training they had received on this aspect of the 
Act both before and after implementation,83 suggesting that responding to 
breaches of civil orders is not being made a police priority.  
All of these factors point to a lack of cohesion and immense confusion 
over the new powers under this legislation. Research commissioned by the 
Ministry of Justice discovered that some legal advisors attributed the decrease 
in the number of applications to difficulties in obtaining legal aid84 and this will 
only get worse under the restrictive criteria of the new legislation,85 examined 
below. The whole concept of legal aid in relation to domestic violence implies 
that it is an individual problem, not a social problem; public funding is available 
for other so-called social problems such as health care, disabilities, and families 
needing support from Child Protection Services.  
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Part Three 
Civil Law Understandings of Domestic Violence in the Provision of Legal 
Aid, Housing and in Child Contact Proceedings 
 
 
Restrictions to Legal Aid Provision under the Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 
 
The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO) 
was implemented in March 2013, reforming the criteria for legal aid.86 Extensive 
primary research conducted into women’s experiences of legal aid, both prior to 
and after the reforms, confirmed initial concerns over the impact this new 
legislation will have on victims of domestic violence.87 Research conducted prior 
to the implementation of LASPO found that the provision of legal aid for 
domestic violence victims is invaluable in providing women with safety and 
protection. Without it many women would still be in the abusive relationship 
because they would have had no way to leave and the financial impact would 
have deterred them from seeking help.88  
In order to access legal aid under the new legislation, supporting 
documents are needed such as evidence of a non-molestation order being 
granted, a criminal conviction for a domestic violence offence by the other party 
towards the applicant, a referral to a Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conference 
(as a high risk victim of domestic violence) or a letter from a health professional. 
Many of these forms of evidence are unlikely to be available in the absence of 
serious physical violence. Even if a domestic violence victim is able to provide 
one of these forms of evidence, she will be able to access legal aid only in 
certain areas of family law.89 Legal advice on housing, education, employment, 
debt, welfare benefits, medical negligence and immigration90 will not be funded. 
Thus the new legislation undermines the government commitment to effectively 
tackle domestic violence, failing to appreciate some of the most serious 
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problems women face when they leave a violent relationship91 and so making it 
more difficult to leave the relationship.  
 
 
Supporting Documents 
 
The approved forms of evidence92 fail to reflect many women’s experiences of 
abuse. The majority of the supporting documents are subject to a 24 month 
timeframe;93 after this time they cannot be used as evidence in order to access 
legal aid. This ignores the fact that many of the problems requiring legal aid 
continue to affect women more than 24 months after particular incidents of 
violence; there is rarely a clear end to the violence and the vast majority 
experience some form of post-separation violence.94 In addition it fails to 
recognise that the abuse is unlikely to be of a purely physical nature. Research 
by Thiara and Gill found that ex-partners often track victims down by starting 
child contact proceedings, thus actively using the court system to continue the 
abuse.95 If this is done 24 months after the last ‘proven’ violent incident, the 
victim would not be eligible for legal aid under the new legislation. Many of the 
respondents felt that they would not have been ready to pursue a civil remedy 
within 24 months and others felt it would actually have put them at more risk if 
they had started legal proceedings straight away: ‘I’ve had a MARAC96 probably 
three or four months ago. I was with him for seven years: we split for six… so 
13-odd years of history between us, that will just be completely dismissed if he 
comes in and finally gets a solicitor on the 12th hour.’97 Most significantly some 
of the respondents felt that if the perpetrators were aware of the time frame they 
would use this as a way to continue the abuse; ‘It’s a gift for perpetrators to say, 
‘keep my nose clean for 1298 months’. Because they’re so controlling and 
controlled that they will manipulate anything that they possibly can.’99 In very 
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few cases of domestic violence is a conviction secured against the perpetrator, 
partly because it can be very hard for women to disclose abuse and partly 
because, as will be argued in the next chapter, the criminal justice framework is 
not adequately set up to respond to domestic violence.  
Certain types of abuse, particularly of a non-physical nature, are 
extremely difficult to prove. Some women do not even see the police as a 
potential source of help.100 It is therefore unlikely that a woman would be able to 
use the perpetrator’s criminal conviction to satisfy the evidential requirements 
for legal aid. A study conducted by Rights of Women101 found that around half 
of women with experience of domestic violence did not have the prescribed 
forms of evidence to access legal aid.102 Reasons for this included not having a 
copy of the evidence and not knowing who to ask to obtain it, cultural reasons 
for not wanting to disclose to a GP, being too frightened to go to the police, 
victims being unable to obtain a refuge place, charges for copies of the 
evidence from the police and health professionals,103 and the difficulty of 
establishing non-physical abuse.104 Lack of legal aid explained the failure of 
60.5% of respondents to take action to deal with their family dispute via family 
law.105  
 
 
Increase in Mediation 
 
One of the intentions behind the reforms was to encourage people to consider 
ways to resolve domestic disputes as an alternative to involving the court 
system. Whilst the government has said that women who have experienced 
domestic violence will not be required to take part in mediation, early research 
indicates that the restrictive nature of the gateways for accessing legal aid is 
leading some couples to be directed to participate in it, despite the presence of 
abuse. Further, it may not be recognised that mediation is inappropriate in a 
particular case since many women do not disclose the abuse that has 
occurred.106 Women with experience of mediation in cases characterised by 
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domestic abuse unanimously reported that it had not worked in their case, with 
other women stating that their safety would have been compromised by 
mediation had they used it. Some thought that the process would be used by 
perpetrators as a way of continuing the abuse; ‘[h]e would love the chance to go 
into mediation because that would be another way to control me’; ‘mediation is 
not for women that live with a control freak because it gives them back the 
control’.107 It is thought that fear of reprisals may lead to a woman feeling 
unable to fully take part in the mediation process resulting in an outcome to 
which she has not genuinely agreed.  
It seems then that mediation is especially unsuitable for couples where 
domestic violence is involved due to the dynamics which will be outlined in 
Chapter Seven. The use of “signals”108 unique to the relationship between the 
perpetrator and victim will be emphasised as one of the subtle ways in which 
power and control over the victim is maintained. Also, it is well-documented that 
domestic violence does not end upon separation.109 This makes it likely that 
some of the controlling tactics will be used during the mediation sessions 
themselves. In light of this, Fischer et al argue that after separation mediation 
‘may actually enhance the likelihood and seriousness of the violence because 
[physical] abuse is one of the few tools the abuser has left to attempt to 
dominate and control his victim’.110 The mediator’s role includes asking 
questions and encouraging the couple mediating to ‘reality test’ their decisions, 
they are not allowed to give legal advice111 or comment about what would 
happen to the case if it went to court, and therefore provided the couple 
(appear) to agree on the outcomes decided upon in mediation, the mediator is 
not able to comment on any unfairness apparent in the decision. 
Findings from the second phase of empirical research conducted by 
Barlow, Hunter and Smithson112 identified increasing pressure being put on 
parties to try mediation. There was also a disturbing lack of appropriate 
screening for domestic violence or mental health issues, despite the 
requirement that mediators take steps to discover whether there is fear of abuse 
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or any other harm, and whether there have been any allegations of abuse by 
either participant.113 This finding led the researchers to question whether the 
notion of ‘voluntary’ mediation is already beginning to disappear because 
couples are finding themselves in mediation even when it may not be 
appropriate because of domestic violence. Reports from legally aided parties 
indicated that since 2005 solicitors have referred parties directly to mediation 
without offering any alternatives.114 Reports of pressure being put on parties to 
attend mediation become more frequent after 2010 and two parties in the study 
believed they were ordered by the judge to mediate.  In addition, solicitors were 
found to be referring clients to mediation even when it was clearly inappropriate 
due to violence and abuse within the relationship, and parties were often found 
not to have been screened for domestic violence. One respondent who was in 
mediation with her husband stated that she had not been asked if there had 
been abuse and did not feel able to mention it, and she also did not feel able to 
be clear about what she wanted because she was intimidated being in the same 
room as him. Another respondent was referred to the Citizens Advice Bureau by 
Women’s Aid and then referred on to a solicitor who referred her to mediation, 
despite the presence of domestic violence.115  
From April 1st 2013, when the LASPO was implemented, problems such 
as those outlined above are likely to occur more frequently as funding for legal 
aid for private family disputes is available for mediation only if recent domestic 
violence can be proven in the prescribed manner. It will be mediators rather 
than solicitors who will be the first to see clients about their family dispute.116 
Hunter emphasises the ‘LASPO gap’ which consists of ‘the gap between the 
ability to reach a successful resolution of a dispute in mediation, and eligibility 
for litigation legal aid’.117 Into this gap fall victims of domestic violence who 
cannot produce the required evidence but for whom mediation is inappropriate. 
It seems that these parties may sometimes end up in the mediation process 
anyway, despite the documented dangers and difficulties of doing so. 
Litigants in Person 
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Although further statistical data is needed to assess the number of those falling 
into the ‘LASPO gap’ who end up in court as a litigant in person, the latest 
figures indicate that in the first three quarters of 2013, the number of finalised 
cases in which both parties were represented decreased, while the number of 
finalised cases in which the applicant or both parties were unrepresented 
increased by over 8000. This represents an increase of over 11,000 litigants in 
person.118 In the context of domestic violence, this could mean victims being 
cross-examined by a perpetrator who is representing himself. This could have 
extremely detrimental effects; ‘you can’t think straight’, ‘if you’ve been in a very 
dominating relationship for so long, they know you so well… they will be able to 
rip you to pieces on that stand because they know every single button to 
press… to make you crack because they’re so used to doing it.’119 Women 
unanimously said they would not have been able to act as a litigant in person in 
their own case. Some said they would not feel safe going to court without legal 
representation and others that they wouldn’t have gone to court at all without it. 
Women with experience of representing themselves had found it traumatic and 
reported that they lacked the skills and expertise to negotiate the legal system 
alone. It seems that the new legislation is not taking the already-traumatic 
nature of domestic violence into consideration by making the court process as 
easy as possible for victims. To provide adequate protection, the legal aid 
apparatus must take into account considerations of whether litigants in person 
can cope with the substantive law, the complexities of procedure, and the 
technical demands of cross-examining expert and other witnesses, particularly 
given the emotional detachment necessary to represent themselves 
effectively.120  
 
 
Child Contact Proceedings 
 
Prior to implementation, concerns were expressed over the Children and 
Families Act 2014 (CFA) which proposed that, unless shown otherwise, contact 
with the non-resident parent is to be assumed to be in children’s best interests, 
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even where the non-resident parent has perpetrated domestic violence.121 The 
intention of the amendment to the Children Act 1989 by Section 11 of the CFA 
is ‘to reinforce the importance of children having an ongoing relationship with 
both parents after family separation, where that is safe, and in the child’s best 
interests.’ The effect of this amendment is to require the court ‘to presume that 
a child’s welfare will be furthered by the involvement of each of the child’s 
parents in his or her life, unless it can be shown that such involvement would 
not in fact further the child’s welfare.’122 This may not necessarily be the case. 
Having left a violent relationship, women often find themselves re-
victimised by their ex-partners as a result of contact proceedings. If an abuser 
appears ‘likeable’ to the court, it may be assumed that the abuse allegations are 
exaggerated and therefore the abuse may not be investigated appropriately.123 
In the past, family courts tended not to recognise the importance of not 
exposing children to the ‘negative role modelling of their abusive father and to 
his hostility and contempt toward their mother’ and thus tended to believe that 
‘children fare better in joint residency or shared parenting’.124 There is still no 
prima facie assumption that there should be no direct contact between a parent 
and a child in cases where allegations of domestic violence had been proven.125 
The judgment in Re L126 provided important guidelines for courts to follow in 
future where it has been proven that the non-resident parent has perpetrated 
domestic violence. It is important to note, however, that the welfare of the 
children involved in these four joined appeals was the overriding consideration, 
not the welfare of the mother. The impact of continuing contact with her abusive 
former partner was not deemed relevant. Although the view that continuing 
contact between a child and the non-resident parent is desirable wherever 
possible is understandable, it does not take into account the impact that 
ongoing contact may have on the primary caregiver. This reflects the 
individualised nature and focus of the justice system127 where individual rights 
seem to be taken in isolation from their social context. In practice, it is 
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impossible to uphold the rights of a child and take their best interests into 
account without considering the needs and welfare of whoever is their primary 
caregiver.  
The decision in Re L was a landmark judgment in terms of signalling 
domestic violence as an issue that courts should take seriously in contact 
proceedings, but its real significance can be seen in how it has been 
subsequently applied.128 Two appeals heard by the Court of Appeal after Re L 
are concerning in this regard; Re K and S (Children) (Contact: Domestic 
Violence)129 and Re H (A Child) (Contact: Domestic Violence).130 In the latter 
case, discussed above, Judge Cockroft decided to allow supervised direct 
contact despite alleged violence and evidence from two expert witnesses that 
contact would not be in the child’s best interests. It is clear that the guidelines in 
Re L were not followed. In particular there was no consideration of the fact that 
the perpetrator had not admitted the violence, taken responsibility for it or 
understood the steps needed to address the damage caused by it. This aspect 
of the case was also criticised by the Court of Appeal, but the fear remains that 
the judgment was symptomatic of a widespread approach in the lower courts. 
Analysis of the judgment of a very recent case, Re M (Children),131 
where a father appealed against the decision not to allow supervised contact, 
reveals a continuing perception that a ‘child’s continuing relationship with a non-
residential parent is highly desirable and contact should not be denied unless 
the child’s welfare demands it.’132 To order that there should be no contact 
between a child and his non-residential parent was described as ‘draconian.’133 
The effect of this view appears to be to create a presumption in favour of 
contact that will be difficult in practice to rebut because of the difficulties of proof 
and the emphasis on physical violence. The likelihood of a negative impact 
upon the children involved makes this a grave concern. 
Both these cases and the newly-implemented CFA appear to take 
insufficient account of the danger a child can be in when contact is maintained 
with an abusive parent.134 The prevailing view is that all fathers are good role 
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models for their children, regardless of whether they are perpetrators of 
domestic and child abuse. Although the legislation only states that an on-going 
relationship with both parents is of paramount importance when it is safe and in 
the child’s best interests, it is suggested that the government’s failure to 
appreciate the reality of post-separation abuse,135 and its impact on children, 
means that shared parenting will still often be the preferred option in situations 
where women and children are put at further risk of violence and abuse. This 
proposed legislation highlights another instance of the government failing to 
comprehend the dangerous reality of domestic violence, the power dynamics 
involved, and the ways in which abusers are able to manipulate child contact 
proceedings as a way of continuing the abuse. 
 
 
Recent Understandings of Domestic Violence under Housing Law  
 
Analysis of the application of housing law provisions in the context of domestic 
violence is also revealing in terms of the potential for misunderstandings of the 
context and dynamics of domestic violence as coercive control. In Bond v 
Leicester City Council136 the Local Housing Authority (LHA) had decided that 
the victim had become ‘intentionally homeless’ and accordingly they had no 
duty to provide her with accommodation.137 The initial decision by the LHA was 
based upon the fact that Miss Bond had never taken any preventative measures 
or ‘reasonable steps’ to address the harassment – such as informing the 
Housing Society, the Police or any other representative body – and had instead 
gone straight to a refuge. Whilst recognising that Miss Bond had been the 
subject of domestic violence for some considerable time, the LHA believed that 
she should have taken action under the criminal/civil law to prevent her ex-
partner from coming near her or her home. This reveals a simplistic response 
that assumes that civil and criminal remedies are available in a timely way for all 
victims who disclose abuse, and that disclosure brings an end to the abuse. 
This decision was overturned on appeal by the Court of Appeal where Lady 
Hale (as she then was) demonstrated a good understanding of the dynamics of 
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abuse and the difficulties encountered by victims. Of domestic violence she 
noted:  
‘Once begun it is likely to be repeated, often with escalating severity. It 
induces a sense of shame and of powerlessness in the victims, who 
often blame themselves and find it impossible to escape. There are 
various legal and practical remedies available, but it is by no means easy 
for many victims to invoke these. However hard the family courts try, they 
are often ineffective. Escape may well be the only practicable answer. 
The victim is the one who knows the perpetrator best and is likely to be 
best able to judge this.’138  
Again, we find an appellate court addressing problems caused by lack of 
understanding in a court of first instance, raising questions as to the 
pervasiveness of the lack of awareness. The case raises the same difficulties 
suggested in the analysis of Re H; it is unclear whether decisions such as this 
one are commonly being made at lower legal and administrative levels, with 
only a few being highlighted through the appeal process. 
In AN (Pakistan)139 Richards J accepted that the term ‘domestic violence’ 
was not limited to physical violence but he also stated that ‘it must reach some 
minimum level of seriousness, which will depend upon the context and 
particular circumstances.’140 It is anticipated that, in light of other judicial 
understandings of domestic violence, the threshold for seriousness is unlikely to 
be reached without serious bodily harm. The recent case of Yemshaw141 does 
suggest that the courts, in applying the civil law, are beginning to interpret 
domestic violence in a less restrictive way which recognises that ‘[t]he test is 
always the view of the objective outsider but applied to particular facts, 
circumstances, and personalities of the people involved.’142 Although in this 
case the majority of the Supreme Court ruled that ‘domestic violence’ is not 
limited to physical contact, the review panel and trial judge initially upheld the 
decision made by housing officers that Mrs Yemshaw was not ‘homeless’ as a 
result of domestic violence because her husband had never actually hit her, or 
threatened to do so. The Court of Appeal held that they were bound by 
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Danesh143 where it was held that ‘violence’ involved some sort of physical 
contact.144 On appeal, Baroness Hale stated that violence is a term ‘capable of 
bearing several meanings and applying to many different types of behaviour.’145 
Despite this, Lord Brown – whilst not dissenting – did state that he did not 
believe that at any point the “domestic violence” provisions at issue in the case 
were intended to extend beyond the limits of physical violence,146 and nor did 
Parliament contemplate or intend for psychological abuse to be “violence”.147 
Concern can again be raised over the fact that this case had to be decided on 
appeal and reveals little about what may still be happening at a lower 
administrative level. Difficulties with this focus on purely physical violence will 
be discussed in Chapter Seven. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The objective of this chapter was to show that gendered expectations and a 
failure to see domestic violence as a social problem impacts upon the 
availability of the civil law remedies for victims. It was suggested that initial 
problems with enforcement of civil protection orders continued after the 
implementation of the FLA, with studies indicating judges may have become 
reluctant to grant a non-molestation order once breaches of them were 
criminalised under the DVCVA. A failure to believe allegations of domestic 
violence and accounts by women victims continues to be a potential problem in 
the courts of first instance, as seen in the case of Re H. This case also revealed 
the continuing use of assumptions based on gendered stereotypes, including 
the idea that women are responsible for provoking the violence they incur. Male 
property rights were still taking precedence over the safety of victims in the 
Court of Appeal in 2000, as seen in Re Y and Re G which both stated that 
occupation orders were ‘draconian’. The reluctance to exclude male 
perpetrators of violence from their home indicates a continuation of male 
privilege and dominance characteristic of a patriarchal state. There has been no 
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recent case law indicating a change in the position found in Re Y and Re G and 
it therefore seems likely that serious physical violence would be required in 
order for an occupation order to be granted. 
As will be argued in Chapter Seven, the failure to recognise the social 
function of domestic violence within a patriarchal society as being to sustain the 
unequal power relations between men and women means the other behaviours 
characteristic of an abusive relationship are often overlooked or trivialised. 
Although Lady Hale’s judgment in Yemshaw is promising in terms of its 
recognition of the broader manifestations of ‘violence’, it is not yet known how 
quickly this will filter through to the lower courts and administrative bodies 
dealing initially with cases like this. The perception of domestic violence evident 
in Lord Dennings’s description of ‘the battered woman’ in Davis v Johnson was 
still seen in more recent cases where a requirement for physical violence in 
order to justify the granting of an exclusion order was apparent. 
Therefore, even when domestic violence is accepted as widespread, it is 
still not often recognised as having a social function and this means, first, that 
legal measures do not address themselves to everyday social life, and secondly 
that there is a focus on physical violence. The argument that the legal 
responses to domestic violence in England and Wales only address the 
symptoms of this abuse by viewing domestic violence as attributable to 
individual deviance will be continued in the following chapter examining the 
criminal justice response.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE TO 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
 
Calls for a separate criminal offence of ‘domestic violence’ – as implemented in 
some European countries1 - have been rejected2 in the UK and therefore the 
criminal justice response consists of a ‘piecemeal strategy’3 of applying the 
existing criminal law provisions to domestic violence incidents. These provisions 
consist mainly of prosecutions under the Offences Against the Person Act 
(OAPA) 1861, introduced over 150 years ago to deal with problems of stranger 
violence and public order.4 As a starting point for critiquing the criminal justice 
response to domestic violence it is clear that using a model derived from 
stranger violence is likely to ignore the ways in which domestic violence is 
unique precisely because it is committed by an intimate.5 Along with the OAPA, 
the Protection from Harassment Act (PHA) 1997 has been used in the context 
of domestic violence in some cases, although it was originally intended to target 
stalking offences and not conduct that occurs in the context of an ongoing 
relationship. 
 Until relatively recently domestic violence was not seen as a public order 
issue and its absence as a topic in mainstream criminal law textbooks6 
demonstrates its continuing invisibility from mainstream perceptions of criminal 
justice issues. This type of violence occurs within the privacy of the home and 
has therefore not traditionally been an issue of public concern. Therefore, the 
criminal justice system has been very slow to recognise and respond to 
domestic violence, and traditional perceptions about what are issues for the 
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police and other agencies to become involved in may still continue to influence 
the responses.  
 Part One of this chapter will focus on the conceptions of harm that are 
apparent under the criminal law, analysing the theoretical underpinnings of the 
Offences Against the Person and how they have been interpreted by the courts 
in a way that excludes much of the harm that victims of domestic violence 
suffer.7 Part Two will then examine the response of the police, the Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS) and the Criminal Courts, putting forward evidence 
that their responses are still hampered by misunderstandings and prejudices 
concerning domestic violence and its victims. Finally, in Part Three, there will be 
an analysis of the implications of the offence created by Section 5 of the 
Domestic Violence Crime and Victims Act 2004 for victims of domestic violence 
who have been prosecuted and sentenced for ‘failing to protect’ their children 
from their violent partner. This will reveal many of the continuing problematic 
assumptions pertaining to domestic violence made by both Parliament, in not 
providing a defence of domestic violence in the context of this offence, and by 
the criminal courts in interpreting the offence.  
  
 
Part One 
The Criminal Law’s Conception of Harm and Focus on Isolated Incidents 
 
With perhaps the exception of the Protection from Harassment Act 19978 
(discussed below), the criminal law focuses on single incidents, isolating 
criminal conduct from its consequences and social and cultural context. This 
creates a situation where a history of domestic violence and the cumulative 
impact this usually has on the victim is not recognised.9 The criminal justice 
system in England and Wales is underpinned by adversarial principles and, as 
Robinson asserts, these are particularly ill-suited for dealing with domestic 
violence.10 There are a number of difficulties that emerge from this system 
because of the multi-dimensional nature of domestic violence and the fact that, 
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 See Chapter Seven for a full discussion of the harm of domestic violence and arguments for how it could more 
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whilst aspects of physical violence are included, the abuse is perhaps best 
understood as a pattern or programme of behaviours, rather than as discrete 
and isolated incidents. The criminal justice system’s focus on incidents is often 
in contrast to the lived experience of the victim, who commonly experiences the 
abuse as a process in everyday life.11  
An analysis of the principles of the practical application of liberal political 
philosophy12 and the rhetoric of individual liberty will be reserved for Chapter 
Eight on the partial defences to homicide. However, some further points can 
serve to illustrate the difficulties with the way in which the criminal law isolates 
individual incidents of violence from the rest of the abusive context in which they 
occur. Norrie’s critique of the criminal law process reveals that at the heart of 
modern criminal law exists a ‘responsible individual’ who is isolated from the 
real world and the social and moral contexts in which the crime occurs.13 
However, as will be expanded upon in Chapter Seven, it is only when the 
context of ongoing abuse is taken into account that seemingly small and trivial 
incidents can be seen to have a detrimental impact on the victim. As a result of 
isolating the individual from the context in which the crime occurs, the criminal 
justice system abstracts the criminal incident from the rest of the defendant’s 
abusive behaviour and actions. The consequence of this is that a cumulative 
pattern of many small incidents of control, threats and coercion will not be 
considered and thus a perpetrator may be charged, if at all, with a much lesser 
offence. The effects of violence over a long period can be taken into account as 
an aggravating feature when it comes to sentencing, but only where the conduct 
is proved or accepted,14 ignoring the difficulty victims often face with disclosing 
abuse and the fact that it can be very difficult to prove certain types of harm. 
The perpetrator’s ‘positive good character’ can be a mitigating factor, and whilst 
the guidelines recognise that ‘one of the factors that can allow domestic 
violence to go unnoticed for lengthy periods is the ability of the perpetrator to 
have two personae’, there must be a ‘proven pattern of behaviour’ in order for 
‘an offender’s good character in relation to conduct outside the home… [to] be 
of no relevance’.15 Again this fails to take into account difficulties of disclosure 
and proof, especially in relation to certain types of harm. As noted in the 
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previous chapter, often the first incident that is reported to the police will be 
following a campaign of abuse stretching over months and years. The 
sentencing guidelines also allow for provocation by the victim to be a mitigating 
factor and it is contended that a finding of such is likely to be influenced by the 
expectations of appropriate feminine behaviour and the expectations of the role 
of a wife or female partner (explored in Chapter Two). Despite the caveat that 
provocation will usually involve ‘actual or anticipated violence including 
psychological bullying’16 it is thought that this could be stretched to include 
‘nagging’, which is often seen to make a woman a ‘deserving victim’ and to 
blame for the violence.17 
Another of the obstacles to the criminal law providing sufficient 
recognition of the harm inflicted by abusive partners results from the fact that so 
much of the violence is emotional and psychological, with the fear of physical 
violence based on past experiences operating, typically, as an unspoken threat 
enabling the abusive partner to maintain power and control. Whilst the definition 
of ‘domestic violence’ used by state agencies including criminal justice agencies 
shows recognition that the phenomenon does not only manifest itself in physical 
violence,18 until very recently there has been limited redress for psychological or 
emotional abuse under the criminal law.  
The focus on physical injury and the neglect of psychiatric injury found in 
the interpretation of the offences under the OAPA has changed to a certain 
extent recently19 and the House of Lords has extended bodily harm to include 
harm to the mind, but only in cases where there is a recognisable psychiatric 
injury. In R v Chan Fook,20 Hobhouse LJ stated that whilst the phrase ‘actual 
bodily harm’ is capable of including psychiatric injury, ‘it does not include mere 
emotions such as fear or distress nor panic.’21 The reason given for this 
exclusion is that it is ‘likely to create in the minds of the jury the impression that 
something which is not more than a strong emotion, such as extreme fear or 
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panic, can amount to actual bodily harm’.22 Hobhouse LJ’s use of the phrases 
‘mere emotions’ and ‘not more than a strong emotion’ trivialises responses such 
as these and, as noted by Munro and Shah in their alternative feminist judgment 
of this case, there is ‘little recognition that emotional suffering, where it is severe 
in its effects and sustained in its duration, can have serious, harmful 
consequences’.23 Following this judgment, Hobhouse LJ has reduced non-
physical harm to being ‘either psychiatric or ‘merely’ emotional, with only 
infliction of the former meriting criminalisation.’24 This judgment is illuminating 
both in terms of the problematic nature of attempts to apply the existing 
offences against the person in the context of domestic violence, and also the 
judicial failure to comprehend the impact that an ongoing programme of abuse 
may have on a person unless it reaches a medically-recognised threshold. 
Therefore, this distinction has continued to prove highly problematic for 
abused women suffering from the effects of psychological abuse that does not 
amount to a recognisable psychiatric injury, as demonstrated by the case of R v 
Dhaliwal.25 In this case, the CPS chose to base their case upon the argument 
that the unlawful act that grounded the manslaughter charge was the inflicting of 
serious psychological injury on the victim as a result of years of domestic 
abuse, contrary to Section 20 of the OAPA. The difficulty with this basis for the 
unlawful act was whether the offence of GBH could be based on non-physical 
injury. In approving the previous case law26 and reaffirming the requirement for 
a recognised psychiatric injury, the court in Dhaliwal effectively ruled out the 
impact abuse can have upon a victim when there has not been a formal 
diagnosis of battered woman’s syndrome or post-traumatic stress disorder.27 
The psychiatric experts in this case did not find evidence of recognisable 
psychiatric injury and, despite finding ‘some features of depression’ that would 
have impacted on her psychological functioning, the prosecution failed. Burton 
notes the ‘privileging of medical knowledge over a large body of social science 
research relating to the effects of domestic abuse’ and how this is especially 
problematic given that medical opinion is also uncertain and experts do not 
always agree.28 Lord Steyn in R v Ireland; R v Burstow29 emphasised that the 
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OAPA is a ‘living instrument’30 to be interpreted in line with current scientific 
knowledge but in Dhaliwal, despite noting this judgment, he concluded that 
medical knowledge on the working of the mind was less than complete.  
Dhaliwal provided the Court of Appeal with the opportunity to 
reconceptualise bodily harm in line with the lived experiences of domestic 
violence victims by recognising that significant psychological symptoms might, 
in cases where a minimum level of severity is attained, amount to bodily harm 
despite the lack of a medical diagnosis.31 In declining to take this approach, the 
court can be seen to be reluctant to amend current understandings of harm 
under the criminal law in a way that would accommodate the impact of ongoing 
abuse. 
This exclusion can be seen to contribute to the view, often held by 
abused women themselves as well as much of society as a whole, that the 
effects of abuse are not matters for the criminal law,32 thus perpetuating the 
sense of shame and self-blame experienced by victims. Through the creation of 
two new criminal offences, the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (PHA) 
opened up new possibilities for criminal prosecutions in cases of intimate 
partner abuse by enabling the courts to address harassing behaviours without 
having to wait until psychological or bodily harm is caused, as is the case under 
the OAPA. The response to domestic abuse found in the new legislation and 
associated case law is considered below. 
 
 
The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 
 
The PHA was introduced in 1997 in response to the perceived inadequacies of 
the existing law in protecting victims of stalking.33 It creates two new criminal 
offences – the basic offence of harassment34 and the more serious offence of 
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 R v Ireland; R v Burstow [1998] AC 147 (HL) at para 158 
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 In their feminist judgment of R v Dhaliwal, Munro and Shah allow for this approach provided that the psychological 
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 Recent studies with abused women suggest that the police are still not always seen as being able to help them and 
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often accept it, not recognising it as a crime, and sometimes not even as wrong 
(http://www.baringfoundation.org.uk/LegalAidLifeline.pdf)   
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causing fear of violence35 - and a statutory tort of harassment36 (enabling 
victims to bring a civil claim at the same time as a criminal case is proceeding 
against the alleged perpetrator). A court now has the option to attach a 
restraining order upon conviction of either of these offences,37 effectively giving 
victims the equivalent of an injunction under the FLA but without the expense of 
obtaining it.38 The legislation was not intended to be used in relation to domestic 
violence, but, as will be seen below, cases involving abuse in intimate 
relationships have been brought under the Act. The legislation prima facie 
appears to indicate that it would be better able to deal with the types of coercive 
and controlling behaviours that are typical in abusive relationships than the 
offences against the person. The offence under Section 4 – putting a person in 
fear that violence will be used against them – seems, at first, likely to be able to 
better accommodate some of the central elements of domestic violence in a 
way that the OAPA cannot. This is because it seems able to respond to the 
reality that the central harm is not necessarily the use of physical violence, but 
the way in which abuse puts the victim in fear, thus enabling the  abusive 
partner to maintain power and control over them. 
Judicial decisions interpreting the Act, however, confound such an 
analysis. The reason appears to be the continuing misunderstandings of the 
context and consequences of abusive relationships. The perception of victims 
as autonomous individuals who remain in or return to the relationship because 
they freely choose to do so means that judges find it difficult to understand a 
victim who reports the behaviour of her ex-partner as being contrary to the PHA 
but remains in the relationship (see the discussion of R v Hills39 below). In 
addition, despite being intended to deal with ‘a course of conduct’ and the 
Home Office’s report on stalking40 recognising that ‘each stalking case is unique 
and highly personalised, involving an idiosyncratic combination of… a wide 
range of other diverse types of behaviour’,41 the judgments lapse back into 
examination of individual incidents of assault and battery, and whether or not 
these, in combination, amount to a course of conduct.  
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For example, in DPP v Lau42 there were numerous alleged incidents but 
only two were proved. Despite the legislation not needing proof of more than 
two incidents, it was held that the fewer the occasions and the wider they are 
spread the less likely it would be that a finding of harassment can reasonably be 
made.43 There are clear difficulties with proving many of the incidents which 
could be used to demonstrate a course of conduct for the purposes of 
harassment when they take place in the context of an intimate relationship, 
typically with no witnesses. Therefore there needs to be recognition that, in a 
case involving domestic violence, there are likely to be other non-disclosed 
incidents and that two proved ones should suffice for a conviction. There also 
needs to be a sufficient nexus between the incidents in order for there to be a 
course of conduct. In R v Hills44 this was not found, despite allegations of 
ongoing abuse between the two proven incidents; ‘there was nothing to show 
that the April matter was more than an unconnected incident.’45 It is submitted 
that if domestic abuse was understood by the judiciary as being programmatic 
in nature, it would be harder to view two incidents of physical violence occurring 
in an intimate relationship as isolated and unrelated. 
Two of the key cases to date suggest that the judiciary have been 
reluctant to utilise the offences under the PHA in the context of an on-going 
relationship between the victim and the alleged perpetrator. In R. v Hills46 the 
incidents relied upon to form the basis of the charge under Section 4 were 
alleged to have occurred between April and October 1999. Allegations of 
ongoing violence between these dates were discounted for evidential reasons 
and it was further held that the incidents of physical assault in April and October 
were unrelated. Lord Justice Otton held that the first incident was unconnected, 
particularly ‘since the parties continued to live with each other through the 
relevant period, during which time as it had emerged in the earlier rape trial the 
complainant had made a video of the parties having sexual intercourse 
together.’47 The fact that the victim continued to live with the appellant 
throughout the period in which she claimed that he put her in fear of violence 
contrary to Section 4 appears to have influenced the judicial disbelief of the 
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alleged behaviour between the two incidents. The case of R v Widdows48 
confirms that this approach has not changed in recent years, indicating the 
assumptions, first, that women freely remain in a relationship characterised by 
abuse, and, secondly, that the abuse is less serious if it is in the context of a 
‘long and predominantly affectionate relationship in which both parties persisted 
and wanted to continue.’49 To interpret the legislation from this perspective 
ignores the dynamics and impacts of ongoing abuse. It also undermines the 
potential usefulness of the PHA in domestic violence cases in providing a victim 
with protection50 when the relationship is ongoing. In fact, Lord Justice Otton 
appeared to regard the Act as unsuited to the purpose, stating that the 
legislation was introduced in the context of stalking, which implies a stranger or 
estranged spouse.51 This approach would exclude a course of conduct in the 
context of the ongoing relationship. 
Whether or not the PHA was intended for use within the context of 
relationships involving abuse and violence, it could have been applied in this 
way. The use of credible threats and other methods to maintain control over the 
victim by keeping them in fear of violence or other unwanted events is key to 
domestic violence. These aspects quite clearly fit with the requirements for a 
course of unwanted conduct that may not be sinister taken out of context, for 
example the delivering of flowers or repeated phone calls, but that can take on 
a more sinister persona in the context of an unwanted or abusive relationship. 
That the legislation does not seem to have been interpreted in this way displays 
a lack of judicial comprehension of the dynamics of abusive relationships.  
It has been argued that Section 4 of the PHA ‘represents a distinct 
offence focused not on harassment, but on the graver wrong of creating fear of 
violence.’52 Had the legislation been interpreted in this way it could have 
provided the potential for a case to be brought against a perpetrator of domestic 
violence who used surveillance, credible threats and intimidation to put the 
victim in fear of violence. Although this would have still probably been restricted 
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to fear of physical violence being used, it would at least have enabled a case to 
be brought when fear of violence based on past incidents of physical violence is 
being used by the abusive partner to maintain power and control.53 However, 
the approach taken in R v Curtis54 construes Section 4 in the broader context of 
the Act,55 requiring proof that the course of conduct that puts the victim in fear of 
violence also amounts to harassment. Although Ormorod asserts that this is 
only of practical significance ‘if there are circumstances in which two or more 
incidents with a sufficient nexus caused a fear of violence without also being 
harassing,’56 it is submitted that without an understanding of the dynamics and 
context of the abuse, conduct not deemed ‘harassing’ may still be capable of 
creating fear in the victim, in the context of the relationship. It is also contended 
that the ‘fear of violence’ required for a Section 4 offence is too limited due to 
the requirement that the victim is afraid that violence will be used. In R v 
Henley57 Lord Justice Pill emphasised in his judgment that for the offence under 
section 4 a course of conduct that caused a generalised state of fearfulness, or 
a fear for the safety of others, could not suffice.58 There would therefore need to 
be two specific incidents which directly caused the victim to fear violence. 
Hence it is not enough that the victim is seriously frightened of what might 
happen or frightened that violence will be used against members of her 
family. This means that much of the behaviours and techniques of domestic 
violence would be excluded, unless the victim could prove she was afraid that 
violence would be used against her at that particular time. Also findings by 
magistrates and juries that a reasonable person59 would have realised that 
someone would be put in fear of violence may be shaped by their existing 
preconceptions.  
Following a Parliamentary inquiry in early 2012 which found that the PFA 
was ‘not an effective tool against stalking,’60 two new specific offences of 
stalking were added to the PHA under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 
(PoF). These were stalking and stalking involving fear of violence or serious 
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alarm or distress.61 However, it seems unlikely that this will increase the legal 
protection available for victims of domestic violence under the criminal law.62 
 
 
Part Two 
The Police, Crown Prosecution Service and Criminal Court Response 
 
The Police Response 
 
It seems that earlier problems with the police response such as women being 
viewed as ‘fickle’ when they withdraw their complaints, rather than afraid of 
further violence,63 and a reluctance to become involved in domestic violence64 
or record  it as a crime,65 continue to be major reasons for police refusing to 
arrest offenders.66 This perception betrays a misunderstanding of the real 
reasons women withdraw their complaints; fear of retaliation from the 
perpetrator or his family, shame, lack of financial resources, still wanting some 
kind of relationship with the perpetrator, the involvement of children.67 Robinson 
suggests that some of the reasons for not proceeding with a case emanate from 
the ways victims interpret and handle risks in their everyday lives, and some are 
shaped by perceptions of the criminal justice process.68 It is thus perhaps 
inappropriate to use arrests and prosecutions as performance indicators 
because victims may still benefit from police involvement even in the absence of 
arrest or prosecution.69 However, evidence also suggests that women are less 
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willing to withdraw when they feel the police are committed to investigating and 
taking the crime seriously and are more prepared to give statements when there 
is photographic evidence.70  
The most recent major review of the policing of domestic violence, 
conducted in 2004 by HMCPSI and HMIC, recognised that ‘tremendous efforts’ 
had been made to overturn stereotypes but that policies and rhetoric are not 
matched on the ground by effective responses and solid investigative practice.71 
The report also confirmed the gap between specialist and generalist policing in 
terms of domestic violence, finding that ‘[w]hilst all officers… were clear about 
the fact that domestic violence was a priority within their force… with the 
exception of specialist officers, few had any real understandings of the 
dynamics of domestic violence.’72 There is also worrying evidence of domestic 
violence incidents still being recorded as ‘no crimes’ when they should not have 
been.73 Considering that many of the behaviours commonly engaged in by 
domestic violence perpetrators are deemed to be ‘sub-criminal’ as a result of 
the conceptualisation of harm under the criminal law and the focus on physical 
violence, it is particularly important that when incidents can be recorded as 
crimes that they are.  
One of the new measures introduced by the DVCVA, making common 
assault an arrestable offence,74 was seen by the police as a step towards a 
wider approach to dealing with domestic violence; the power of arrest added 
clarity and clout to their already existing powers, and victims also supported the 
measures because the perpetrator could be removed from the situation and 
given chance to “sober up” or “calm down”.75 However, this finding is at odds 
with anecdotal evidence suggesting that temporary removal from the home after 
arrest can make the perpetrator even angrier and therefore more likely to inflict 
serious injury on return.  
A recent study indicated poor experiences of police responses, for 
example an incident occurring after a woman had left her abusive partner where 
the abuser had broken her car windscreen, slashed the tyres, locked their child 
in the car, and shouted and screamed at her, being met with the police 
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response of ‘It’s all very recent, it’s all very raw, you know, that’s what happens 
when people split up.’76 This indicates a lack of awareness of the complexities, 
power dynamics and methods of intimidation found in domestic violence. 
However, other studies77 have found increasing satisfaction with police practice, 
suggesting their approach is improving  in terms of how they respond to the 
victim and what action they take, but less with the Crown Prosecution Service 
(CPS) and the criminal courts,78 aspects of which will be examined next. 
 
 
The Crown Prosecution Service Response 
 
The CPS now promotes a policy of effective evidence gathering by the police 
and the use of alternative evidence such as photographs of the scene and the 
victim’s injuries, evidence from police officers and other witnesses and written 
statements from the victim.79 This is definitely preferable to compelling the 
victim to testify which can be a very traumatic experience for domestic violence 
victims. However, the CPS policy statement does highlight that ‘where the 
victim is the only witness to the offence, it is very difficult to satisfy the court that 
justice is being served when the defence cannot cross-examine the only 
witnesses against them.’80 This probably contributes to their decision not to 
continue a prosecution. The Crown might take a rather different position if 
Parliament implements a provision which would enable courts (in addition to 
imposing restraining orders when sentencing any offence under the PHA81) to 
impose a restraining order on acquittal for any violent offence,82 for example 
when there is insufficient evidence to secure a conviction. In an assessment by 
Hester et al, this provision was singled out by advocates, barristers and other 
legal professionals as the measure that could potentially have a large and 
positive impact on how domestic violence cases are dealt with and one 
Advocacy Service Manager stated ‘it’s another proactive step that could be 
taken and another sanction that could be used that saves the woman having to 
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go somewhere else and do it all over again…’83.The implication of this would be 
that the prosecution of a case could be justified even where a conviction is 
unlikely. This would be a radical step, but one that could be very useful in 
protecting victims when a prosecution does not result in a conviction for 
evidential reasons. It would also, perhaps, enable the police and the Crown to 
see their role as being to protect victims, rather than simply to secure conviction 
and inflict punishment.  
The CPS policy statement in The Prosecution of Domestic Violence 
Cases (last revised in 2005) deals with the public interest tests84 and here there 
is an inconsistency between the policy (it is the victim’s interests, not wishes, 
that are to be weighed in determining whether prosecution is in the public 
interest) and the practice (where it was found the victim’s wishes appeared to 
determine whether prosecution occurred).85 Research also indicates that the 
reduction in severity of charge, discussed above, is still more likely to happen in 
domestic violence cases than in cases involving other types of violence. A 2006 
study by Cammiss found that in a sample of 100 cases, 17 of which were 
domestic violence cases, domestic violence cases were deemed suitable for 
summary trial in 76% of cases, compared to 43% of cases overall.86 Interviews 
conducted with victims of domestic violence who had experienced the criminal 
justice system found that ‘they were generally bewildered and shocked by the 
plea-bargaining and reduction of sentences that tended to take place in court’.87 
These difficulties with prosecution are reflective of the general inability of the 
criminal justice system to conceptualise domestic violence appropriately and in 
a way that meets with the need and expectations of the victim. In many cases 
the failure to prosecute may not be due to indifference or ignorance but due to 
concern as to how the outcome would impact upon victims. For example, if a 
witness is in fear, her initial – and probably oral – statement to the attending 
officer or a bystander could be used as hearsay evidence and a conviction 
sustained upon that. However, the dilemma is whether to go against her wishes 
to proceed with a prosecution if she either refuses to make a written statement 
or withdraws the one she did make. The CPS have been urged to prosecute 
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domestic violence cases but they have to consider both the likelihood of a 
conviction and whether the victim will suffer further abuse because of their 
decision. 
The recent case of R v A88 found a victim of domestic violence convicted 
for perverting the course of justice when she withdrew a complaint of domestic 
violence against her husband. Whilst the initial prison sentence was quashed on 
appeal and substituted with a community sentence and supervision order, ‘the 
conviction for perverting the course of justice following the retraction of a truthful 
allegation because of fear and pressure still stands.’89 This case reaffirms the 
inappropriateness of prosecuting a domestic violence victim for withdrawing an 
allegation, where that withdrawal was motivated by fear of further abuse and 
pressure. In deciding to prosecute, the CPS demonstrated a worrying lack of 
understanding of ‘the complexity of pressure for a victim of rape and domestic 
violence, and the difficulty she has in describing her coercion in precise legal 
niceties.’90 Even though The Court of Appeal accepted that the original 
sentence was excessive, arguments relating to the pressure that the victim was 
under were only deemed relevant in terms of mitigation of sentence. The Lord 
Chief Justice of England and Wales rejected the defence’s claim of duress, 
emphasising the importance of not further eroding the limitations of the 
doctrine.91 Despite reference to the plight of domestic violence victims and the 
coercion they are often placed under, he asserted that this is pressure, not 
duress which ‘involves pressure which arises in extreme circumstances, the 
threat of death or serious injury [including rape] which cannot reasonably be 
evaded.’92 Whilst it is understandable that the court felt unable to apply the 
defence of duress to the circumstances of this case,93 it is concerning that the 
CPS decided to prosecute, given that someone who retracts a truthful 
statement because of fear is not usually proceeded against. The CPS guidance 
states that ‘there may be credible reasons why a complainant of rape or 
domestic violence may retract a truthful allegation and prosecutors will need to 
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ensure that the reasons for the retraction are fully explored and understood.94 
This seems not to have happened in this case, perhaps indicating a lack of case 
management and a lack of understanding of domestic violence within the 
organisation.95 The decision to prosecute in this case belies a continuing lack of 
understanding of the fear that domestic violence victims often experience. 
 
 
Sentencing and the Criminal Court Response 
  
The new sentencing guidelines on domestic violence introduced in 2006 can be 
seen as another missed opportunity to show that domestic violence is 
something to be taken seriously and that sentences need to take into account 
the need for victim protection.96 For example the need for a ‘previous pattern’ of 
offences that the perpetrator has been convicted or cautioned over means that 
a domestic violence offender convicted of GBH may get a non-custodial 
sentence despite there being a considerable history of violence towards their 
partner.97 Yet a woman is assaulted an average of 35 times before she first 
contacts the police.98 Additionally, incidents of violence typically occur against a 
background of on-going control and intimidation, meaning the severity of the 
abuse and the risk to the woman cannot be assessed by looking at the previous 
convictions of the perpetrator for incidents of physical violence alone. 
 Rape is an integral part of the overall picture of intimate abuse. The new 
sentencing  guidelines issued by the Court of Appeal in R v Millberry99 state that 
the starting point for sentencing stranger and non-stranger rape should be the 
same but Burton expresses concern over elements of the judgement because 
they create the potential for ‘negative and outmoded attitudes to continue to 
play a significant role in judicial responses to marital and relationship rape’.100 
For example the suggestion that mitigating factors may apply when the offender 
is married to the victim that would not apply to stranger rape, and the idea that 
during ‘stranger rape’ the victim’s fear may be increased because her offender 
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is an ‘unknown quantity.’101 This overlooks research on marital rape which 
suggests that victims are equally fearful because they do not know where their 
husband or partner will stop102 (as well as the huge betrayal of trust that results 
from being raped by an intimate). Circumstances that might amount to 
mitigation under the Milberry guidelines included the existence of a continuing 
close relationship, where the victim and offender are regularly sharing a bed, or 
the offender failed to show the restraint he should have because both parties 
had been drinking. It was held that it would be contrary to common sense to 
treat such a category of rape as equivalent to stranger rape. This allows 
mitigation for intoxication which would not be relevant for stranger rape and 
endorses the view that rapists are simply unable to control sexual urges,103 
ignoring the reality that rape is an expression of power. Subsequent case law 
seems to suggest that these concerns were justified.104  
The way that the criminal law abstracts and isolates incidents leads to a 
failure to comprehend the link between domestic violence and sexual violence 
or that rape in marriage is rarely an isolated incident. The perception that the 
rapist cannot control his sexual desires misunderstands the rapist’s motives and 
ignores the reality that rape is an expression of power and a method of gaining 
control over the victim.105 An example of this misunderstanding is provided by a 
2006 case106 where the prosecution had a 999 tape of the defendant raping his 
wife (an event she claimed had occurred once a week since the parties 
separated two years previously) and the first instance judge passed a two and a 
half year sentence remarking that the tape was ‘troubling listening’ with the 
victim crying out in pain and begging him to stop. The disturbing part of the 
judgement is the remark ‘in your case it was not pure lust because you did have 
a genuine affection for your wife and even when this sexual act was over you 
asked her to give you a cuddle and then you told her that you loved her.’107 As 
Burton emphasises, ‘[t]o view the events as ‘sex’ motivated by love, belies the 
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real exploitation of power and control evident in this case’108 (the victim was a 
disabled woman suffering from agoraphobia and thus effectively imprisoned in 
her home).  
The first specialist domestic violence court was set up in Leeds in 1999 
and there are now around 50 throughout the country. These are specialist 
magistrates courts where training on domestic violence for key personnel (CPS 
lawyers, domestic violence officers, magistrates and clerks) is provided and 
there is an emphasis on improved sharing of information between the key 
agencies, with a key aspect being advocacy, provided by Independent 
Domestic Violence Advisors (IDVAs). The introduction of IDVAs has resulted in 
a successful outcome (if success is measured by the securing of a conviction) 
in 73% of the domestic violence cases where an IDVA was present. Early 
evaluations of their effectiveness is encouraging, with an increase shown in 
conviction rates, fewer victim withdrawals and more guilty pleas.109 However, 
victim satisfaction with the new courts has been found to be mixed and there 
still seems to be wide variation in practice with a concerning lack of 
communication between the CPS and victims. In particular, the sentencing of 
those convicted has been found to be worrying and this is what victims have 
been most dissatisfied with; they expected to be provided with immediate 
protection which was not usually the case and they therefore felt the courts had 
failed them.110 This finding has been reflected in other studies,111 leading some 
victims to question whether it is worth going through the criminal justice process 
at all. It remains to be seen whether the response and sentencing outcomes 
provided by the specialist courts has improved in recent years. These concerns 
echo those above in relation to the police response; the legal approach seems 
to fail to address the victims’ priorities and thus disappoints their expectations. 
Alongside this, research into perpetrator programmes which are often 
ordered following a conviction for domestic violence reveals that they can be 
more detrimental than beneficial because they allow groups of abusive men to 
interact. This may result in the promotion of misogyny and negative attitudes 
towards women, and may actually encourage men to continue engaging in 
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violence, thus increasing the risk the victim is under.112 When attendance is 
court-mandated instead of a custodial sentence the programme may be seen as 
a ‘soft option,’ thus failing to emphasise that the abusers behaviour is wrong.113 
There is also little evidence that they are successful, especially when 
attendance is mandatory, and because the abuser only needs to attend there is 
no assessment of any resulting changes in his behaviour.114 According to 
Mullender and Burton ‘there has been insufficient and insufficiently rigorous 
monitoring of perpetrators’ programmes’ and ‘much of the practice-based 
literature makes over-stated, impressionistic claims for success.’115  
 
 
Part Three 
Failure to Protect Policies under the Domestic Violence, Crime and 
Victims Act 2004 
 
One of the most recent ways that the criminal law can be seen to fail to 
adequately comprehend the power dynamics and complexities of domestic 
violence is the devastating impact that the operation of Section 5 of the DVCVA 
2004 has had on some victims of abuse. The section effectively creates the 
offence of ‘allowing the death of a child or vulnerable adult’ with the intention of 
overcoming the difficulty of proving which of two individuals residing in a house 
with a child at the time of a killing caused the death. Where a parent misjudges 
the seriousness of the risk posed by their abusive partner, or does not summon 
help ‘due to an overarching fear that this could precipitate further violence,’116 
there is a risk that the bereaved parent could be imprisoned for up to 14 years 
under the legislation. It us up to the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable 
doubt that the parent was, or ought to have been, aware117 of the risk of death 
or serious physical118 harm and failed to take reasonable steps119  to vitiate the 
danger. ‘Reasonable steps’ are thought to include as full a combination of the 
following as possible; reporting incidents of domestic violence to the police 
immediately, making applications for injunctions under the FLA 1996, reporting 
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any breaches of civil protection orders granted immediately to the police, 
notifying the local authority of any risk to the child, a planned escape to a 
women's refuge.120 All of these things may be both difficult to obtain and may 
exacerbate the abuse. 
In the first reported case under the new legislation, R v Stephens and 
Mujuru121 Sandra Mujuru – a young asylum seeker escaping violence in 
Zimbabwe – was convicted of ‘allowing’ her partner to murder her 4 year old 
child from a previous relationship. She was sentenced to a two year community 
order, although while awaiting trial she served more than a year in jail. The 
prosecution contended that Miss Mujuru was aware that her partner had been 
responsible for hurting her daughter (A) in the past122 and was therefore aware 
that he posed a significant risk of serious physical harm to A. She then failed to 
take steps that could reasonably have been expected to be taken to prevent the 
death. In this case the Court of Appeal gave weight to the unusual fact that she 
may not have fully appreciated how to go about accessing local protection 
services in England. From this can be inferred that, had the mother been 
familiar with local protection services in England, her 2–year community 
sentence could have been drastically more severe. We have seen above that 
women who report violence will not necessarily receive a fast and supportive 
response from the criminal justice system or other helping agencies. It was 
apparently sufficient for a conviction under Section 5(1)(d)(i) and (iii) of the 
DVCVA that the mother had known her partner to be a domestic abuser, albeit 
that he had not previously shown any inclination to violence of this magnitude, 
nor had he previously abused the child blatantly.123 In a case with similar facts, 
Rebecca Lewis,124 despite being absent when her baby was killed, was also 
convicted under Section 5 and sentenced to 6 years in prison. The jury must 
have found that because she knew that her partner of 6 weeks had flicked the 
baby’s ears and feet when he cried, picked him up by his ears and ankles, and 
thrown him onto a bed that she was aware, or ought to have been aware, that 
there was a risk of death or serious harm. The fact that she did not summon 
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help because he said he would kill her if she left was not taken into 
consideration.125 
It seems entirely ‘inappropriate to charge a defendant with failing to 
protect when they are a victim of domestic violence at the hands of the person 
who goes on to kill the child.’126 The fact that there is not a specific defence for 
victims of domestic violence so that no or little blame is attributed to them 
shows how far the effect of the law’s failure to understand intimate abuse 
extends. Herring points out that because victims often regard their own 
behaviour as the cause of the abuse they often believe that if they can 
somehow modify their behaviour, they will be able to keep themselves and their 
children safe.127 As the violence is typically used by the man as a method of 
gaining power and control over the woman, an abused woman seen to be 
asserting her independence by challenging the authority of the abuser, either by 
intervening to protect her child by alerting the relevant authorities or restricting 
contact between the abuser and the child, can find herself and her children in a 
very dangerous situation. A study by Humphreys and Thiara indicates that the 
reality of post-separation violence means that it can be more dangerous for a 
woman to leave than to remain with an abuser.128 An abused woman ‘may well 
decide that for herself and her children the violence to which she has become 
accustomed is safer than the violence that may be provoked by an attempt to 
leave or seek assistance’.129 This assessment is probably not wrong given the 
reality of post-separation violence and the fact that a woman is most likely to 
suffer a fatal attack at the point of separation.130 The state perspective is 
completely misplaced in imposing obligations on victims of domestic abuse if it 
does not succeed in ensuring assistance is in place to enable women to protect 
their children. In demanding that a woman leaves, regardless of the risk this 
may pose to her and the children, legal responses can be seen to contribute to 
the vulnerability of the children involved in abusive relationships.  
Policies that ‘ask the impossible of mothers’131 render the abuser 
invisible by focusing on the mother132 and can be seen to reflect a ‘glorification 
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of motherhood’.133  The implication of FTP policies is that women are neglectful, 
even abusive, because their actions/inactions in response to violence inflicted 
on them either directly harmed their children or placed them at a risk of harm.134 
Child protection authorities in most jurisdictions respond to situations of intimate 
abuse where children are involved135 by engaging primarily or solely with 
victimised women;136 male perpetrators of violence are typically ignored, even 
when they are fathers or father figures, thus absolving them from the 
responsibility of protecting their children.137 These ‘gendered practices 
inappropriately transform women who are intimate partner violence victims into 
child abusers while exculpating and absenting the actual perpetrators of 
violence’.138 Strega and Janzen identify the most dangerous implication of FTP 
policies as their expectation that ‘women can, and hence should, control men’s 
violence’139. While this may seem ‘absurd’, it accords with persistent and 
widespread beliefs about women’s responsibility for male violence.140  
Research has shown that mothers frequently take action to safeguard 
their children from the effects of violence,141 and yet the ways abused mothers 
seek to protect their children are often overlooked.142 To be seen as acting 
protectively by child support agencies, women are required to monitor and 
manage the behaviour of violent men and reduce the consequences of the 
violence.143 The frequent requirement of child protection services that mothers 
control violent men’s access to their children is often in direct contradiction of 
family court orders requiring women to facilitate contact, and again 
demonstrates a failure of the law to adequately comprehend the problem and a 
failure of the various state agencies to work together in addressing it. Women 
have been imprisoned and threatened with the loss of their children through 
child protection services proceedings when they refused to facilitate their 
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children’s contact with a violent partner.144 As Bancroft has stated, a woman in 
‘an abusive relationship is criticised for continuing to live with an abusive man, 
and child protection officials can take the children away from her for ‘failure to 
protect’. However when an abused woman leaves an abusive relationship 
suddenly she is punished by court personnel for being reluctant to expose her 
children to the same man.’145 One of the obstacles identified by Strega is that 
there is now a ‘moral panic’ about children’s exposure to domestic violence,146 
but instead of making perpetrating violence in front of children the focus, the 
attention remains on the mother for allowing the abuse to occur in front of her 
children.147 A number of assumptions, then, are inherent in the operation of S. 5 
DVCVA and FTP policies more generally; first that the woman has some control 
over the violence, secondly that reporting the violence or leaving will reduce it 
and that the criminal justice system provides fast and supportive responses for 
women who choose to report violence.148 The reality is very different. Post-
separation violence means that defining a good mother as a mother who 
leaves149 and working on the assumption that women have the ‘choice’ to leave 
in order to protect themselves and their children is yet another way the law fails 
to take into account the realities and complexities of intimate partner abuse. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
A general theme can be seen to be emerging of good intentions within the 
criminal justice response being thwarted due to continued naiveté about 
domestic violence. As was seen in Part One, the ability of the criminal justice 
system to respond to domestic violence appropriately is hampered due to only 
being able to criminalise behaviour on a model founded upon stranger violence. 
The dynamics resulting from the intimate nature of the abuse are not able to be 
fully conceptualised and the judiciary are seen to struggle to comprehend 
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violence and abuse in the context of a relationship in some of the cases under 
the PHA. The prevalence of stranger violence within criminal law 
understandings, alongside a failure to comprehend the additional complexities 
of domestic violence, has led to a focus on the need for bodily harm, unless a 
recognised psychiatric injury can be proved – as seen in Chan Fook, ‘mere’  
emotions such as fear are not enough. It was also seen that the criminal law 
process focuses on single incidents and isolates conduct from its broader social 
context. This is seen in the cases under the OAPA and the PHA, despite the 
latter being introduced to provide an offence relating to a ‘course of conduct’. 
The cumulative impact of the abuse is not able to be taken sufficiently into 
account.  
It seems, therefore, that the impact of the abuse on the victim, especially 
her fear and the coercion she is usually under are misunderstood to some 
extent at least by all the criminal justice agencies. This is particularly evident in 
relation to the discussion of the convictions of abused women under the 
DVCVA. There is also the continuing perception that women who report abuse 
receive a fast and effective response to the abuse and that it is safe for them to 
leave if they choose to do so. This results in the misconception that women 
would exit the relationship if they wanted to. This will be revealed to be an 
incorrect assumption in the analysis of the dynamics and impact of the abuse in 
the following chapter. It is contended that it is partly the failure to recognise the 
role of domestic violence in sustaining male dominance within a patriarchal 
state that leads to this focus on incidents of physical violence. Until the root 
causes and purpose of domestic violence are acknowledged, the violence can 
be seen as angry outbursts resulting from individual stresses and frustrations. 
The next chapter will develop the argument that once it is understood that 
domestic violence is functional, it becomes clear that it is best understood as a 
programme of coercive control designed to control and dominate the victim, 
thus challenging the traditional focus on isolated incidents of mainly physical 
violence.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE LIMITATIONS OF A LEGAL FOCUS ON PHYSICAL VIOLENCE 
 
In the previous chapters the argument was developed that domestic violence is 
embedded in the key institutions of society and is therefore primarily a social 
problem, not one caused by the deviancy of particular individuals or relationship 
dynamics. It was argued that one of its root causes is gender-role stereotypes 
and the expectations placed upon males and females to behave in certain ways 
and adopt certain roles – particularly within the institution of the family – that are 
necessary to sustain a patriarchal society. The analysis of the legal responses 
to domestic violence in England and Wales further revealed that the responses 
not only overlook its root causes, they also focus primarily on physical violence 
when assessing both the existence and the severity of this violence. Chapter 
Six concluded by suggesting that this focus on physical violence could be 
explained by a failure to see the functional nature of domestic violence as a 
method of establishing male power and domination over the victim. 
One explanation for the difficulties found within the legal responses to 
domestic violence is that legal academic literature has not employed the 
insights developed in some sociological and social-psychological literature to 
examine the underlying conceptual question of what ‘counts’ as domestic 
violence.1 In engaging with these insights, this chapter will attempt to develop 
an alternative conception of the dynamics and harm of abusive relationships in 
order to highlight the limitations of the legal focus on physical violence as their 
defining feature. It will be claimed that this focus is misplaced; the dynamics of 
abusive relationships can best be understood as a range of coercive and 
controlling strategies used to maintain power over the victim, with physical 
violence being merely one tool to establish this. When this is not understood, 
the victim of abuse becomes identified with the ‘battered woman’,2 leaving many 
victims unidentified and unprotected because their experience is not recognised 
as domestic violence.  
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Part One will demonstrate that much of the sociological and 
psychological literature on domestic violence that has influenced the legal 
responses continues to perpetuate the focus on domestic violence as incidents 
of mainly physical violence. In particular this can be found in the foundational 
studies by Lenore Walker,3 which, despite revisions, continue to identify 
abusers as ‘batterers’ and victims as ‘battered women’.4 An alternative 
conception of domestic violence will then be presented in Part Two, where the 
dynamics of domestic violence will be shown to be best understood as a range 
of methods aimed to gain power over the victim by undermining her autonomy 
and decision-making ability. The aim of this analysis is to provide the basis for 
the claims that it is hard, or impossible, for the victim to leave the relationship, 
and that the requirement or expectation of serious physical violence under 
many of the legal remedies and responses in England and Wales leaves many 
victims outside the protection of the law. Part Three will then aim to show the 
problematic nature of this approach, claiming that it ignores the programmatic 
nature of the abuse and the other control strategies typically used by abusers. It 
will be claimed that this has led to the medicalisation of the ‘battered woman’5 
through syndromes which suggest her response is unusual, and that this, in 
turn, has led to a focus on the behaviour and personality of the individual 
woman, rather than the social context in which the abuse occurs.  
 
 
Part One 
The Focus on Incidents of Physical Violence 
 
Throughout the previous two chapters, it was noted that the current legal 
responses to domestic violence typically require evidence of physical violence 
(or fear of physical violence under the PHA) before legal protection can be 
offered.6 This chapter will develop arguments to support the claim that this 
focus is misplaced, thus challenging many of the assumptions that influence the 
operation of legislation and practice that engages with domestic violence 
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 See Walker, L., 1979. The Battered Woman, New York: Harper and Row; Walker, L., 1984. The Battered Woman 
Syndrome, New York: Springer. 
4
 Walker: 2009 
5
 Through the use of Walker’s ‘Battered Woman Syndrome’ (BWS) (Walker: 2009) and Post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) to explain the behaviour of the victim of abuse. 
6
 See Chapter Five and Chapter Six where this focus is noted throughout. 
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victims, such as Section 5 DVCVA,7 the domestic violence evidential 
requirements under LASPO,8 the granting of occupation orders under the 
Family Law Act,9  and the operation of policies implicitly based upon the 
assumption that women would choose to leave an abusive relationship if they 
wanted to.10 
Stanko helps to clarify the difficulties with the approach to harm taken in 
the criminal justice system due to its conception of violence. She claims that 
‘what violence means is and always will be fluid, not fixed; it is mutable’.11 
However, the statutes used to criminalise violence specify the form of injury, 
threat and harm in a fixed way, and place different violent acts along a 
continuum that separates their seriousness by some ‘objective’ measure of 
outcome.12 This has led Stanko to question whether the criminal law can be 
adequately used to address domestic violence due to its very clear conception 
of the harm arising from physical violence and which outcomes are the most 
harmful.13 It seems to be assumed that different forms of violent behaviour will 
have similar consequences if the objective harm is the same. This approach 
does not account for the differential vulnerability of victims of violence. The 
dynamics of abusive relationships explored below will reveal that physical 
violence does not accurately encapsulate the harm of domestic violence, and 
the ways in which particular vulnerabilities can be created and exploited by the 
abuser in the context of the abusive relationship.  
It can be seen that different definitions of violence are clearly in existence 
and used in different contexts. It is not problematic for definitions to differ in 
terms of the range of behaviours and experiences researchers include in the 
term violence, provided they are explicit about how they are operationalising the 
term.14 Herein lies the difficulty; societal and legal understandings of domestic 
violence continue to be premised upon incidents of physical violence, even 
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 See Chapter Six at pp. 161-5  
8
 See Chapter Five at pp. 132-3  
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 See Chapter Five at p. 118, p. 122-5 and p. 141  
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 The focus on physical violence leads to an incident-based approach which assumes that there is time and space 
between incidents of violence in which a woman can exercise her choice to leave the relationship. Thus, when she does 
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 Stanko: 2003 p. 3. Stanko clarifies that this does not mean outlawing forms of violence is misguided, it is necessary 
for the prosecution of some kinds of violence that the legal definitions be precise. However, the focus on the outcomes 
of specific forms of violence is not helpful in all circumstances (p. 5). 
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 Stanko: 2002 p. xiii 
13
 Under the OAPA, grievous bodily harm (Sections 18 and 20) is the most serious outcome, followed by actual bodily 
harm (Section 47) and common assault (Section 39 Criminal Justice Act 1988) which is either battery (defined in R v 
Burstow) or assault (defined in Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 1 QB 439). 
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 Gordon: 2000 p. 6 
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where it is purported to include different types. This leads to the side-lining of 
non-physical violence which thus becomes perceived as less important and less 
harmful. Domestic violence as a term to describe what happens to abused 
women has come to be understood as a particular thing – battering – and 
therefore despite recognition that domestic violence can involve other types of 
abuse, this hasn’t adequately filtered down to everyday and legal 
understandings which tend to be culturally ingrained.  
 
 
Research that has impacted on Legal Understandings of Domestic 
Violence 
 
Psychologist Lenore Walker’s model remains the dominant explanation of the 
ways in which the dynamics of an abusive relationship can impact upon the 
victim adopted in legal understandings. Her theories of ‘Battered Woman 
Syndrome’ (BWS) and ‘Learned Helplessness’15 have in part determined the 
availability of the partial defence of Diminished Responsibility16 for women who 
kill their abusers.17 Battered Woman Syndrome, as it was originally conceived, 
‘consisted of the signs and symptoms that have been found to occur after a 
woman has been physically, sexually, and/or psychologically abused in an 
intimate relationship, when her partner (usually, but not always a man) exerted 
power and control over the woman to coerce her into doing what he wanted, 
without regard for her rights or feelings.’18 The model will be explored in more 
detail below, when difficulties with this focus on physical violence are 
considered. For present purposes it can be noted that even in the revised 
editions Walker continues to use the term ‘battered women’19 to refer to women 
in abusive relationships. Whilst many women do experience at least low-level 
physical violence and beatings on a regular basis,20 the use of this phrase 
serves to exclude the experiences of many women who are not experiencing 
serious and frequent physical violence and thus, by not identifying themselves 
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 This is the theory that woman passive and stop trying to help themselves due to ongoing violence.  See Walker: 2009 
Chapter 4 for the most recent explanation of the theory and implications of Walker’s theory of Learned Helplessness. 
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 Section 52 Coroners and Justice Act 2009 amended Section 2 Homicide Act 1957 so that those relying on the partial 
defence of Diminished Responsibility needed to prove they killed as a result of suffering from a ‘recognisable medical 
condition’ (Section 52(1)(a)). 
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 See the discussion of Diminished Responsibility in Chapter Eight. 
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 Walker: 2009 p. 42 
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 Walker: 2009 
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 Stark’s research found that physical assaults in abusive relationships are typically minor, but routine (Stark: 2009 p. 
206). 
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as being ‘battered,’ may not see themselves as experiencing ‘real’ domestic 
violence. Calling men ‘batterers’ retains a primary focus on physical abuse. 
Instead, the focus must be on ‘the nature of domination’21 and the ways in which 
it prevents women from leaving the relationship. Walker doesn’t explicitly 
exclude the other aspects of abuse, and she does recognise that the man uses 
various forms of abuse (physical, sexual and/or psychological) to exert power 
and control over the woman in order to coerce her into doing what he wants her 
to do,22  but the term impliedly excludes these other aspects and focuses 
attention on physical violence.  
Walker’s cycle of violence theory23 is based on the idea that there are 
three distinct phases associated with a ‘recurring battering cycle:1) tension 
building accompanied with rising sense of danger, 2) the acute battering 
incident, and 3) loving contrition.24 Phase two is seen as ‘inevitable explosion… 
characterised by the uncontrollable discharge of tensions that have built up 
during phase one.’25 In focusing on physical violence as the culmination of the 
cycle, the cycle of violence gives both a pre-eminence to physical violence and 
perpetuates an incident, or act-based, approach to domestic violence (because 
physical violence inherently consists of isolated incidents; even when there are 
multiple incidents, each one is separate from the previous). This implies that 
there is a respite from the abuse between incidents and therefore that women 
have the ‘opportunity to exit’ and ‘sufficient volitional space between abusive 
incidents to exercise decisional autonomy.’26 Stark’s research indicates that this 
simply is not the reality ‘in the millions of cases where abuse is unrelenting, 
volitional space closed, or decisional autonomy is significantly compromised’.27 
The cycle theory also provides implicit support for the assumption that violence 
occurs as a result of pent-up anger and frustration, thus overlooking its 
purposive nature and function as one of the methods of sustaining power and 
control over the victim. These points will be explored in more detail below. 
Some attempt has been made to integrate an understanding of the 
harms of domestic violence apparent in sociological literature into legal 
understandings, for example the conceptual analysis provided by Madden 
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 See Walker: 2009 Chapter Five for the most recent explanation of her theory of the cycle of violence  
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 Walker: 2009 p. 91 
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Dempsey.28 Her analysis is useful in that it recognises that domestic violence 
entails structural inequality; something she identifies is not acknowledged by the 
‘violence account’ of domestic violence which predominates in criminal justice 
understandings.29 Her explanation of structural inequality30 as one of the 
defining features of domestic violence reveals an understanding of the root 
causes of domestic violence and the reasons why men are able to coerce and 
control their female partners.31  
However, detailed analysis of Madden Dempsey’s understandings of the 
worst form of domestic violence (domestic violence in its ‘strong’ sense32) 
reveals an operationalising of a hierarchy of harms whereby domestic violence 
involving physical violence is seen as more serious than domestic abuse. In 
building her analysis she can be seen to accept the existing terminology, with a 
clear privileging of ‘violence’ per se as characterising the worst type of domestic 
violence.33 The methods used by abusers to gain control and power over 
victims,34 she classifies as ‘domestic abuse’ rather than domestic violence. In 
accepting that ‘violence can be best understood under a non-legitimist 
account35… [she] adopts a narrow view of what counts as violence, focusing on 
the direct, physical use of force’,36 and, whilst she does not intend to exclude 
violent acts that do not result in injury or damage (recognising that ‘violent acts 
are no less violent for their failure to cause injury or damage’37), this 
nevertheless has the effect of relegating the types of acts that should, it will be 
argued below, be the defining features of domestic violence to a less serious 
category of harm. It is from what is included in the category of ‘domestic abuse’ 
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 Madden Dempsey notes the two diverging debates regarding domestic violence in recent decades – one in 
sociological literature over gender prevalence and one in legal literature over how the criminal justice system should 
address domestic violence, and notes that the sociological debate has had little significant impact on the legal debate 
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 Madden Dempsey: 2005 p. 321 
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see Chapter Two in particular, but also Chapters One and Four.  
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 Madden Dempsey: 2005 
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context that tend to sustain or perpetuate structural inequality - domestic violence in its ‘strong’ sense; 2) includes 
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its symbolic significance ‘as a place of comfort, safety and protection’ (pp. 306-316). This she refers to as domestic 
violence in its ‘strong’ sense, with the classic paradigm being ‘wife beating’ (p. 318). 
34
 Such as ‘a refusal to allow an abused person contact with friends or family, demands to know the abused person’s 
location and companions at all times or a refusal to allow the abused person to work outside the home or have access 
to money or other necessities’ (Madden Dempsey: 2005 pp. 318-9).a  
35
 See Madden Dempsey: 2005 pp. 307-310 for her understanding and critique of legitimist accounts and structuralist a 
36
 Madden Dempsey: 2005 p. 310 
37
 Madden Dempsey: 2005 p. 310 
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that it becomes apparent that Madden Dempsey’s analysis of domestic violence 
in its strong sense does not extend beyond physical acts, and thus her analysis 
continues to fail to accurately capture the harm of domestic violence (see 
below). It can be seen, therefore, that even feminist scholars attempting to 
improve the criminal justice response to domestic violence by highlighting 
structural inequality as integral to domestic violence lapse back into a focus on 
physical violence as characterising the harm of domestic violence. It is 
necessary to examine further ideas about the shortcomings of the focus on 
physical violence. 
 
 
Part Two 
The Dynamics of 'Domestic Violence’: An Alternative Conception 
 
The dominant model of the dynamics of abuse in legal understandings – 
Walker’s Cycle of Violence, outlined above – suggests that physical violence 
occurs as part of a cyclical explosion of pent-up anger and frustration. However, 
other models, such as Pence and Paymar’s Wheel of Power and Control,38 can 
be used to undermine this model. These models contend that while physical 
violence may appear to be cyclical because of its relatively infrequent 
occurrence, the use of physical assaults and sexual abuse merely serves to 
reinforce the power of the other tactics, explored below. Walker’s model can be 
seen to perpetuate the myth that assaults are neatly circumscribed but Stark 
has found that ‘abusive assaults are typically comprised of numerous acts of 
coercion and control of varying degrees of severity and may extend over an 
hour, all night, or be separated by periods of R&R, when the offender sleeps, 
goes out to buy beer or drugs, or he or the victim goes to work’.39 The time 
between seemingly discrete episodes must not be negated; as a result of not 
knowing when the next incident will occur, and perhaps living with on-going 
psychological abuse, she is subjected her to a continuing ‘state of siege’.40 The 
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 Pence and Paymar devised the wheel to illustrate that violence is part of a pattern of behaviours rather than isolated 
incidents of physical abuse, thus drawing drew attention to violence as a constant force in abusive relationships (See 
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methods used to maintain this ‘state of siege’ will now be considered and their 
seriousness explained.  
 
 
The Dynamics of Coercion and Control 
 
Evan Stark  divides the ‘technology’ of coercive control41 into: isolation 
(intended to prevent disclosure and the seeking of help or support, instil 
dependence, express exclusive possession, monopolise skills or resources), 
intimidation (induced through threats, surveillance, and degradation in order to 
instil fear, secrecy, dependence, compliance and shame), control (an array of 
tactics that ensure the woman’s subordination, deprive her of the means 
needed for autonomy or escape, and regulate her behaviour to conform with 
stereotypic gender roles42) and violence (used concurrently with the other 
technologies to establish dominance, prevent escape, repress conflict, 
appropriate resources and establish privileges lessens its importance in 
achieving these aims).43 Violence does not need to be a constant presence for 
the victims to feel threatened that it could erupt at any point. To keep the victim 
in fear and thus control her behaviour, there need only be the threat of future 
violence, often based on past experiences.44  
The abuser typically employs violence to establish power and control 
over the victim through the making of extremely controlling rules backed up with 
threats. These rules dictate how the victim must act in all aspects of everyday 
life and are often abusive in and of themselves. The victim will be punished for 
breaking them, either through physical violence or through other threatened 
consequences. In order to maintain control over the victim, the abuser’s 
demand must be linked with a ‘credible threatened negative consequence for 
noncompliance.’45 This ensures that the victim feels compelled to comply to 
avoid the negative consequences that are threatened. These can include the 
threat of physical violence if sexual demands are not met, the threat to take 
children away from their mother if the abuser is not allowed to return home and 
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 For a full explanation of the tactics and techniques of coercive control identified by Stark in his research and work with 
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 Stark: 2009 pp. 241-274 
44
 Fischer et al: 1992 p. 2128 
45
 Dutton and Goodman: 2005 p. 747 
175 
 
also coercion that is seen as less serious than physical harm – but 
psychologically harmful nevertheless – such as ‘the threat to embarrass a 
woman in front of her family, or to seek sex outside of the relationship if a 
woman doesn’t allow her partner to engage in unwanted sexual behaviours with 
her’.46 A victim is likely to be particularly vulnerable to coercion even when the 
immediate threat is relatively minor if she has experienced violence from her 
partner already; ‘the possibility remains that it will happen again’.47 Dutton and 
Goodman refer to this as ‘priming’ the target for coercion; this can happen in 
many ways and is how the stage is set for coercive threats to be complied with 
in the future. Whether these threats are coercive or not cannot be judged 
objectively; they depend upon the social context of the relationship and whether 
the victim has reason to be believe the threats can and will be carried out.48  
Therefore, as the rules become internalised and automatically performed 
by the victim, less and less physical violence and other punishing behaviour is 
needed to ensure compliance. The rules are even more likely to become 
internalised when the victim feels responsible for making the relationship work 
due to societal expectations that this is the responsibility of the female in the 
relationship. At the same time, the abuser will often blame her for the “failure” of 
the relationship and thus the need for the abuse. This reinforces societal 
messages concerning women’s responsibility which may result in the woman 
making ‘frantic attempts… to be the perfect wife, mother, and homemaker’49 by 
conforming to the rules and expectations.  
In many abusive relationships the rules set by the perpetrator do not 
even need to be verbally expressed to create an atmosphere that is controlled 
by the abuser.50 The use of signals and other covert messages become integral 
to the maintenance of control over the victim. In abusive and non-abusive 
relationships alike, daily interaction and shared history enable couples to 
develop ‘idiosyncratic modes of communication, such as single word phrases, 
facial expressions, gestures, tones of voice, and private jokes, that may be 
mysterious or unnoticed to outsiders but which convey clear meaning to the 
couple themselves’.51 In abusive relationships, these modes of communication 
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‘become an extension of the pattern of domination itself; ‘a gesture that seems 
innocent to an observer is instantly transformed into a threatening symbol to the 
victim of abuse’.52  
The setting of rules and demands by the perpetrator require close 
surveillance of the victims’ behaviour and activities to ensure compliance, 
something that becomes possible as a result of the close physical and 
emotional proximity between the parties. For the abuser to maintain their power 
over the victim they ‘need to have information about the target’s behaviour to 
know whether or not the contingency for failure to comply needs to be 
imposed’53 and it needs to be clear to the victim that her compliance is being 
monitored. Surveillance methods thus act as ‘behavioural constraints’54 by 
ensuring the victim knows she is being watched or overheard. In conveying that 
the perpetrator is omnipotent and omnipresent, methods of surveillance impact 
upon a victim’s sense of freedom and autonomy. For example, a woman who 
finds out that her abusive partner has been monitoring her movements and 
spending habits, and who later gets punished for breaking rules she was not 
aware of at the time, will become so fearful of making the wrong decision in the 
future that ‘choice itself becomes fearful.’55 Furthermore, the success of 
methods of intimidation such as this ‘rely heavily on what a woman’s past 
experience tells her a partner is likely to do’56 and are thus linked to the use of 
credible threats in the past. 
The abusive partner may intentionally create vulnerabilities and thus 
undermine the self-esteem of the victim, making it easier to control her. Control 
can, therefore, also be maintained, and fear intensified, through ‘the extensive 
use of humiliation, ridicule, criticism, and other forms of emotional abuse; 
financial abuse; and social isolation’.57 Stark identified the technology of 
coercive control as being designed to respond to women’s agency and 
resistance; ‘[a]busive partners appreciate what the loss of autonomy means to 
women and shape their tactics accordingly. In anticipation that their target will 
attempt to break free or seek support, they may extend their efforts to isolate 
and control them in ways that can appear vastly disproportionate to the 
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immediate resistance they confront’.58 Isolating the woman from her friends and 
family can, amongst other things, prevent disclosure and the seeking of help or 
support, instil dependence and express exclusive possession.59 The impact of 
ongoing abuse on the autonomy and sense of self of the victim will be further 
considered below. 
 
 
The Involuntary Nature of Women’s Compliance 
 
If it is not recognised that the victim has internalised the petty demands and 
rules of the abuser in order to avoid violence and other negative consequences, 
it may seem as though she is acting voluntarily when she complies. However, 
because the compliance typically follows a period of escalating physical and/or 
other violence, the victim is aware that the abuser has the means to exert 
coercion60 and therefore, although they have some form of choice over whether 
to comply, this is not ‘free choice.’61 The use of credible threats and the delivery 
of threatened consequences in the past increases the likelihood of compliance 
in the future. For example ‘when a man threatens to “teach his wife a lesson” for 
not having sex with him, and then rapes her when she refuses, the likelihood of 
her compliance the next time is increased’.62  
Alongside gestures, “symbolic violence”63 is also frequently used to 
maintain control over the victim. For example ‘[w]hen I came back to the 
apartment, he had smashed every single piece of furniture in the bedroom. On 
the wall there was the red dress that I had worn to my office Christmas party the 
week before. It was stuck to the wall with a butcher knife through the heart’.64 
Stark provides examples of a woman in his study who would be beaten if the 
bedcovers were not a certain number of centimetres off the floor. Another 
woman’s husband used to text her phone numbers; she had to guess the 
significance of these or incur physical violence.65 Fear of serious violence, then, 
can be seen to run as an undercurrent beneath the daily demands and petty 
routines that must be adhered to, and explains why conforming to these 
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demands may seem voluntary to outsiders, but is in fact vital for the victim’s 
survival. This fear can arise as a result of previous beatings or threats and may 
also be triggered by ‘any verbal or nonverbal symbol associated with the onset 
of an abusive incident’.66 
 
 
The Impact of Abuse: Loss of Self 
 
As a result of this awareness of the surveillance methods used, and the abused 
woman’s development of tactics, such as conforming to internalised rules, that 
may reduce further incidents of violence, abuse or other threatened 
consequences,67 it can be seen that women often come to incorporate the world 
view of their aggressor, leading them to become a ‘satellite’ of their captor.68 
This means that the victim may come to know more about her abuser’s 
personality and behaviour than her own, in an attempt to predict his responses 
and thus avoid violence and other threatened consequences. This can lead the 
victim to lose her sense of self.  
In her work with abused women, psychologist Judith Herman found that 
ongoing abuse typically leads to personality changes including deformations to 
the sense of self-identity and the ability to relate to others.69 It is widely 
recognised that the worst fear of any traumatised person is that ‘the moment of 
horror will recur’ and, in recognising that this fear is ‘actually realised, multiple 
times, in victims of chronic abuse,’ it can be asserted that victims of domestic 
violence experience a severe disruption to their system of  self-defence which 
‘tends to persist in an altered and exaggerated state long after the actual 
danger is over.’70  This means that chronically traumatised people, such as 
abused women, are in a permanent state of hyper-arousal and vigilance,71 thus 
undermining the perception that women have sufficient space between abusive 
incidents to make the decision to exit the relationship. 
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Trust is taken as one of the foundations of an intimate relationship and it 
can thus be seen that the harm experienced in abusive relationships is different 
from that experienced when a stranger attacks or abuses an individual because 
of the breach of the trust commonly established in an intimate relationship. This 
breach of trust impacts upon the victim because ‘it is through our intimate 
relationships that we form our identity and sense of self’ so when a person is 
domestically abused it ‘strikes at the very conception of the self for the victim’ 
and turns ‘a tool for self-affirmation and self-identification into a tool for 
alienation and self-betrayal’.72 Brison emphasises that trauma of ‘human origin 
and… intentionally inflicted… shatters one’s fundamental assumptions about 
the world and one’s safety in it’ and also ‘severs the sustaining connection 
between the self and the rest of humanity’.73 Herman and Stark’s work both 
suggests that the situation of abused women can be compared with that of 
victims of capture crimes such as kidnapping.74 Prolonged captivity produces 
profound alterations in the victim’s identity because ‘[a]ll the psychological 
structures of the self – the image of the body, internalised images of others, and 
the values and ideals that lend a person to a sense of coherence and purpose – 
have been invaded and systematically broken down.’75 Since our sense of self 
exists fundamentally in relation to others,76 and a traumatic event destroys the 
belief that the person can be herself in relation to others, a situation is created 
where the victim cannot even be herself to herself.77 Stark suggests, however, 
that regardless of the ‘technical resemblance’ of coercive control to the 
techniques used in torture and kidnapping, ‘everything about the experience of 
coercive control reflects its personal and individualised nature… Only in 
coercive control do perpetrators hone their tactics to their special knowledge’ of 
the victim and her life.78 
It can thus be seen that the programme of coercive control typical in 
abusive relationships results in a ‘liberty crime’;79 the primary harm is the 
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deprivation of freedom, not the infliction of physical violence as is commonly 
held. Stark identified degradation – including shaming – as an isolation tactic 
and explains how ‘[c]ontrolling men establish their moral superiority by 
degrading and denying self-respect to their partners.’80 In her concept of the 
‘project of becoming a person,’ Cornell explains how our perception of “the 
person” is not static but part of a project that must be ‘open to each one of us on 
an equivalent basis.’81 For this project to take place, a human being must be 
‘able to imagine herself as whole’ and all must have this ‘equivalent chance of 
becoming a person’.82 This requires freedom and thus the project is interfered 
with both by the condition of ‘unfreedom’ inherent in relationships of coercive 
control, and also when the ‘degradation prohibition’83 is violated, as it is by 
domestic abuse. Ongoing abuse can thus be seen to undermine a woman’s 
sense of self and threaten her personhood; her conception of herself as a living 
person. The words of a domestic violence victim (whose partner gouged her 
eyes out and permanently blinded her) in a 2012 episode of Channel 4’s 
‘Dispatches’84 provide an example of the claim that  many traumatised and 
abused people feel as though a part of themselves has died and is lost forever; 
‘I knew I would die that day’. Her use of the word knew, instead of thought is 
revealing, as if a part of her really did die that day, demonstrating the enormous 
impact that trauma often has and the way it can result in a loss of sense of self. 
Having established the reasons for the assertion that the dynamics of 
domestic violence need to be recognised to involve physical violence as one of 
the tools to gain power and control over the victim, rather than physical violence 
being seen as the pinnacle of the abuse, many of the central assumptions 
pertaining to abusive relationships can be challenged. There are two primary 
assumptions leading from the failure to recognise the functional and 
programmatic nature of domestic violence and focusing on incidents of mainly 
physical violence. The first is that the woman’s behaviour and decision to stay in 
the relationship becomes the focus. The second, related, assumption is that 
answers to this question can be provided through examining the personality and 
behaviour of the abused woman. This has led to a medicalisation of the impact 
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of the abuse, primarily through the use of BWS. The limitations and implications 
of these two misconceptions are focused on more fully in Part Three below. 
 
 
Part Three 
Implications of the Focus on Physical Violence 
 
When the programmatic nature of the abuse is seen as the defining feature, 
with physical violence being recognised as just one tool amongst many coercive 
strategies to maintain power and control over the victim, it becomes harder to 
ignore the functional nature of domestic violence than when the focus is on 
incidents of physical violence alone (because these can be seen as outbursts 
attributable to anger, frustration and stress). The misplaced focus on incidents 
of serious physical violence as characterising the most serious aspect of an 
abusive relationship has led to the question being asked of abused women; 
“why did she not leave the relationship?”85 This is based on the assumption that 
she could leave safely and easily if she wanted to, and that there is sufficient 
volitional space between incidents for her to exercise her autonomy by leaving. 
 
 
‘Why does she Stay?’ 
 
The seeking of explanations for why the woman stays in the relationship in 
terms of her characteristics and behaviour, instead of conceptualising the 
behaviour of the victim as a response to the abusive situation, has led mental 
health professionals frequently to attribute the abusive situation to the victim’s 
presumed underlying psychopathology.86 If the viewpoint that the characteristics 
and problem profile of abused women results from the abuse, rather than 
causing it, explanations for why the woman stays can then be sought by 
examining the impact and dynamics of the abuse.  This would enable the 
assumption that women have the opportunity to safely and freely exit an 
abusive relationship between incidents of violence87 to be challenged. 
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The behaviours of an abused woman who remains in an abusive 
relationship and conforms to the demands of the abuser do not make sense 
until her cage – and the aspects of her life that constitute the bars – are 
identified; ‘once we start with the cage, everything changes and seemingly 
discrete, unrelated behaviours and effects fall into place.’88 The bars of her cage 
consist of things such as a barrage of assaults, a locked door, missing money 
or the distributor cap from her car, rules for cleaning, a timer set at the 
telephone, the reality of post-separation violence and the economic inequality of 
women, not to mention the guilt the woman can feel for not living up to the role 
expected of her. Stark’s research has found that women often live in a state of 
perpetual fear for not doing what’s expected of them in the right way, or 
because they need to work out the significance of a certain message.89  
When the impact of domestic violence as a programme of coercive 
control intended to undermine the victim’s autonomy and sense of self is 
recognised, abused women can be seen as victims of liberty crimes, not violent 
crimes per se. This then undermines the common assumption found within legal 
and societal understandings that women remain in or return to abusive 
relationships out of free choice. Questioning why the woman stays is then 
revealed as a value judgement rather than a real question, demonstrating 
prevailing societal views and misconceptions concerning the responsibility and 
behaviour of abused women.90 Abstracting the effects from the context results 
in more attention being paid to the personality and behaviour of the victim than 
the perpetrator,91 in an attempt to understand why she behaves as she does. It 
will be claimed that legal and societal misunderstandings contribute to the 
perpetuation of the myth that there is something abnormal about the particular 
woman which makes her a victim; many women can be heard to insist ‘I 
wouldn’t let that happen to me.’ This puts responsibility firmly on the victims – 
they are letting this type of abuse happen – and this misplacement of 
responsibility allows perpetrators to avoid incurring appropriate legal and 
societal scrutiny for their behaviour.  
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The explanations outlined above for the reasons women may become 
‘entrapped’92 in an abusive relationship, enduring years, even decades, of 
continuous physical and mental abuse can be used to challenge the focus on 
the woman and why she does not leave. None of these explanations make it 
possible to hold the woman accountable, suggest it is her fault, or support the 
idea that she stays because she ‘enjoys’ the abuse. If this were to be 
understood in legal understandings through a comparison with capture crimes 
such as kidnapping in the common terminology, then explanations for why the 
woman stays would be sought in the behaviour of the abusive man and the 
societal conditions which prevent her from leaving, rather than in the behaviour 
and personality of the woman. However, because this is not understood, 
explanations such as the BWS offered by Walker have come to dominate legal 
understandings. As will now be shown, this has had some success in at least 
highlighting the plight of individual abused women,93 but has done little to 
benefit abused women as a group.  
 
 
‘Battered Woman Syndrome’ and the Medicalising of the ‘Battered’ 
Woman  
 
As the dominant model of the effects of domestic violence used in legal 
understandings, BWS is concerning because the use of the term “syndrome” 
implies that ‘a malady or psychological impairment’94 can be found in the 
woman to explain why she does not leave.95 Walker’s theory of learned 
helplessness implies women are passive, when in fact women develop diverse 
coping strategies which are far from passive, and make many attempts to 
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leave.96 Evidence that abused women call the police, seek civil protection 
orders, enter shelters and so on all discount the claim that they are reluctant to 
seek help. 
BWS was widely criticised by feminist advocates in the 1990s who 
claimed that ‘the use of a syndrome to explain the psychological effects from 
battering was neither empowering nor able to explain all the symptoms that 
battered women could experience’.97 Despite attempting to address these by 
revising her model several times (the most recent version being in 2009) and re-
examining the criteria for BWS98 and revising the battered woman syndrome 
questionnaire,99 it is suggested that Walker does not adequately overcome the 
criticisms levelled at the use of the BWS. Walker asserts that it must not be 
overlooked that, as a subcategory of Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
BWS ‘is the most useful diagnostic category to use for battered women’100 and 
that it has enabled an emphasis on trauma therapy as one of the most 
beneficial interventions for abused women. However, in medicalising the 
experience of the abused woman, the problem has become individualised with 
a continuing focus on the behaviour and personality of the woman, rather than a 
focus on the behaviour of the abuser and the social explanations for this type of 
behaviour.  
Both BWS and PTSD rely upon physical violence per se as causing the 
problem profile found in abused women. Stark suggests that Walker’s 
explanation relies upon an inappropriate direct causal link, retained by 
Herman’s revision of trauma theory,101 ‘between the continuous occurrence of 
life-threatening incidents of violence or prolonged repeated trauma and the 
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clinical outcomes identified as criteria for BWS or PTSD [despite there being] no 
evidence from population-based or controlled studies that full-fledged BWS 
and/or PTSD are widespread among battered women’.102 An early study 
conducted by Stark and Flitcraft refuted this as it found that the ‘problems 
[abused] women presented… suggest a pattern of chronic and diffuse stress 
that has little in common with the more focused and intense trauma anticipated 
by BWS and PTSD.’103 This led them to conclude that ‘[s]ome-yet-to-be-
identified process other than [traumatic] violence was clearly affecting these 
battered women’104 and causing the secondary problems they developed. 
Stark’s own research found that the type of violence abused women reported 
experiencing was only occasional and moderate and therefore not the sort 
‘normally thought to elicit trauma’ and so he suggests that it is on-going trauma 
in the sense of being entrapped or ‘unfree’ that leads to the range of problems 
that keep a woman in an abusive relationship. The implication of this is that 
abused women should not need to prove that they are suffering from either 
BWS or PTSD in order for the impact the abuse has had on them to be 
understood. By medicalising the impact of the abuse, BWS and PTSD have 
operated to exclude women from being recognised as victims of domestic 
violence unless they have a medically acceptable reaction to the alleged abuse. 
Indeed, BWS also perpetuates this exclusion of many women’s 
experiences by its portrayal of women as passive victims, something which 
‘resulted in an exclusive definition of who “counts” as a victim.’105 By operating 
as a kind of checklist and attempting to fit all abused women’s experiences into 
the specific criteria of the syndrome instead of looking at the reality of each 
abused woman’s actual experience, many women have not been recognised as 
suffering abuse due to evidence of BWS not being found.106 This can render 
expert testimony on BWS inadmissible in court.107 Exclusive definitions of who 
“counts” as a victim have led to conceptions of the “ideal victim” being found 
within criminal justice understandings in particular;108 the “ideal victim” is a 
woman who has never provoked a fight, responded physically to aggression, or 
themselves been violent ‘without provocation’. Women who had engaged in any 
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of these things were in danger of having their sympathy revoked109 and possibly 
seen to be contributing to the violence.110  
The claim here is that it is what Walker’s term learned helplessness 
conveys – an impression of abused women as passive and helpless – that is 
objectionable, rather than what perhaps Walker herself understands it to 
mean.111 Learned helplessness implies that ‘while battered women may employ 
various strategies to attempt to stop the violence early in the relationship, 
including leaving the abuser, these attempts decline gradually towards total 
passivity’.112 This is challenged by accounts of the actions of victims. Fischer et 
al found various strategies were used to rebel against and resist domination, 
and that these attempts did not decline in the face of continuous abuse113 as 
suggested by Walker’s model. Research carried out by Dutton and Goodman 
indicates that ‘as the severity of the violence increases, both battered women’s 
resistance and placating (i.e. compliance) increase’114 and that abused women 
‘frequently resist their partners demands… in a variety of ways’.115 Sometimes 
complying is easier than resisting, and, as seen above, sometimes ‘compliance 
with expectations or demands can become internalised or routine – with those 
actions taking on the appearance of being “voluntary”’.116 Women engaging in 
strategies of resistance may be excluded from BWS due to their actions not 
reflecting the concept of learned helplessness. They could thus be excluded 
from being recognised as a ‘real’ victim of domestic violence because their 
behaviour does not conform to that of the ideal, passive victim.117 
Walker continues to maintain in the 2009 edition of her book that the 
term ‘learned helplessness’ demonstrates how ‘someone can lose their ability to 
perceive that their actions will have a particular outcome’ and that it is one of 
the ‘most useful concepts to help jurors understand how a battered woman 
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could be driven to use deadly force against her batterer in self-defence’.118 The 
concept of learned helplessness may have had a beneficial impact for some 
individual battered women, however, it is argued here that it has had a 
detrimental impact on abused women as a group because it misrepresents the 
impact of ongoing abuse and has led to a focus on the behaviour and 
personality of the abused woman, rather than on the abuser and the societal 
expectations and norms that support his behaviour.  
Whilst Walker has recognised the larger societal issues that enable 
violent relationships to continue,119 demonstrating how the syndrome applies to 
individual women retains focus on the ‘individual women as the problem most in 
need of immediate fixing’.120 However, individualising the problem and 
pathologising women seems to have done more harm than good in the longer 
term, thus clearly indicating that it is important to recognise domestic violence 
as a social problem.121 It is not enough for the public to be sympathetic to the 
plight of an individual woman, there needs to be an understanding society-wide 
that women are not to blame, they do not choose to remain, and nor do they 
passively give up hope.  
The difficulties which emerge from the medicalisation of the battered 
woman are threefold. First is the retention of the primary focus on the woman, 
rather than on the abuser and his methods of abuse, and on the societal 
conditions in which domestic violence occurs. The second is that not all abused 
women’s experiences and behaviours will fit the category of BWS. If women 
don’t appear ‘helpless’ they will not be deemed to have the recognisable 
medical condition of battered woman syndrome.122 Third is that it is overlooked 
that a victim does not leave because she is not free to, not because she has a 
medical condition. The retention of the primary focus on the woman and why 
she remains has led to individualised solutions rather than the need to address 
the structural inequalities that lead to the abuse. It is therefore not necessarily 
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that medicalising the impact of abuse is inherently wrong, it is that it results in 
the perpetuation of certain erroneous explanations for abused women’s 
behaviour so that only the more extreme reactions to abuse seen in PTSD and 
BWS are legally recognised. This overlooks the central harm of domestic 
violence which is that it is a liberty crime and this is why women often do not 
leave. This medicalisation implies it is abnormal, but understandable, for a 
woman to react to abuse in that way. However, Stark’s explanation, which looks 
beyond physical violence, makes it clear that the loss of autonomy and self-
esteem/sense of self are normal responses of ordinary women resulting from 
the deprivation of liberty which results from ongoing abuse. The woman stays 
because she is not free to leave, not because she is psychologically damaged 
in some way.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Throughout this chapter, the dynamics of abusive relationships as a programme 
of coercive control have been examined and have provided support for the 
claim that it is the changes induced by the abuse, the relative status of the 
partners, and the dynamics of the relationship itself that lead to women being 
unable to leave an abusive relationship.123 Analysing the various methods used 
by abusers to maintain control and power over their female partner has 
revealed that physical violence is but one tool within the framework of coercive 
control, and that violence becomes less important once the rules set by the 
abuser have been internalised by the victim. It has been shown that behaviour 
on the part of the victim, such as conforming to petty rules and demands, often 
seems voluntary because it is abstracted from the context.  
Previously, in Chapter Six, the main legislation used to prosecute 
domestic violence offenders was explained to be the Offences Against the 
Person Act 1861124 which is limited to acts of physical violence125 which cause 
either physical injury or a recognised psychiatric injury. This chapter has shown 
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how the predominant requirement of physical violence, measured objectively, 
when assessing the existence of severity of domestic violence is misplaced and 
contributing to many victims being excluded from legal protection. When seen 
as coercion and controlling behaviours, the impact of domestic violence cannot 
simply be measured objectively; its impact will depend upon the context of the 
relationship. Neither can it be compared with random violence perpetrated by a 
stranger; as seen above, there is a different impact upon the victim because of 
the betrayal of the trust developed in an intimate relationship and the ways in 
which the abuser can exploit his intimate knowledge of the victim’s personality, 
behaviour and activities to gain control over her. A relatively minor incident of 
physical violence takes on a whole new meaning when it is taken against a 
programme of coercive control designed to undermine the volition and 
autonomy of the victim, and this is something that neither the criminal justice 
system nor the civil remedies are equipped to deal with appropriately.  
This is, therefore, one of the main reasons it is difficult to apply the legal 
responses to domestic violence to coercive controlling behaviour; behaviour 
such as a woman who has ‘a panic attack in the supermarket because they 
don’t have the right shaped piece of meat’ does not make sense to most 
people, but if the woman knows that if she returns home with the wrong shaped 
piece of meat, or cooks it incorrectly, or does not wipe the surfaces correctly 
she will be punished, then her behaviour falls into place.126 However, the 
criminal law is not able to punish perpetrators for psychological harm caused by 
contingent threats, only threats of a serious, physical nature that are actually 
carried out, or in the case of the PHA put the victim in fear of serious violence. 
The following chapter will consider the statutory and judicial treatment of women 
who kill their abusers to further illustrate the impact that these misconceptions 
and misunderstandings are having in practice. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
VICTIMS TURNED PERPETRATORS: 
WOMEN WHO KILL THEIR ABUSERS 
 
The escalating nature of the violence in abusive relationships and the failure of 
the state and legal institutions to adequately respond before it reaches fatal 
levels is illustrated by the domestic homicide statistics. Partner and ex-partner 
homicide has accounted for the deaths of approximately 100 women annually 
for the past 3 decades,1 typically in the context of an abusive relationship.2 In 
fewer, but a still significant number of cases (approximately 10 men annually), 
the ongoing abuse and the inability to exit the relationship results in the abused 
woman feeling she has no meaningful option but to kill her abuser to protect 
herself and her children. This chapter is premised upon the argument that it is 
the lack of adequate legal intervention, revealed in previous chapters, that 
results from misunderstandings of the causes, consequences and dynamics of 
domestic violence that leads to this domestic homicide. Support will also be 
provided for the claim that the gender bias inherent in the legal system is 
particularly evident when the perpetrators of this lethal violence come before the 
courts. Women have been unable to rely successfully upon self-defence3 and 
the partial defences to homicide4 are available for women who kill their abusers 
only in very prescribed circumstances. This will be shown to emphasise judicial 
inability to fully comprehend the complexities of domestic violence by holding 
women to a standard set by – and for – men. Analysis of the availability of the 
partial defences for abused women who kill, alongside a discussion of the 
criminal law’s abstraction and isolation of offences and offenders from their 
social context, will indicate how the actions of these women are prevented from 
appearing to be reasonable and understandable. This can be contrasted with 
the treatment of men who kill their current or former female partner. Men who 
commit domestic homicide have habitually had their charge reduced from 
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murder to manslaughter and their sentences reduced on the grounds of being 
provoked by their nagging, alcoholic, unfaithful or departing wives or girlfriends.5  
 
 
Part One 
Understandings of Women who Kill their Abusers 
 
In the eighteenth century and before, ‘husband killing’ was viewed as a ‘special 
crime' threatening the basic conceptions of a traditional society. This means that 
the current legal responses must be analysed within the context of conceptions 
of appropriate gender roles and behaviours, and the marital-type relationship. 
Blackstone’s Commentaries state it as a crime of ‘treason’ akin to that of killing 
the King because it not only breaks through the restraints of humanity and 
conjugal affection, it also ‘throws off all subjection to the authority of [the] 
husband’6. This history provides evidence of the cultural context in which the 
law evolved in terms of male authority and female subordination. It can be noted 
that a serf who killed his master was also guilty of petty treason. In the same 
way that gender role expectations can still be seen to operate along traditional 
lines, it is suggested that when women kill their partner, notions of this idea of 
petty treason remain, albeit not explicitly articulated.7 A woman who kills her 
partner, even when he is abusing her, disrupts everyday understandings of 
appropriate feminine behaviour in a way that a man, typically viewed as 
biologically dominant and aggressive, who kills his female partner or ex-partner 
does not.  
It can thus be seen that this is a crime that has historically been 
perceived as different from that which is included in the traditional framework of 
criminal law.8 It will be demonstrated in this chapter that the crime still is viewed 
as different and thus excluded from the conceptions of criminal behaviour and 
the valid excuses and justifications provided by liberal legal theory and 
criminology under current law and legal decision-making. Women’s point of 
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view has traditionally been excluded from the legal understandings found in 
statute and case law, meaning their explanatory accounts of their behaviour 
have not been advanced in the courtroom and therefore have not been part of 
the voiced or received excusatory narratives which have informed and shaped 
the development of the law.9 Schneider notes that scholars have ‘amply 
documented that situations involving battered women who kill fall within 
traditional frameworks of defences or excusable action, but are nonetheless 
viewed as different or exceptional by judges who apply the law to these 
cases.’10 She further asserts that until battered women, like all criminal 
defendants, are included within the traditional framework of criminal law their 
equal rights to a fair trial will not be guaranteed.11  
There appears to be a great deal of public and legal misunderstanding 
concerning abused women who kill their assailants, alongside deep societal 
resistance to perceiving the circumstances and legal treatment of women who 
kill their assailants as a problem of gender equality’.12 Invisible gender bias 
operates to question the reliability of the testimony of female witnesses which 
has led to the need for ‘expert witnesses’ and the medicalisation of the impact 
ongoing abuse can have. This has meant that the concept of ‘battered woman 
syndrome’13 (BWS) needed to be developed and utilised in the courtroom in 
order to explain the reasons abused women can end up using lethal force 
against their partners. Abused women’s experiences, and the impact that these 
experiences had on them, have rarely been sufficient to explain, excuse or 
justify the killing. 
 
 
Legal Construction of Narratives  
 
Despite the likelihood of the violence escalating over time or if the woman 
attempts to leave, and the impact that on-going abuse can have on the victim, it 
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seems that women need to be presented as irrational and lacking in agency for 
their actions to become legally understandable14 and to enable them to invoke 
the most likely partial defence to succeed under these circumstances - 
diminished responsibility. Chapter Two examined the legal construction of 
gender and demonstrated how, even when written legislation is not directly 
discriminatory, legal personnel ‘disseminate frequently sexist and oppressive 
ideas of what it means to be a “real woman”, how she behaves and what social 
role she performs’.15 This legal construction then affects women who kill their 
abusers by constructing them in terms of how well they conform with 
‘appropriate femininity’ and punishing them accordingly. The consideration of 
how female experiences may differ from men’s are often now considered by the 
courts but this is frequently in the form of ‘sexist stereotypes which reinforce the 
oppression and control of women in general.’16  
It is open to the judge in any case to construct the perpetrator’s story in 
the way he or she feels appropriate when presenting the “facts” of the case; 
these facts do not exist ‘pre-packaged for judicial recital… Facts have to be 
selected, interpreted and communicated. This process is neither mechanical nor 
neutral, but is aimed at persuading the reader of the logical and emotional force 
of the judge’s decision’.17 It is further suggested by Bibbings that judges ‘first 
arrive at a conclusion as to the desirable outcome of a case and then seek to 
rationalise this by looking for a means to justify it in terms of statute and case 
law.’18 This makes it possible to select and present the facts in a way that 
further supports the decision and also convinces others that it is correct.19 This 
means that a trial judge can construct a narrative for a jury, but also that an 
appeal judge can be seen to construct a version of events (the ‘facts’) that 
justifies the decision reached. It is thus necessary, when reading judgments, to 
consider ‘what extra-legal factors were influential’.20 
 This “manipulation” is very clear when the judicial constructions of 
Kiranjit Ahluwalia21 and Sara Thornton22 – two of the most commonly-discussed 
defendants in the context of the partial defences for abused women who kill – 
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are analysed. In these two cases, the narrative of their stories given by the 
Court of Appeal  judges used fact organisation and rhetoric to ‘construct the two 
women at opposite ends of the scale of appropriate femininity’23 meaning they 
were presented as killing their husbands in very different circumstances and 
were thus not equally deserving of sympathetic treatment. The opening 
statement by Lord Taylor in Ahluwalia – [t]his is a tragic case’24 – can be 
contrasted with that of Thornton in her first appeal where Lord Bedlam provides 
a detached list of Sara Thornton’s personal details.25 Throughout the Ahluwalia 
judgment, Kiranjit is portrayed by Lord Taylor as a victim of ‘grievous ill-
treatment’ and he builds a story that posits a sympathetic subtext portraying her 
as passively borne along by events that outline her irrationality and lack of 
agency.26 However, in Thornton, where diminished responsibility failed at the 
first appeal, Lord Bedlam can be seen to paint the defendant as a calculating 
woman27 and ‘little of the narrative is given over to recounting the abusive 
nature of the matrimonial relationship.’28 Rollinson contends that Sara Thornton 
was not being tried as a defendant but as a woman, and as a woman she was 
found wanting because she did not conform to the behaviour expected of her 
sex. 29 Instead she continued to exercise her autonomy and agency by acting as 
she did, rather than giving in and accepting her situation.30 Nicolson asserts that 
the treatment of Ahluwalia and Thornton depended on ‘a judgement, not so 
much of their actions, but of their character and the extent to which it accords 
with social constructions of appropriate femininity.’31 
The contrasting cases of R v Tandy32 and R v Moloney33 provide a clear 
example of the way that the legal construction of narratives can influence 
judicial perceptions of the defendant’s actions. The decision of the Court of 
Appeal in Tandy emphasises the difficulties with invoking the partial defences to 
murder for women who act in response to male violence and highlights the 
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effect of ‘the artificial construction of fact in legal trials and appeals’34 The ‘facts’ 
that are presented by Lord Bridge relate only to the defendant’s alcoholism, not 
the fact that the defendant had just found out her daughter was being sexually 
abused by her step-father, thus indicating a lack of understanding of the 
emotional trauma of this discovery. In contrast, the House of Lords seem able to 
clearly ‘identify with the mess which Moloney, a soldier, had got himself into 
while drunk’.35 The way that the ‘biography of the defendant is presented thus 
reveals a great deal about judicial empathy with the defendant and whether or 
not the judges in any given case are able to relate to the situation in which the 
defendant found themselves. This in turn will influence the outcome, thus 
providing a potential way of accommodating the limitations inherent in the strict 
doctrine of mens rea and the intention needed for murder, considered below. 
 
 
Part Two 
The Criminal Law: Abstraction, De-Contextualisation and Autonomy 
 
One of the reasons that women who kill their abusers need to raise the partial 
defences is that, due to the foundational principles of criminal law and the ways 
in which the definitional elements of offences are constructed, the actus reus 
and mens rea of murder will usually be established in these situations. The 
practical application of liberal political philosophy and notions of individual 
justice that lie at the heart of the criminal law36 mean external factors which may 
have undermined a defendant’s ability to freely choose their actions, such as 
poverty and years of abuse, are typically ignored and, as the ‘ultimate arbiter of 
[her] will and of [her] own actions, little or no regard is had to the context and 
circumstance of [her] behaviour’. Hence, the motive is ‘theoretically ostracised’ 
from the action.37 One of the fundamental issues affecting the criminal justice 
system’s treatment of abused women who kill is the ‘construction of the abstract 
individual in legal discourse.’38 The context and the impact of on-going abuse 
becomes masked by this rhetoric of individual liberty, and the social world is 
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presented as resting on the consensus of individuals regarded in isolation from 
the social and moral context in which their actions occur.39 Two aspects of 
Norrie’s critique of the criminal law can be utilised to analyse the criminal justice 
system’s response to abused women who kill; the narrow concept of 
involuntariness in relation to the actus reus, and the separation of motives and 
intentions in the construction of the mens rea.  
The actus reus consists of the behaviour which the defendant engages in 
seen from an external point of view and therefore abstracted of meaning or 
significance for the defendant herself.40 This is seen first of all in relation to the 
requirement that the actus reus be performed voluntarily, and the way in which 
the law ‘adopts a very narrow notion of involuntariness. It does not take much 
for something to be freely chosen; merely that the mind was in control of the 
body.’41 According to Ashworth, this approach is grounded in ‘the principle of 
autonomy: individuals are regarded as autonomous persons with a general 
capacity to choose among alternative courses of behaviour’.42 This technical 
criterion serves to exclude ‘subjective excuses based upon a broader moral 
conception which might incorporate the social context of action.’43 All 
considerations relating to the social context and broader judgments about 
whether the accused could have helped doing what she did - such as fear of 
escalating violence, desire to protect her children, inability to leave due to the 
erosion of autonomy and self-esteem resulting from the abuse – are deemed 
irrelevant at this point; all that needs to be proved to establish the actus reus of 
murder is that the act was a conscious one.44 The reliance of this doctrine on 
de-contextualised acts of atomistic individuals means that abused women who 
can be seen to have acted under compulsion and thus could not act freely, are 
still held to have acted voluntarily for the purpose of the actus reus of the 
offence.45 A broad, moral concept of involuntariness would challenge the idea of 
individual responsibility in a way that this narrow conception of physical 
involuntariness does not. This reflects Hart’s account which can be seen to 
crystallise the liberal conception of a world of free individuals; it is justifiable to 
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hold people accountable only for actions which they could have avoided in the 
sense that they knew and understood what they were doing and had the 
capacity and fair opportunity to control their actions.46  
Due to the foundational principles of autonomy and agency, the 
legitimacy of modern criminal law is fundamentally premised upon the notion of 
individual responsibility and this has led to a division between motive and 
intention when considering the existence of the mens rea of an offence.47 Whilst 
motive is not allowed, it remains central to human agency and, in practice, it is 
impossible ‘to imagine people forming intentions without having motives’48 and 
vice versa. However, the criminal law views the motive, such as jealousy or 
fear, as a consequence ulterior to the mens rea and actus reus and therefore as 
no part of the crime; ‘each individual is seen as a separate monad operating 
according to discrete personal motivating characteristics or emotions… No 
thought is given to the social context within which ‘jealousy’ or ‘greed’ are 
stimulated’.49 In the context of women who kill their abusers it is clear that their 
individual actions, intentions and motives are formed within the context of the 
abuse, and yet when it comes to prosecution this is not seen as relevant to the 
forming of the necessary mens rea.50 The effect of this is that, for the purposes 
of mens rea, no legal difference is drawn between circumstances that are vastly 
morally different; the contract killing of a third party is seen to be as culpable as 
a women who kills her abuser in order to escape and protect herself and her 
children.51 The assertion that motive is legally irrelevant to mens rea within 
criminal law doctrine is a political decision which allows the courts to appear to 
treat essentially political issues apolitically, and thus exclude moral and political 
challenges to the order of things.52  
Lord Bingham’s judgment in R v Kennedy (No. 2)53 affirms that the 
conventional position on individual responsibility continues to be the acceptance 
of the doctrine of psychological individualism; ‘[t]he criminal law generally 
assumes the existence of free will… certain exceptions… But, generally 
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speaking, informed adults of sound mind are treated as autonomous beings 
able to make their own decisions about how they will act’.54 He then quotes 
Glanville Williams statement that ‘I may suggest reasons to you for you doing 
something; I may urge you to do it tell you to do it, tell you it is your duty to do 
it… My efforts may perhaps make it very much more likely that you will do it. But 
they do not cause you to do it’ and it is this ‘voluntary’ act that sets a new ‘chain 
of causation’ going, irrespective of what has happened before.55 The weakness 
of this approach is its inability ‘to produce a synthesised conception of the 
relationship between individual agency and social and political structures;’ 
drawing upon the ‘isolated, asocial individual alone with his private emotions’ 
ignores the reality that ‘individual agency is fundamentally constructed and 
constituted within pre-existing social relations.’56  
Central to the overarching principles and practices of the criminal justice 
system is the concept of the abstract psychological individual because this 
removes social conflicts from the courtroom, making the psychological 
individual at the heart of criminal law a political and ideological construction.57 
This construction has been especially pernicious in terms of removing the 
context of the abuse from the plight of the victim when she kills her abuser. 
Viewing the definitional elements purely as voluntary action (the actus reus) 
performed with intention (the mens rea) regardless of motive or the context in 
which she has committed the act means many women will be found guilty of 
murder. Unless she can raise self-defence (discussed below) or one of the 
other criminal law defences, she will need to then raise one of the partial 
defences in order to avoid the mandatory life sentence. Motive is considered 
when it comes to sentencing, provided the sentence is reduced from murder – 
requiring a mandatory life sentence - to voluntary manslaughter through the 
successful plea of either diminished responsibility or loss of control. However, 
this is a judicial decision, not a jury one, and will be made ‘according to an 
individual view of the defendant,’ therefore keeping the decision over whether 
the motive was ‘good’ or ‘bad’ ‘politically safe with the judges’.58 
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Part Three 
Self-Defence 
 
A strong case can be made for this defence being used to provide battered 
women who kill with a full acquittal when their life and bodily integrity was in 
danger as a result of the continued abuse they were suffering, and when they 
honestly couldn’t see a way out. This is because it permits the use of such force 
as is reasonable to defend oneself or another.59 However, the law of self-
defence evolved in the context of patterns of male behaviour because women 
are less violent than men60 and therefore their behaviour did not impact upon 
the development of the law in this area.61 It is suggested that statute and case 
law only succeeds in comprehending and including paradigmatic male 
responses to paradigmatic male violence.62 Therefore, masculine bias pervades 
the operation of this defence and women are typically excluded from relying on 
it – to date not a single battered woman in this country has successfully been 
able to plead self-defence in the context of a homicide charge appeal.63  
The operation of the defence was clarified by the Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Act 2008 and allows the question of whether the degree of force 
was reasonable to be determined by reference to the circumstances as the 
defendant believed them to be.64 The defendant should be judged on the facts 
as she saw them, whether or not her perception of the threat was reasonable. 
The reasonableness of the force is then to be judged on whether it was 
necessary and whether it was proportionate to the threat perceived by her. 
Battered women who kill often fail on both standards which can, in part, be 
attributed to the abstraction and decontextualisation evident in the foundational 
principles of individual responsibility of the criminal law. In not situating 
behaviours in the context of a person’s life, the impression is created that their 
behaviours are irrational or unintelligible.65 Even if it is found that the use of 
some force was necessary, the defence fails in its entirety if the jury find that the 
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force used was excessive66 in the circumstances as the defendant believed 
them to be. 67 Edwards identifies a problem for women pleading self-defence 
where their fatal act follows on from a lesser attack (which is, of course, often 
the case and why the woman survives it).68 
Due to the requirement of imminency, unless the woman was fearing for 
her life at the actual time she killed her abusive husband, the force will often be 
found unnecessary; it will be unreasonable for a woman to use force if she has 
other options available to her at that particular point in time, regardless of 
whether the violence is likely to continue or increase to a fatal level in the future. 
It is possible for the force to be judged non-proportionate, and thus 
unreasonable again, if her partner attacks her with bare hands and she uses 
some kind of weapon, regardless of the fact that men typically have superior 
strength and combat skills.69 It is also usually overlooked that the scores of 
women killed by their partners every year are most likely to die at their hands 
rather than at the receiving end of a weapon.70 If women were able to respond 
in a proportionate way it can be assumed that they would not be being 
repeatedly battered and abused. All of the factors limiting women’s options are 
typically ignored, for example the economic and social constraints upon women, 
the fact that a fatal attack is most likely to occur when women try to escape their 
abusers, that domestic violence typically follows a pattern of escalation, and 
that it is almost impossible to entirely disappear from the sight of an abusive 
partner, especially when, as seen in Chapter Five, there is the concern that the 
courts generally grant abusers access to their children.71  
This analysis of self-defence in the context of abused women who kill 
demonstrates that the criminal law’s reliance on abstraction and the way in 
which it isolates individual cases from their social context is failing women when 
they come before the courts. The masculine bias towards reasonableness in the 
assessment of criminal liability and a failure to understand the reality of 
women’s lived experiences is having a detrimental effect upon women in 
practice. It also emphasises the way that legal institutions do not fully 
comprehend domestic violence and are often blind to its underlying social 
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context of gender inequality and female subordination, thus making quite 
reasonable actions ‘unreasonable’. This goes some way to explaining why legal 
reforms have not been able to adequately address the issue.  
In the 1990s, campaigners, such as the Southall Black Sisters and 
Justice for Women, proposed a new defence of self-preservation that would 
contextualise the experiences of violence of women who kill their abusers.72 
However, work in this area has proved unsuccessful to date, and analysis of the 
proposed defence indicates that even those developing it focused on an act-
based approach encompassing only continuing physical and sexual violence, 
rather than recognising, as argued in the previous chapter, that the dynamics of 
domestic violence are best understood as a programme of coercive control.73  
 
 
Part Four 
The Partial Defences to Homicide 
 
Loss of Control 
 
After years of campaigning by women’s organisations such as the Southall 
Black Sisters, the Law Commission finally recognised that the defence of 
provocation ‘elevated the emotion of sudden anger above emotions of fear, 
despair, compassion and empathy.’74 This served to privilege ‘male angered 
states but excluded from its ambit abused women who killed out of a state of 
fear or of self-preservation’.75 The lack of a defence related to fear or despair 
has been seen as one of the biggest obstacles to the provision of a homicide 
defence for abused women who kill.76 The Law Commission in 2005 highlighted 
the lack of a partial defence for a defendant who, ‘fearing serious violence from 
an aggressor, goes too far in deliberately killing the aggressor in order to repel 
the feared attack.’77 This led to the introduction of the new partial defence of 
loss of control, which came into force in 2009 with the intention of amending the 
common law defence of provocation to provide a defence for battered women 
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who kill.78 However, it will be argued that it is highly unlikely that this new 
legislation will be any more successful for battered women who kill than 
provocation was under the old law.  
 
 
Difficulties with the Qualifying Triggers 
 
Under the new legislation, the charge will be reduced from murder to voluntary 
manslaughter if the defendant can prove that one of two qualifying triggers 
provides an explanation for her loss of self-control. These are either fear of 
serious violence79 or things done or said80 which constituted circumstances of 
an extremely grave character81 and caused the defendant to have a justifiable 
sense of being seriously wronged.82 It was anticipated that this new formulation 
would enable abused women who kill to rely upon the defences as the 
qualifying triggers go beyond anger to encompass fear. However, there are 
several difficulties with the requirements under the qualifying triggers.  
The first is that the central requirement remains a loss of self-control. The 
government failed to adopt the proposal of the Law Commission to remove this 
aspect of the defence and found it simply upon fear of serious violence.83 It 
could be argued that abolition of the need for the loss of self-control to be 
‘sudden’84 represents a departure from a traditional understanding of loss of 
self-control as a form of ‘partial insanity through anger’85 to include loss of self-
control through fear, outrage and despair. It has also been claimed that the 
requirement of loss of control is not regarded by the government as central to 
the philosophical basis of the defence and is only there to ensure that the 
defence is not available to those acting out of revenge or in a cold-blooded 
way.86 However, it can be asserted that in maintaining the requirement of a loss 
of self-control, the new partial defence will continue to be unable to 
accommodate women who kill out of fear, rather than in anger. The defence is 
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predicated on an understanding of loss of control being fuelled by anger and it 
will be hard for the judiciary to understand women’s fear and why she did not 
lose control in the conventional way. Edwards suggests that the law will 
continue to infer a particular state of mind from an outward behavioural 
expression so that understandings will continue to be fixed, with anger as the 
‘signature’ of a loss of self-control.87 An observable physical reaction is 
regarded as evidence of an inner state which caused the loss of self-control. 
This is because, within the law of excuses, provoked anger, which typically 
manifests in a physical reaction, has become the core justification or excuse for 
failing to exercise control over human conduct. Under the new law, the 
establishment of a loss of self-control is likely to continue to be based upon the 
dominant – if not exclusive – template of loss of self-control: anger.88 Edwards 
claims that this inherent contradiction within the fear defence threatens and 
undermines its very purpose and potential so that the battered abused woman 
in fear ‘has to conform to an outward expression of loss of self-control 
predicated on the vehement passion of anger when her emotional state and her 
state of mind are intractably one of a state of fear… her state of mind and 
manifestation of behaviour at the time of the killing are not a loss of self-control 
in the traditionally masculinist sense at all’.89 
Notwithstanding the removal of the requirement for a ‘sudden’ loss of 
control, there is still a risk that if abused partners kill after a period of delay they 
will be excluded from the new defence, even though they do actually experience 
a loss of self-control in being unable to refrain from killing.90 The jury will be able 
to take into account a delay between the qualifying trigger and the killing when 
deciding whether the defendant did actually lose their self-control and a longer 
delay may make them more likely to view the killing as pre-mediated or out of a 
desire for revenge. Withey claims that the intention behind the legislation – to 
provide a defence for abused women who kill out of fear rather than due to 
anger - is undermined by the fact that the government opted not to formulate a 
separate defence for domestic abuse and excessive force cases. This would 
have no requirement for loss of control. The Government expressed the desire 
to prevent undeserving cases from succeeding with the defence. Cases where 
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there was a lapse in time between the trigger and the killing were seen as 
potentially undermining the claim that there was a loss of self-control.91 Withey 
further suggests that it is illogical to remove the requirement of suddenness but 
to keep the requirement of loss of self-control when loss of self-control is, by its 
nature, sudden.92 The term loss of self-control is ambiguous, and, as Lord 
Thomas of Gresford noted, could be used to mean ‘either a failure to exercise 
self-control or an inability to exercise self-control’.93 This could mean that a 
victim of intimate abuse who kills their partner does experience a loss of self-
control even in the absence of a physically ‘sudden’ loss of control before the 
killing because they cannot see a way out and feel unable to refrain from killing. 
For example, if an abused woman kills her partner whilst he is asleep because 
she fears for her safety and is aware of the likelihood of serious violence in the 
future, the fact that her actions do not seem to be out of control does not mean 
she could refrain from doing what she did. It could be the only way she could 
envisage being free without risking further serious violence. Whether or not this 
will be the position adopted when the legislation is interpreted by the courts, 
however, remains to be seen.  
As well as the likelihood that an outward expression of anger will be 
required to provide evidence of a loss of self-control, it is also likely that the 
requirement for a fear of serious violence itself will be misunderstood. This is 
because the context and dynamics of abusive relationships are often not fully 
comprehended, and, as has been shown, this has led to a misplaced focus on 
physical violence as the defining characteristic of an abusive relationship.94 As 
discussed previously, abused women’s awareness of the likelihood of the 
violence intensifying means that they often learn to recognise the signs of 
escalating violence, meaning that ‘subtle motions or threats that might not 
signify danger to an outsider or trier of fact acquire added meaning for the 
battered woman whose survival depends on an intimate knowledge of her 
assailant.’95 An abused woman may be in fear of serious violence despite there 
not having been any physical violence for a period of time because of the 
continued use of other coercive tactics. The use of credible threats and other 
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intimidating and controlling behaviour may be keeping her in the relationship, 
and she may be aware that were she to attempt to leave there would be a 
strong likelihood of serious violence being inflicted. Without understanding the 
typical dynamics of an abusive relationship and its programmatic nature, a 
judge or jury may not believe that there really was a fear of serious violence. 
Her perception of the likelihood of future serious violence is assessed as 
reasonable – or not – by a jury with, probably, no experience at all of abuse of 
this kind, and who have incorporated many of the prevalent misconceptions 
about domestic abuse into their assessment of her behaviour. Edwards 
questions the selection of the experts who are called upon to make this 
assessment, highlighting the often overlooked fact that the abused woman 
herself is the expert on her own situation. In relation to self-defence it is 
recognised that ‘a person acting for a legitimate purpose may not be able to 
weigh to a nicety the exact measure of any necessary action’96 and it is 
contended that without an understanding of the coercion and fear a women can 
face in an abusive relationship, the actions of women pleading fear under the 
loss of control defence may not be understood.97  
 There is a further difficulty inherent in the written legislation that is likely 
to act as a barrier to abused women being able to rely upon the partial defence. 
Fear is qualified by ‘serious violence’ and not ‘extremely grave circumstances’, 
which means that an ‘‘inequity [is] embedded in the two types of defence.’98 The 
implication of this inequity is that it raises the evidential bar for the part of the 
defence intended for abused women to rely upon. Edwards suggests this 
demonstrates insufficient understanding of the circumstances that abused 
women face and thinks it may lead courts to take a restrictive view of what 
constitutes ‘serious’ violence so that common types of abusive and coercive 
treatment such as ‘a woman who is constantly humiliated by a partner, who is 
tied up and has water poured over her, or is made to sleep in the bath or 
outside, or is subjected to cruelty, may not satisfy the threshold of ‘serious 
violence’’.99 In addition, it will be for the courts to determine what amounts to 
‘fear’ and, because fear reduces the capacity for rationality, an extremely fearful 
woman may not be capable of reasoning, thus reinforcing the stereotypical view 
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of women as irrational and unreasonable. If a female defendant is thought to be 
acting irrationally due to fear, this may undermine her claim that a person of her 
age and sex, in her circumstances, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-
restraint might have reacted in the same or a similar way. It is difficult to see 
how someone will be regarded by a jury as having a normal degree of tolerance 
and self-restraint, when they also appear to be acting irrationally.  
Despite efforts to provide a defence for abused women, little attempt 
seems to have been made in the legislation to understand the impact of fear on 
the human will or on an abused woman’s thinking and behaviour. The way fear 
is constructed in the new partial defence is inadequate and maintaining the 
requirement for a loss of control continues to authorise anger and an ‘outward 
manifestation of loss of control.’100 The Law Commission envisaged that fear of 
serious violence was sufficient per se, provided that the objective test was also 
established, and there was to be no added requirement that the defendant also 
lost their self-control101. That this requirement was nevertheless maintained 
impacts on the ‘fear trigger’ and means the defence is likely to fail some of 
those intended to benefit from the new provisions.102 This supports the 
argument that the legislature still fails to adequately comprehend domestic 
violence, not understanding the complexities and power dynamics of the 
situations abused women find themselves in. As emphasised in the previous 
chapter, abused women usually cannot simply leave in order to escape the 
violence and therefore the fear of serious violence should be a sufficient trigger 
in itself, whether or not the defendant lost her self-control.  
It was envisaged that the most suitable qualifying trigger for abused 
women who kill would be fear of serious violence. However, the second 
qualifying trigger could still be invoked under these circumstances. For this 
second one to be available there must have been something said or done that 
was of an extremely grave character and left the defendant with a justifiable 
sense of being seriously wronged.103 This has a significantly different 
philosophical underpinning than provocation because it is based on righteous 
indignation or moral outrage rather than angry loss of control and it could 
therefore be more successful than the old partial defence of provocation in 
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providing a defence for abused women who kill.104 For this limb of the defence 
to be available, as with fear of serious violence, the defence must establish that 
a person of the defendant’s age and sex ‘with a normal degree of tolerance and 
self-restraint and in the circumstances of D, might have reacted in the same or 
in a similar way to D.’105 It is therefore imperative that the wrongfulness of 
domestic abuse be considered in order to make an accurate assessment of how 
the hypothetical woman might react. Herring believes that this limb of the 
defence will shift the focus from the defendant’s psychological state and on to 
the wrongfulness of the abuse they are suffering, meaning that a woman need 
not be presented as suffering from a psychological disorder, as with diminished 
responsibility, and can be presented and perceived as responding in the same 
way as any ordinary person might when facing a grave wrong.106 However, 
analysis of the context and dynamics of domestic violence indicates that until 
the impact of domestic violence and its programmatic nature are fully 
understood by the judiciary and by society more generally (as they make up jury 
panels), the wrong of domestic violence may not be sufficiently understood. In 
addition, whilst this qualifying trigger is predicated on being seriously wronged 
rather than being in fear of serious violence, and as domestic violence is 
typically understood as being incidents of physical violence, judges and juries 
may not see the abuse as being sufficiently grave as to explain or justify killing. 
 
 
Diminished Responsibility 
 
Due to the exclusion of abused women who kill from relying on self-defence, 
and the masculine bias that still pervades the partial defence of loss of control, 
the partial defence of diminished responsibility continues to be the one most 
likely to be invoked in these circumstances. This partial defence was reformed 
recently107 and now contains the statutory requirement for a ‘recognisable 
medical condition’108 (a requirement reflective of the changed state of medical 
science since the Homicide Act of 1957). Thus, for an abused woman to rely on 
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this defence she must be found to be suffering from PTSD, or a sub-category of 
it: ‘battered woman syndrome’ (BWS).109 As seen in the previous chapter, this 
was a concept developed by psychologist Lenore Walker in an attempt to dispel 
the myths and misconceptions about domestic violence and to explain how 
battered women may come to commit violent crimes. Due to the fact that it is a 
medicalised specialist term, it can allow into court crucial evidence of the 
context in which an abused women may come to kill their abusive partners and 
why they did not leave the relationship. The potential for the syndrome to allow 
the introduction of the context of the abusive relationship could be viewed as 
useful given that generalised evidence concerning domestic violence is difficult 
to bring before the court. Without a medical explanation requiring expert 
witnesses, domestic violence becomes merely a part of the ‘normal’ world which 
courts are assumed to need no help in understanding.110 There is also an 
internal inconsistency within BWS as an explanation of how a woman came to 
kill her abusive partner: it suggests that a woman was helpless, but then 
killed.111 
 
 
Difficulties with Diminished Responsibility for Abused Women Who Kill 
 
Unlike loss of control, the legal burden of proof is on the defendant to satisfy, on 
the balance of probabilities, the terms of the partial defence under Section 2. 
The reform also means that she must prove that the recognised medical 
condition caused the killing, whereas the old law on diminished responsibility 
allowed the defence if it was shown that the condition existed at the time of the 
killing. Even if a defendant can prove that she has BWS, if it only explains why 
she did not leave the relationship, and cannot be seen as the cause of the 
killing, the partial defence will fail. 
It has been shown that one of the main misconceptions, perpetuated by 
individualised understandings and responses to domestic violence, is that this 
type of abuse occurs because of deviant individuals or relationship dynamics, 
carrying the implication that this abuse is abnormal.112 Utilising a homicide 
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defence requiring expert evidence of a ‘recognised medical condition’ makes 
domestic violence seem unusual, when in reality, as shown by the statistics and 
broader prevalence indications, domestic violence is commonplace. As Taylor 
has emphasised, ‘female homicide defendants may be exceptional because 
they are rare, but they may not be exceptional women; they may be ordinary 
women pushed to extremes.’113 The use of a medical syndrome to explain why 
women kill their abusers helps to perpetuate the myth, rather than the reality. 
A further potential problem for abused women when utilising the partial 
defence of diminished responsibility is that it focuses on the pathology of the 
individual woman. This draws attention away from the behaviour and actions of 
abusive men. BWS ‘shifts the focus of the violent act to the woman, and the use 
of ‘syndrome’ suggests that it is she who is emotionally or mentally impaired.’114 
It also perpetuates a view of women as irrational and not acting with agency or 
autonomy, when in reality battered women who kill can be seen to be acting 
very rationally, doing what they do understandably out of fear and sheer 
desperation. BWS implies that women wrongly perceive the threat of violence 
as being more serious than it actually is because of the psychological effects of 
the abuse. However, the statistics show that their perception of the threat is 
real; studies on post-separation violence have found that violence and 
harassment often increase on separation.115 Wilson and Daly also found that 
women are at the greatest risk of homicide at the point of separation or after 
leaving a violent partner.116 These statistics do not suggest that women are 
unreasonable or irrational in their perception of the danger, but the use of BWS 
to provide a legal excuse for their action in killing their abuser does. As a 
concept to protect women, BWS is flawed and contentious, attempting to fit all 
women’s experiences of abuse into the criteria of a specific syndrome, rather 
than looking at the reality of each abused woman’s actual experience. If a 
female defendant does not fit with the expected characteristics and reactions of 
a woman suffering from this syndrome, then her experience of abuse could be 
disregarded completely. This is seen particularly in the contrasting judgments in 
the cases of R v Ahluwalia and R v Thornton. As discussed above, Sara 
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Thornton is presented as a calculating woman,117 complicit in her own abuse 
and questioned by the trial judge in the court of first instance for not choosing 
another course of action.118 Her failure to conform to the passive victim 
envisaged by BWS meant that her first appeal was dismissed and there is 
evidence of a lack of judicial sympathy or understanding even in the second 
appeal hearing where a retrial was ordered based on new medical evidence. 
This can be contrasted with Kiranjit Ahluwalia whose behaviour conformed to 
the more stereotypical view of abused women envisaged by BWS; a passive 
and compliant victim of aggression and her own attempts to fill the role 
expected of her as wife and mother. It was made clear in Chapter Seven that 
not all battered women experience the entire cycle of violence119 nor do all 
battered women display all the characteristics of learned helplessness120 or just 
passively accept their fate with no attempt to change their situation. The way in 
which BWS, and the resulting sympathetic treatment, is withheld from women 
who don’t display all the symptoms of battered women involves an ‘absurd and 
dangerous elevation of the pseudo-scientific syndrome and its symptomology 
over the reality of battered women’s experiences’.121  
This incongruity is particularly noticeable in cases where the defendant 
pleads both diminished responsibility and loss of control. The defence of loss of 
control rests upon the normality of the mental response that underlies the 
offence; the defendant is excused because any reasonable subject would have 
responded in this way and explicitly excluded is recourse to the defence by 
anyone whose responses fall outside this norm. For diminished responsibility it 
is the abnormality of the response that grounds the exculpation; ‘the defendant 
is to be excused in precisely those cases where no reasonable person would 
have responded in such a way.’122  
In the case of R v Williams, Stephanie123 a victim of abuse (both 
domestic abuse from the partner she fatally stabbed and sexual abuse as a 
child) was not able to rely on either plea. Williams notes the failure of the 
psychiatrists assessing her to recognise that her responses may have seemed 
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misleadingly passive and unaffected by the trauma she had experienced (one of 
the psychiatrists stated her response to trauma was ‘not more severe than one 
would normally expect to find in someone who had experienced episodes of 
violence’124). An alternative analysis would suggest that her ‘propensity for 
survival’125 flowed from the control tactics she had learned as a response to the 
on-going abuse she had suffered. It can be seen from Williams’ examination of 
this case that because the victim turned perpetrator did not conform to 
stereotypical views of how women would respond and behave following years of 
abuse, she was excluded from relying on self-defence or the partial defences to 
homicide. 
In R v Tandy126 the defendant, an alcoholic, killed her 11-year-old 
daughter shortly after hearing that she was being sexually abused and 
suspecting the perpetrator was her husband, the child’s stepfather. This case 
provides an example of the judicial concentration on the defendant’s weakness. 
This results in the absence of the abuser from the presentation of the legal 
facts. The focus is on the defendant’s alcoholism and whether, for the purposes 
of diminished responsibility, her first drink of the day was ‘involuntary’.127 The 
emotionally traumatic events surrounding the case are thus deemed irrelevant. 
Due to the restrictive criteria needed to prove actus reus and mens rea there is, 
of course, no consideration of what led the defendant to become an alcoholic in 
the first place.128  
A further problem with diminished responsibility is that even if successful 
it only provides abused women who kill with a partial defence, reducing their 
conviction from murder to manslaughter and thus avoiding the mandatory life 
sentence. The judgment in the case of R v Howell129 helps to enunciate the 
drawbacks and inconsistencies inherent in this approach. In this case, in 
addition to diminished responsibility succeeding in the first instance, the Court 
of Appeal also reduced Howell’s sentence from 6 years to 3 and a half. The 
original sentence was imposed because she had failed to withdraw to avoid 
confrontation, but on appeal Lord Justice Brooks says ‘One asks rhetorically 
where could she escape to?’ This rhetorical question needs attention, for if 
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escape really was not possible – as even the judges seemed to understand – 
then it is questionable in what sense imprisonment, for any period of time, can 
be considered a just outcome. Was Margaret Howell really expected to allow 
herself to be beaten even when she seriously believed she would die at his 
hands?130 The availability of the partial defence of diminished responsibility for 
certain types of female defendants gives the impression of a defence for 
abused women that understands and responds to domestic violence, detracting 
attention away from the fact that the most appropriate defence, self-defence, is 
not available for women who kill their abusers and therefore a full acquittal in 
these circumstances is denied.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In summary, it has been shown in this chapter that, despite the numerous 
possible defences available to abused women,131 none of them work in a 
satisfactory way either to benefit individual women perpetrators in the context of 
an abusive relationship, or to benefit female defendants as a whole. It has been  
argued that self-defence provides the most accurate reflection of women’s 
experiences when they kill an abusive partner due to the reality of post-
separation violence and the fact that women are most likely to be a victim of 
fatal levels of violence at the point of separation.132 However, due to the law’s 
masculine construction and the way that it views acceptable responses to 
violence as following a paradigmatic male response, women are excluded from 
using the defence in this context. The defence of loss of control was amended 
with the primary intention of providing a partial defence for women who kill their 
abusers, and yet the defence appears to continue to operate along traditional 
gender lines and thus privilege male responses, and it is therefore likely that it 
will fail as a defence for abused women who kill. It is also contended that the 
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way in which the defence of diminished responsibility works in practice is 
detrimental to all women as a group; it can be very dangerous in terms of the 
stereotypical view of women it reinforces as suffering from the sort of mental 
illness or instability to which all women are prone.133 
Therefore, it is evident that women’s experiences of ongoing abuse 
continue to be excluded from the traditional conceptions of justifiable criminal 
actions implicit in the operation of the homicide defences. The legal arguments 
in the cases of battered women who kill are ‘routinely viewed as claims for 
special and undeservedly lenient treatment for battered women.’134 There 
appears to be a clear tension between equal treatment and special treatment 
apparent here. The difficulties brought to light by examination of the long 
enduring equality versus difference dilemma come into play here; treating 
women by the same standards as men can be seen as desirable because it 
treats women with dignity and as equal legal subjects. However, practical 
problems abound due to male patterns of behaviour either being written into the 
law or operating as informal models governing the requirements that must be 
established to provide a defence. Therefore, formal equality can be seen to lead 
to substantive inequality and nowhere is this more apparent in relation to 
domestic violence than in the context of homicides committed by abused 
women. The difficulty is that insisting on female specific defences leads to 
situations that resonate with established stereotypes of women as passive and 
dependent, as seen in the operation of diminished responsibility which relies on 
gender constructions which harm women as a group.135  
One of the possible implications of the use of BWS for the partial defence 
of diminished responsibility is that, because the syndrome is seen ‘to manifest 
itself, crucially, through a series of unreasonable decisions’,136 it paints women 
as irrational as a result of the abuse,137 a perception which is carried across and 
automatically excludes women in this situation from claiming their behaviour 
was reasonable in order to rely on self-defence. Traditionally, the actions of 
battered women who kill have not been seen as reasonable, removing the 
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availability of self-defence. They are thus denied the justificatory defence138 and 
must instead rely on the excuse139 of diminished responsibility or loss of control. 
In order for women’s actions when they kill their abusers to be seen as justified 
– rather than excusable due to some type of deficiency inhering to the woman – 
the stereotypes that prevent women’s acts from being understood in terms of 
their social context and thus from being justified in their lethal use of force must 
be challenged. The eradication of BWS is a key way of doing this because it is 
in tension with the notion of reasonableness necessary to self-defence by 
emphasising women’s defects and incapacity.140 A plea of diminished 
responsibility alienates the woman from the claim to have acted justly and 
prevents attention from being given to appropriate responses to cumulative 
violence of this type; the act is acknowledged as a crime and the focus is on the 
defendant’s mental state at the time. This does nothing for battered women as a 
group and even if as a defence it occasionally benefits individual female 
defendants, it is a defence that should be avoided.141 Therefore, in order to 
consider whether a battered woman’s acts are reasonable in terms of a claim to 
self-defence, the sex-based stereotypes of reasonableness need to be 
overcome along with the development of an adequate understanding of the 
experiences of battered women.142 
It appears that the criminal law does not yet recognise that in a society 
which institutionalises male dominance and violence, women’s autonomy and 
agency are frequently constrained by male power and their ‘criminal’ actions 
may be a rational and understandable response.143 Unless masculine standards 
of reasonableness are ‘adapted to circumstances which are, by and large, 
foreign to the world inhabited by the hypothetical ‘reasonable man’’144 then 
women will continue to be excluded from defences which have this requirement. 
It is imperative that abused women who kill their partners be seen as victims of 
domestic violence first and foremost, rather than as criminals first with the 
abuse as a ‘relevant circumstance’ but not a cause. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
 
It is contended that international human rights law is a complementary system 
to the national legal system and thus can be viewed as overseeing the national 
law and providing a potential means of scrutinising the existing legal, social and 
policy provisions. This ensures consistency in state implementation of the 
standards that have been internationally agreed upon, and a method of holding 
states accountable for fulfilling their obligations regarding these standards. This 
chapter will assess whether there are aspects of the various international 
human rights law mechanisms that have the potential to affect the response to 
domestic violence in England and Wales in a more effective way than the 
national legal system alone.  
There are two strategies by which international human rights law has 
been implemented at a national level in the UK. The first (discussed in Part 
Two) has been available since 1998 as a result of the Human Rights Act (HRA) 
incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into domestic 
law. This made it possible for individuals and groups to bring litigation against 
the various bodies of the State for perceived human rights abuses. As a now 
integral part of the domestic legal system, consideration of this strategy is 
needed in any critique of the responses of the national system to domestic 
violence. The second way (discussed in Part Three) in which international 
human rights law can potentially influence the legal system and policy 
measures at a domestic level is through the advocacy approach. This involves 
incorporating the legislation and other measures called for by the UN human 
rights treaty bodies into domestic law and policy. These two approaches will be 
analysed to assess their understanding of the root social causes of domestic 
violence, whether they go beyond physical violence in their conception of 
domestic violence – as this thesis has shown to be necessary – and the 
potential influence the approaches have upon the domestic responses. 
First appearances may suggest that international human rights law, with 
its clear emphasis on tackling violence against women,1 would have much to 
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offer both the victims of domestic violence and the groups working to target this 
widespread phenomenon. However, it will be claimed that, despite the ways in 
which women’s interests and concerns have begun to be incorporated on to the 
international human rights law agenda over the last twenty or thirty years, 
women are still only rhetorically included;2 on a practical level they are still 
excluded from many of the protections offered due to the concept of human 
rights remaining ‘entrenched in the world of liberal legalism’3 and thus acting as 
a barrier to human rights law’s ability to work for women.4 It will be suggested 
that the public/private dichotomy remains a powerful ideological barrier that 
justifies non-intervention by the state at a domestic level. 
This is not to say that incursions into the private domain do not occur. A 
promising willingness to bring the private sphere under scrutiny may  be found 
in the decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in S.W. v UK.5 
It was held that the House of Lords judgment in R v R6 clarified the scope and 
progression of the common law in relation to rape within marriage; this meant 
that such acts were not being retrospectively criminalised which would have 
violated Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights ECHR). The 
ECtHR thus shows itself ready to interpret law in accordance with changing 
societal norms. Of significance is the statement that ‘the abandonment of the 
unacceptable idea of a husband being immune against prosecution for rape of 
his wife was in conformity not only with a civilised concept of marriage but also, 
and above all, with the fundamental objectives of the Convention, the very 
essence of which is respect for human dignity and human freedom’.7 The idea 
of a ‘civilised concept of marriage’ is noteworthy in light of the critique of the 
marital-type relationship contained in previous chapters. The decision arguably 
represents ‘another shift in the boundary between public and private spheres’ 
meaning ‘sexual offences committed within the marital home are no longer 
automatically outside the protection of the law.’8 Although progressive on the 
matter of female autonomy in relation to sexual intercourse, the statement still 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Assembly, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 12 July 1993, A/CONF.157/23), General Recommendation 19 
(UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), CEDAW General Recommendations 
Nos. 19 and 20, adopted at the Eleventh Session, 1992 (contained in Document A/47/38), 1992, A/47/38), the 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (UN General Assembly resolution 48/104 of 20 December 
1993), and further demonstrated by the appointment of the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women in 1994. 
2
 Edwards: 2010 p. 306 
3
 Palmer: 2002 p. 92 
4
 For feminist critiques of human rights and liberalism see Palmer: 2002 and  Lacey: 2004 
5
 [1995] 48/1994/495/577 
6
 [1992] 1 A.C. 599 
7
 [1995] 48/1994/495/577 at para 44 
8
 Palmer: 1997 p. 95 
217 
 
appears to ‘sentimentalise’9 the marital-type relationship and the idea that 
women need to be protected within it, rather than asserting that no woman 
should be immune from viewing forced intercourse as rape, regardless of her 
marital status. 
 
 
Part One 
The Public/Private Dichotomy in International Human Rights Law 
 
The ideology of the public/private divide originates in classic liberal political 
philosophy and consists of a division between the public, political sphere as the 
realm of governmental action and intervention, and the private, non-political 
sphere of the family, home and sexuality where, theoretically, legal regulation is 
deemed to be inappropriate.10 According to the liberal tradition, the two spheres 
also correspond with the two sexes: the public sphere is the realm of men, the 
traditional breadwinner assumed to be the rational and political sex, and the 
private is the realm of women, the irrational sex. This divide has been used to 
justify governmental non-intervention in the private sphere, although it is clear 
that the government does regulate ‘private’ issues such as sexuality and family 
life.11 Some feminists have argued that as well as justifying the exclusion of 
women from the public arena, the dichotomy has also made it possible to justify 
the lack of intervention in issues of violence against women within the private 
sphere. As Charlesworth has argued, lack of intervention “does not 
signify…neutrality”, a state’s failure to regulate instead “supports and 
legitimates the power of husbands over wives.’12 
Although international human rights law initially challenged the 
public/private divide by making the conduct of states toward its citizens a matter 
of public international law rather than a domestic issue,13 it at first left the 
public/private dichotomy within each state relatively untouched. This is because 
the protection it offers is mainly in relation to civil and political rights (indeed the 
ECHR only contains these rights).14 These rights essentially create the 
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public/private dichotomy because, by definition, they exist to prevent the public 
(male) world from intruding into particular areas of private life.15 It was males 
who created the traditional canon of rights and, not fearing violations in the 
private sphere because they were masters of that territory,16 these rights were 
not created or intended to cover violence and other deprivations of liberty in that 
sphere. It can be clearly implied from the wording and content of the UDHR that 
the drafters did not envisage that human rights could be violated within the 
home by non-state actors,17 despite this being the site where women are 
commonly abused and violated. This oversight lends support to the claim that 
‘[l]iberalism ignores women's subordination by emphasising the danger of state 
power and protecting, in the name of freedom, the very site of women's 
subordination.’18  
As recently as 1995 support was still needed for the statement that 
‘human rights are women’s rights – and women’s rights are human rights.’19 The 
claim itself emanates from a feminist analysis of the human rights canon and its 
uncovering of the ways in which women are systematically marginalised or 
excluded. This occurs through a variety of means resulting from the dominant 
masculine standards of the international human rights regime, and means 
women are therefore not constituted as fully human for the purposes of 
guaranteeing their enjoyment of human rights.20 The explicit separation of 
women’s rights from human rights until this time, and the fact that even now 
there is often ‘a specific lack of recognition of women’s rights as human rights 
where women’s experience is distinct from that of men,’21 is indicative of the 
secondary status of women.22 The claim can be seen to originate from the 
critique of the public/private dichotomy and the types of rights and interests 
deemed worthy of international protection. It thus strikes right at the heart of one 
of the most fundamental premises enshrined in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights; human rights apply equally, ‘without distinction,’ to everyone.23  
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One of the effects of the ideology of the public/private divide is that when 
the national legal response to domestic violence is under consideration, 
international human rights issues are rarely raised. If they are invoked, it tends 
to be in support of a non-interventionist approach; a state-imposed resolution is 
deemed inappropriate because of the ‘private’ nature of the incident.24 However, 
as argued in previous chapters, the state can be deemed to be complicit in 
domestic violence because it perpetuates many of the social conditions in which 
the abuse can occur by sustaining the gendered stereotypes and defining the 
distribution of power in society.’25 Thus, the state is arguably not absent from 
crimes committed against women and is instead ‘deeply and actively complicit 
in the abuses.’26 MacKinnon challenges the operation of the public/private 
divide in international law and claims that when the same things happen to men 
but in settings largely reserved for abuses of women, international law regards 
the violations as private and domestic (in both senses; within homes and within 
states) and therefore beyond its scope.27 The direct provision of an unregulated 
domestic sphere reflects state-centric thinking where the power of the state to 
do harm ‘trumps’ all other power and minimises the harm private actors can do. 
The view that State violence is worse than private violence is rooted in the 
theory that the State will provide redress for private violence,28 which, as the 
analysis of the limitations of the domestic law demonstrated, is clearly not the 
case in the context of domestic violence. 
Rather than excluding the private sphere entirely, the traditional human 
rights regimes can be seen to use the divide as a screen or ‘convenient tool’29 
to avoid addressing women's issues.30 It has been observed that the divide is 
irrational and inconsistently applied, meaning the public-private distinction is 
perhaps being used to justify female subordination in the home,31 render 
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women’s concerns invisible, and ensure the preservation of the status quo.32 
Binion has argued that it is in state's interests to retain the pre-eminent position 
of the public/private dichotomy because it shields various institutions from 
external investigation. She further claims that if a deconstruction of the 
patriarchal nature of family (or private) life were to be allowed, it may lead to an 
improved understanding of the patriarchal and hierarchical structures of society 
by citizens, who may then attempt to reconstruct them.33 Therefore, the 
distinction can be seen to exist for political reasons and has been able to 
continue because female subordination runs so deep that it is viewed as 
natural, preventing sex discrimination and violence against women being seen 
as political issues or human rights abuses.34  
The exclusion of the private sphere from international scrutiny has meant 
that international human rights law has been able to see women's oppression 
and exclusion from public life as rooted in sexuality and private life.35 This has 
enabled it to disregard the inter-connection between the two spheres. Failing to 
recognise women's oppression as rooted in the creation, by the state, of a 
sphere where non-intervention is justifiable, the state’s complicity in forms of 
oppression such as domestic violence is rendered invisible. However, there will 
be a consideration of whether the public/private divide is beginning to be 
dismantled due to the imposition of positive obligations on states below. 
 
 
Part Two 
The Litigation Approach 
 
This approach can be broadly divided into the outcomes of cases heard by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) under the ECHR, and the 
implementation and interpretation of the HRA by the UK courts.36 McQuigg 
identifies three main categories of measures most strongly highlighted by 
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commentators in the UK as being beneficial if adopted in relation to domestic 
violence. These would be to improve the criminal justice system to ensure 
domestic violence is treated in the same way as any other crime, increased 
social support measures for victims, and efforts to increase awareness of 
domestic violence. This latter closely reflects the analysis of the underlying 
causes of domestic violence presented in this thesis. However, McQuigg’s 
research indicates that, at present, the potential of the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR in relation to domestic violence may be limited to ‘the amelioration of the 
criminal justice system, for example, ensuring that the police respond effectively 
to cases of domestic violence’.37 This is because the courts are probably 
reluctant to hold that the state has a duty to provide accommodation or financial 
resources and points out that judges themselves do not feel equipped to make 
decisions about the allocation of resources because this is something that 
should be left to politicians.38  
 Although it is now generally accepted that domestic violence is an affront 
to the physical and moral integrity of women as human beings,39 there is far 
less agreement over the responsibilities of States for that violence because the 
public/private divide has operated to exclude state liability for violence and 
abuse that occurs in the private sphere.40 This has meant that in order for 
domestic violence cases (and other matters deemed ‘private’) to fall within the 
scope of the ECHR,41 the court has needed to take a dynamic approach by 
establishing positive obligations42 from its negative provisions. The ECtHR has 
imposed positive obligations and extended state liability for privately inflicted 
violence through the concept of ‘due diligence’; states parties are responsible 
for ‘private acts’ if they fail to act ‘with due diligence to prevent violations of 
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rights, or to investigate and punish acts of violence, and to provide 
compensation’.43  
 
 
The Application of the ‘Due Diligence’ Standard by the Courts 
 
The ECtHR did not consider a case involving domestic violence until 2007 – 
itself revealing in terms of the types of cases deemed to be of concern under 
human rights law – but since this time there have been a series of cases 
brought before the court which involved domestic violence.44 The most 
significant of these, for present purposes, being Opuz v Turkey45 where the 
applicant’s mother was killed by the applicant’s ex-husband, and the applicant 
herself suffered ill-treatment amounting to ‘a familiar litany of abuse, combined 
with inaction and ineptitude on the part of the authorities.’46 The court held that 
there were violations of Articles 2 and 3 (the right to life and the right to be free 
from ‘inhuman or degrading treatment’) but also Article 14 – the right to be free 
from discrimination.  
By finding that the state had failed in its ‘due diligence’ duties, the Opuz v 
Turkey ruling extends the positive obligations upon states in respect of cases of 
domestic violence, requiring a proactive approach by ensuring the criminal 
justice systems of states parties are ‘fit for the purpose.’47 By regarding victims 
of domestic violence as ‘vulnerable’ for the purposes of Article 3, the Court also 
puts a greater onus on States to take measures to protect them, including the 
need for an authority to take action against a perpetrator even without the 
victims consent and the obligation to provide assistance and support for 
victims.48 However, the implications of this requirement are perhaps of less 
significance to the UK response than in countries such as Turkey where 
prosecutorial and judicial tolerance of domestic violence is apparent in the face 
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of the law or policies.49 The ‘gap between policy and practice can be 
enormous’50 so, in focusing upon the written laws when assessing whether 
states are complying with their obligations under Article 3 rather than the 
practices of the authorities, states may be deemed to be complying even when 
their practices are significantly failing to protect domestic violence victims. The 
ECtHR in Opuz allowed a contextual approach to the continuation of 
prosecutions and it is likely that the discretionary approach of the CPS51 will not 
violate Article 3. In practice, it has been historically unusual for prosecutors in 
the UK to proceed without the victim’s support, but the existence of the 
possibility to continue, whilst not mandatory, means the UK can likely be 
confident that it is not violating Article 3 in this regard.52 
The inclusion of psychological pressure in this case53 indicates that, 
provided the victim falls into a group of ‘vulnerable’ individuals,54 non-physical 
violence will engage the State’s obligations under Article 3. However, given the 
2008 decision by the House of Lords55 concerning the amount of discretion to 
be granted to the police in respect of their positive obligations following Osman 
v UK56 (considered below), it seems unlikely that the obligations the police are 
under will be engaged in the absence of physical abuse or threats to life. It was 
emphasised in Chapters Five and Six that the judiciary, CPS and police, at 
present, focus on physical violence, usually of a serious nature, as the defining 
feature of an abusive relationship. The positive obligations arising under Opuz 
will likely not improve upon this, unless there is clearly visible and 
understandable psychological pressure. Without examining the context and 
relationship between the parties, the police are unlikely to deem abuse such as 
the use of credible threats as indicative of a threat to life or bodily integrity. 
 It has been argued that Opuz does nothing to redefine the scope of the 
obligation imposed upon States and merely applies the test established in 
Osman where it was claimed that the UK was in breach of Articles 2 and 8 (right 
to life and right to respect for private and family life).57 This case was brought by 
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a pupil and his mother after the pupil’s teacher (who had developed an 
unhealthy attachment to the pupil and committed a series of incidents) injured 
the pupil and fatally shot the pupil’s father. The case was brought on the 
grounds that the police (a public authority for the purposes of Section 6 of the 
HRA) had failed to take sufficient measures to protect the lives of the pupil and 
his father, despite being notified that their lives were at risk. In relation to Article 
2, the judgement of the court recognised not only a duty on States to ‘refrain 
from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps 
to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction… [T]he State’s obligations… 
extends beyond its primary duty to secure the right to life by putting in place 
effective criminal-law provisions... Article 2… may also imply in certain well-
defined circumstances a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive 
operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from the 
criminal acts of another individual’.58  
Although the ECtHR here makes it clear that the State may have a 
positive obligation to prevent the rights of one individual being breached by 
another, for the duty to become effective the authorities must either know – or 
ought to have known – ‘of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life 
of an identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party 
and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, 
judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk.’59 Even in the 
case of Osman itself, it was held by the ECtHR that on the facts of the case the 
criteria had not been met and no breach of Article 2 was established.60 There 
was also no breach of Article 8 because the police had taken all the steps they 
could reasonably have been expected to take. This was despite the fact that 
they had been aware of the teacher’s behaviour and yet did not put the 
Osman’s home under surveillance, and allowed the teacher to abscond.  
Osman certainly demonstrates the limitations of the ‘due diligence’ 
standard in terms of its ability to dismantle the public/private divide and impose 
obligations upon states to prevent the human rights of individuals being violated 
by private individuals. In relation to domestic violence this would mean that 
‘public authorities could only be held liable for failing to protect a victim if the 
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authorities were already cognisant of the situation’.61 The state could be in 
breach if the police did not take steps to protect known victims, or did not 
respond adequately when called to an incident of domestic violence, but this 
duty does not come into existence until the police are alerted and, as seen in 
previous chapters, the majority of incidents go unreported (the 2004 British 
Crime Survey found that the police hear of only one in four of the worst 
domestic violence cases).62 Sullivan suggests that establishing the necessary 
factual record for breach of a due diligence duty will always be difficult due to 
the extent that the state and society conceal domestic violence.63  
The Osman ruling and the UK courts’ acceptance that the HRA does 
have indirect horizontal effect (so that there are some circumstances when 
individuals can rely on Convention rights indirectly in proceedings against 
private parties under the provisions of the HRA) can be seen to have laid the 
doctrinal foundations for using the Act to provide assistance to domestic 
violence victims. McQuigg suggests that this demonstrates that UK judges are 
willing to transcend the public/private dichotomy in cases involving human 
rights.64 However, it must be emphasised that the effectiveness of the courts 
depends on the attitudes of individual judges, and, as was shown in the 
chapters examining the domestic law, judicial attitudes tend to perpetuate 
traditional roles and expectations of women.  
Two cases heard in the European Court since Osman have refined the 
principles with regards to positive obligations. In Mastromatteo v Italy65 the 
European Court had to consider whether the decision to grant prison leave to 
offenders who subsequently killed Mastromatteo’s son amounted to the 
violation of the state’s duty to protect life under Article 2. They held that there 
was no violation of Article 2 on the grounds that a positive obligation only arises 
when the authorities knew or ought to have known of the existence of a real and 
immediate risk to the life of an identified individual(s) and had failed to take 
reasonable measures to avoid that risk.66  The Court emphasised that Article 2 
may also imply, in certain well-defined circumstances, a positive obligation on 
the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual 
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whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual. It was reiterated 
that such an obligation must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an 
impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities, bearing in mind the 
difficulties involved in policing modern societies, the unpredictability of human 
conduct and the operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities 
and resources. Accordingly, not every claimed risk to life can entail for the 
authorities a Convention requirement to take operational measures to prevent 
that risk from materialising. 
Mastromatteo v Italy was distinguished from Osman and Paul and 
Audrey Edwards v UK67 (another case concerning positive obligations and 
police responsibilty) because, in those cases, there were specific potential 
victims identified in advance, whereas in this case the issue concerned the 
existence of an obligation to afford protection to society in general.68 Therefore 
in this case there was no obligation in the first place, whereas in Osman and 
Paul and Audrey Edwards there was an obligation to the identified individuals, 
but it was found the authorities had done all that could be reasonably expected 
to discharge this duty.  
The requirement that potential victims be identified in advance comes 
under question following the case of Maiorana v Italy69 where it was held that 
there was a violation of Article 2 when a man in prison for a particularly violent 
crime killed two previously unidentified women when on day release. As it  had 
not been possible to identify the two women as potential targets of a lethal act 
on his part, the case concerned the obligation for the Italian judicial system to 
afford general protection to society against potential danger from a person who 
had been convicted for a violent crime. The Court took the view that the 
granting of day release to the prisoner despite his criminal record and incidents 
of violent behaviour in prison constituted a breach of the duty of care required 
by Article 2 of the Convention. This case indicates that there may be a violation 
of Article 2 if the state is deemed to have been especially negligent in terms of 
the lack of protection provided for society in general. 
The way in which the scope of the positive obligations arising for police 
and other authorities have been interpreted by the UK courts following Osman 
can be seen in Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Police v Van Colle and 
                                                          
67
 2002, Application No. 46477/99 
68
 2002, Application No. 37703/97 at para 68 
69
 2009, Application no. 28634/06 
227 
 
Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police70 (Van Colle and Smith). This joint 
appeal involved one case of fatal non-domestic violence and one case of non-
fatal domestic violence where it was alleged that the police had failed to take 
adequate steps to protect the victims. In Smith the victim had complained to the 
police after a series of threatening communication from his former same-sex 
partner and was then subject to a serious assault. Although the police had 
begun to investigate the complaints, they had failed to take any steps to initiate 
a prosecution against the perpetrator. Despite there being an identified 
individual at risk and known to the police, the majority of the House of Lords 
upheld the public policy principle that the police should not be liable in 
negligence for their inaction. When considering the amount of discretion the 
police needed to be granted, the majority expressed concern over how the 
police should respond to domestic violence cases because not every complaint 
of this kind is ‘genuine;’ those that are genuine must be distinguished from 
those that are not. It was felt that if the police were required to treat every report 
from a member of the public that he or she is being threatened with violence as 
giving rise to a duty of care to take reasonable steps to prevent the alleged 
threat from being executed then police work elsewhere may be impeded. They 
decided that the judgment as to whether any given case is of that character 
must be left to the police.71 This judgment has serious ramifications given the 
misunderstandings that abound concerning the extent, nature and dynamics of 
domestic violence within the criminal justice system. Victims already suffer from 
not being believed and having the abuse they are suffering misunderstood, 
without the courts granting the police further discretion to decide whether or not 
an alleged threat to life is genuine. 
The restrictive application of the Osman test applied by the House of 
Lords in the jointly heard Van Colle, whilst not a domestic violence case, 
suggests that domestic violence victims who want to argue in the domestic 
courts that the police failed to protect them from a known domestic violence 
perpetrator will not fare well. This is due to the decision that  ‘ought to have 
known’ means ‘ought to have appreciated on the information available to them’, 
rather than ‘ought, had they carried out their duties with due diligence, to have 
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acquired information that would have made them aware of the risk’.72 Victims 
would therefore need to bring a great deal of contextual information to the police 
before it can be said that they knew of a real and immediate risk to life (this was 
clearly discharged by Ms Opuz and her mother due to the number of times they 
contacted the police with details of when Mr Opuz had threatened their lives). 
As Burton emphasises, many domestic violence victims will not be able to bring 
their cases within the ambit of Osman even when the police could have done 
more if they had exercised due diligence in their investigations.73 These two 
appeals indicate that the very restrictive test under Osman and reaffirmed by 
Opuz is being applied even more restrictively by the UK courts so that even 
where a victim is known to be at risk by the police, there still might not be an 
obligation for the police to take action, or to act with due diligence when 
assessing whether there is a risk.  
It is also evident that the concept of ‘due diligence’ is far removed from 
the absolute prohibitions on torture, genocide and slavery found elsewhere in 
international human rights law. Therefore violence against women is treated in a 
different manner from the most serious human rights violations and is aligned 
with qualified or limited rights, not the peremptory or non-derogable ones.74 The 
concept both permits and accepts that non-state violence against women isn’t 
per se within the scope of international law and only falls within it indirectly; 
‘non-state acts of violence against women (the predominant kind) are not 
considered within the scope of international law unless they satisfy a threshold 
level of failed state behaviour in circumstances where there is no reasonable 
justification for that failure’.75  
It seems that in combatting domestic violence, ‘due diligence’ is not likely 
to be a very useful standard to engage due to its lack of precision and the 
suggestion that it is enough that the state has done something, whether or not 
the agreed result has been achieved.76 Analysis of cases before the ECtHR 
(and some of the UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies which also employ the 
concept) led Edwards to allege that the test is not yet determined with any 
certainty, has no clear criteria and there is no absolute standard.77 Successful 
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case law to date that has ‘engaged with the concept is at the extreme end of the 
state complicity spectrum’ (i.e. cases where it seemed very clear that the State 
ought to have acted to prevent the violations) and it is therefore unclear where 
the limits of the concept lie.78 Under Osman, there is only a requirement that 
states take reasonable steps,79 it is not yet clear what would constitute 
reasonable measures or a reasonable omission or failure in respect of different 
forms of violence against women such as domestic violence.80 Furthermore, it is 
hard to establish the failure of state institutions in relation to incidents of 
domestic violence due to the particularly concealed nature of this form of 
violence against women.  
Therefore, it seems that the due diligence test is likely to be of little 
significance in terms of holding states responsible for failing to prevent domestic 
abuse. This is especially apparent when so much of their complicity in these 
acts is currently denied and the construction of appropriate femininity and 
masculinity that is created and sustained by constructions within the law, are 
generally invisible under a patriarchal system which states that differential 
treatment of the sexes reflects natural biological differences. The requirement 
for a close link to the state ignores the role and function of male violence in 
women’s lives and that it is rooted in and perpetuates the culture and structure 
of the patriarchal state.81  This contextualisation is crucial to understanding state 
responsibility for violations of women’s human rights,82 especially domestic 
violence.  
The Stubbings83 case suggests that states ‘may be granted a wider 
margin of appreciation84 in cases involving their positive obligations to protect 
the rights of individuals from being violated by the actions of other private 
entities.’85 Combined with Osman, where the ECtHR stated the need to take 
into account ‘the difficulties involved in policing modern societies,’86 this is 
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indicative of a wide margin of appreciation being granted to states in terms of 
policing decisions and resources, something clearly of enormous import to the 
handling of domestic violence cases. Therefore, even though the ECtHR is 
demonstrating a dynamic approach to the Convention rights by extending the 
doctrine of positive obligations, it is submitted here that the test of ‘due 
diligence’, as it is currently applied and interpreted, does not go anywhere near 
far enough because it does not hold states responsible or accountable for 
domestic violence in the very circumstances most commonly found in such 
cases.  
It therefore seems that the litigation approach is extremely limited in the 
context of domestic violence because, although the ECtHR has held that there 
are positive obligations on the signatory State in certain instances, and that the 
Convention rights can have effect between private individuals, the ideology of 
the public/private divide still prevails and prevents the obligations necessary to 
tackle domestic violence from being imposed. In addition, this approach is 
predominantly applicable to measures that could be put into place once 
domestic violence is already occurring, due to the types of rights protected 
under the provisions of the ECHR,87 and the fact that the state is not seen to be 
responsible or accountable for domestic violence until a particular individual is 
brought to the attention of the authorities.  
 
 
Judicial Attitudes and the Restricted Scope of Judicial Comment 
 
As well as the fact that the ECHR does not contain social, economic and 
cultural rights, the litigation approach is bound to be limited because, as 
McQuigg has pointed out, ‘judges generally must confine themselves to dealing 
with the precise matter in the actual case that is before them, [and] cannot 
make sweeping statements on societal matters’.88 They will, therefore, always 
be limited to some extent in terms of what can be achieved as a result of the 
outcome of a particular case. The correlative point being that legal victories, for 
example a successful result for a specific victim of domestic violence, don’t 
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automatically or necessarily produce the desired change89 in terms of reducing 
or ending the prevalence of domestic violence generally. The potential of 
litigation for victims of domestic violence will also inevitably be limited by the 
fact that this is often an unseen crime with ashamed and frightened victims 
frequently unwilling to take their case to court; ‘Judges… cannot make rights-
supportive law unless they have rights cases to decide’.90 Overall, the judicial 
process is slow, costly, and produces legal changes only in ‘small increments’91, 
if at all, and is hampered by the understanding, acceptance and willingness to 
adapt of both the judiciary and the legislature, something of especial 
significance in the context of addressing domestic violence.  
 
 
Part Three 
The Advocacy Approach 
 
Rather than being an attempt to evaluate the whole of the UN Human Rights 
Treaty Body system’s treatment of women,92 or even the entirety of its response 
to domestic violence,93 this section will highlight aspects of the system which 
engage with the causes, context and consequences of domestic violence, or 
show some potential in relation to understanding these elements. None of the 
UN human rights treaties refer specifically to domestic violence – a notable 
absence - but the issue has been brought within the ambit of the treaty bodies 
by relying upon other provisions.94 The main international human rights 
instruments of relevance to domestic violence are the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), General 
Recommendation 19 of the CEDAW Committee, and the Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW) (produced by the CEDAW 
Committee in 1993 to enable the CEDAW Committee to address violence 
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against women). However, of these instruments,95 only the CEDAW is binding 
on states96 and the lack of a free-standing right to be free from violence 
suggests women will be subjected to additional legal burdens when trying to 
rely on human rights provisions. 
 
 
Marginalisation: Implementation and Enforcement Difficulties 
 
The essential difficulty with implementation of any of the human rights provided 
for under the UN treaty body system is that enforcement may not be considered 
a priority by State Parties, largely due to the enforcement difficulties that human 
rights treaties tend to suffer from.97 Even though the obligations under the UN 
treaty body system are legally binding on states that have signed and ratified 
the Conventions, it is difficult to compel states to comply with their duties. This 
leads to a lack of compliance, particularly as governments do not yet seem to 
have accepted that they must act on their commitments.98 It has been argued 
that the enforcement difficulties that are found with the UN system of human 
rights generally99 are magnified when it comes to the treaties and statements 
that pertain to issues concerning women.100  
Whilst it has been suggested that the work of the treaty bodies overall is 
less tied to patriarchal competitive paradigms of justice – due to being less 
dependent on adversarial modes of dispute resolution – it must nonetheless be 
conceded that women and their experiences are still almost completely 
excluded from mainstream101 human rights instruments.102 This has led to the 
creation of ‘women’s only’ instruments, which, it is suggested, creates the 
potential for the more mainstream instruments to avoid discussing matters 
perceived to be only relevant to women. 
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There are several features of the CEDAW itself, alongside the working 
methods of the Women’s Committee, which indicate that this treaty is not taken 
as seriously by the international community as the other treaty bodies are.103 It 
has been argued that the existence of the CEDAW has itself led to a 
marginalisation of matters perceived to be ‘women’s issues’ and although the 
CEDAW was intended to tackle inequality and discrimination against women, it 
has in fact implicitly allowed the other treaty body Committees to ignore issues 
pertaining only to women, thus relieving them of the responsibility of addressing 
the concerns themselves.104 The time allocated to the CEDAW Committee to 
examine the reports submitted by states parties is significantly less than the 
time allocated to the more mainstream treaty body committees, with only one 
day being available for the examination of each report.105 This is a third less 
time than is allocated to the monitoring bodies of many of the other human 
rights treaties, making it extremely difficult to formulate meaningful Concluding 
Observations.106 Another important element of the treaty body system which 
suggests that the CEDAW is deemed less important than the other treaties is 
that whereas the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD) is ‘[c]onvinced that any doctrine of superiority based on 
racial differentiation is scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially unjust 
and dangerous, and that there is no justification for racial discrimination, in 
theory or in practice, anywhere’, the CEDAW does not at any point state that 
sexism is a lie or that sex equality is the only position consistent with the 
evidence.107 Even the name of the Women’s Convention compared with the 
name of the Convention on Race is evidence of the failure to recognise the 
gravity of the issues affecting women and the inability to name ‘sexism’ as a 
harm that needs to be taken seriously. Furthermore, the large number of 
reservations that are made to the CEDAW compared with other more 
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mainstream instruments, albeit not impacting directly on women in the UK,  
demonstrate that this treaty is seen as different. Reservations are not 
necessarily indicative of a lack of importance attributed to the Convention by the 
State, but, alongside the other differences, the number of reservations certainly 
implies that the CEDAW is taken less seriously than the other human rights 
treaties.  
It is noticeable that many of the reservations to CEDAW concern the 
central provisions relating to non-discrimination on the basis of sex, ‘obligations 
to which many states parties are already bound by virtue of their ratification of 
other human rights treaties, or under customary international law’.108 This 
means that the existence of a woman-specific instrument has ‘allowed states to 
register backdoor reservations that they have not otherwise made (or been 
permitted to make) to mainstream treaties’ and although ‘this does not affect the 
obligations of states parties under these other treaties, and therefore many of 
the reservations to the CEDAW are effectively meaningless in law, they 
nonetheless serve to undermine the political significance of the CEDAW as an 
instrument for the advancement of women’s rights’.109 Charlesworth, Chinkin 
and Wright assert that the pattern of reservations to the CEDAW underlines the 
inadequacy of the ‘present normative structure of international law.’ 110 The high 
number of reservations, in particular those that defeat the object and purpose of 
the Convention as being to eliminate sexual inequality and discrimination, tends 
to undermine the idea that women’s equality and rights are as universal as 
men’s rights.111 
 
 
Domestic Violence: Not a Human Rights Violation Per Se 
 
It is striking that the Women’s Convention, implemented in 1970 and intended to 
cover human rights abuses that are of particular concern to women, does not 
have a single mention of violence against women in its anti-discrimination 
provisions. This is concerning given that this abuse is one of the predominant 
ways in which inequality manifests itself under current gender relations. This 
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absence suggests that violence of this type was normalised within the 
international community at this time. Even where it was acknowledged it was 
not recognised as an issue that could, or needed to, engage with human rights 
law – in part due to the public/private divide justifying state’s non-intervention in 
the private sphere.  
Although CEDAW’s anti-discrimination provisions were extended by 
General Recommendation 19112 of the CEDAW Committee and concretised by 
the DEVAW113 which recognised ‘gender-based violence’ to be ‘a form of 
discrimination that seriously inhibits women's ability to enjoy rights and 
freedoms on a basis of equality with men,’114 it did not create a free-standing 
right to be free from violence and there is no acknowledgement that violence is 
a human rights violation per se. General Recommendation 19 only explicitly 
incorporates gender-based violence by holding it to be discrimination within the 
meaning of Article 1 of the CEDAW when it ‘impairs or nullifies the enjoyment 
by women of human rights and fundamental freedoms.’115 Although the 
Preamble of the DEVAW affirms that ‘violence against women constitutes a 
violation of the rights and fundamental freedoms of women’116 (making violence 
against women an issue of international concern) there is no standalone right to 
be free from violence in any of the DEVAW’s operational provisions, leading to 
a failure to create a nexus between violence against women and human 
rights.117 This is reflected in Article 4118 of the DEVAW where efforts to end 
violence against women are framed as policy initiatives, not measures pursuant 
to human rights standards. Charlesworth submits that this is due to a fear of 
diluting the traditional notion of human rights which require direct state 
involvement. It is thought by ‘mainstream’ commentators that extending the 
concept of human rights to cover private behaviour would reduce the human 
rights canon as a whole.119 This concern implies a preference for preserving the 
current status quo, rather than extending the human rights canon to provide 
more effective protection for women. 
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Following this absence, violence against women has typically been 
declared to be ‘sex discrimination’120 thus using equality guarantees to ‘plug a 
worrying gap in the law’.121 Although this assimilation transformed the CEDAW 
from an anti-discrimination treaty into a gender-based violence treaty122 – with 
clear benefits in relation to the conception of violence against women123 – it has 
also resulted in enormous practical and theoretical difficulties. The perception of 
violence against women as a barrier to other human rights, rather than as a 
violation in itself, leaves subjects marginalised and needing special measures 
for their protection.124 The advantages must not, therefore, be allowed to divert 
attention away from the potentially worrying consequences of the assimilation, 
such as the preference for formal over more substantive equality and the use of 
the language of equality which is rhetorically weaker than the language of 
violence (because the international community does not condemn 
discriminatory treatment to the same extent as violence).125 Edwards points out 
that this strategy of framing violence against women as sex discrimination 
simply because it is the only available remedy almost covers up the violence 
that has occurred and may trivialise the harm or the rights violation at issue. As 
Edwards emphasises, ‘[t]he language of violence conjures up… a different 
calibre of violation’.126 The only thing that’s offered to women is indirect 
protection; they are only protected to the extent that they can establish that the 
violence was discriminatory.127 This requires a link between the act and a 
discriminatory intent128 thus narrowing the scope of protection available and 
subjecting women to additional legal burdens.129  
It can further be contended that when it comes to ‘private’ violence, such 
as domestic violence, this approach provides double indirect protection because 
a victim must demonstrate first that she suffered discriminatory violence and 
second that the state is responsible owing to its ‘due diligence’ failures, which 
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may or may not be due to discrimination.130 Londono has recently criticised the 
assimilation of violence against women to equal treatment and non-
discrimination legislation for this very reason; violence is not a matter of 
inequality of treatment, it is a human rights violation in itself131 and should be 
recognised and treated as such. Violence against women as sex discrimination 
offers a two-tier system of protection whereby violence perpetrated against 
women outside the context of violence based upon sex discrimination is 
excluded.132 However, it has been claimed that it is important to see violence 
against women as an issue of inequality, as well as violating other human rights 
provisions. The case of Opuz v Turkey, heard by the ECtHR, has been argued 
to represent an important change in approach and a move away from the 
intentions of the original drafters of the Convention by articulating the violations 
as issues of inequality and thus as violations of Article 14 of the ECHR as well 
as Articles 1, 3 and 8. Previously, even where a State was found to be in 
violation due to a positive duty to secure rights between private individuals, this 
was not articulated as an issue of inequality and Article 14 violations were not 
generally found in cases involving violence against women.133 In the Opuz v 
Turkey ruling, the discrimination ‘was not based on the legislation per se but 
rather resulted from the general attitude of the local authorities, such as the 
manner in which the women were treated at police stations when they reported 
domestic violence and judicial passivity in providing effective protection to 
victims’.134 It was thus found that ‘the practice of the authorities discriminated 
against women in light of the ‘general and discriminatory judicial passivity… 
[which] created a climate that was conducive to domestic violence’.135 By 
engaging Article 14, the ECtHR in Opuz acknowledged the extent to which 
domestic violence is an issue of inequality, and how this impedes the enjoyment 
of other rights.136  
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It seems a positive move to articulate domestic violence as an issue of 
inequality, as well as violations of the substantive rights to life or right to be free 
from torture and other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment, as this has 
symbolic importance by emphasising the gendered and discriminatory nature of 
domestic violence. However, the preferred approach under the UN treaty body 
system seems to see domestic violence as an issue of inequality alone, rather 
than as a direct human rights violation in itself. This continues to measure 
women’s equality against men’s enjoyment of rights, and so in turn reinforces 
the masculinity of the universal subject of human rights law.137 This 
concentration on discrimination places the emphasis not on defining women’s 
rights but on eliminating discrimination within the context of already accepted, 
male-dominated norms.138 It also prevents the Committee from condemning 
gender violence as a direct human rights violation unless a comparison can be 
made with men.139 There is also the problem that by holding that violence is a 
matter of inequality, i.e. something that is stopping women being treated the 
same as men, violence such as domestic violence is transformed from being a 
serious human rights violation into a ‘women’s issue’.140 Women are subjected 
to additional legal burdens before acts of violence are considered ‘worthy of 
international legal attention.’141 Paradoxically, therefore, human rights regimes 
can be seen, when addressing domestic violence, to reinforce inequality under 
international human rights law: the more women work within the existing norms, 
the more the unequal structures of that system become entrenched.142  
 
 
Approach to the Causes and Consequences of Domestic Violence 
 
The claim has been made that one of the root causes of domestic violence 
remains the gendered expectations placed upon women and men in a 
patriarchal society. Furthermore, it was asserted that one of the reasons the 
legal remedies in England and Wales are unable to adequately address the 
phenomenon is because they fail to comprehend this. It is therefore necessary 
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when examining the response of the international human rights system to 
assess whether it comes any closer to applying an appropriate conceptual 
understanding which recognises the functional nature of domestic violence as 
being to sustain male power and domination.  
The CEDAW certainly indicates that, at least on a theoretical level, it 
understands that the objectification of women – linked to stereotypes and 
prejudices based on gender – must be tackled in order to end discrimination 
against women143 (although, of course, it does not link this to violence against 
women because there is no mention of violence in the CEDAW). The mandate 
of the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women includes information 
on its causes and consequences. Reports have been issued dealing with the 
ideologies that perpetuate cultural practices that are violent towards women.144 
Given the vital need to address the underlying causes of domestic violence, it is 
disappointing that the approach to societal awareness provided in the report 
does not do this. Although the Declaration of Purpose states that one of the 
purposes of the legislation is to provide ‘programmes to assist in the prevention 
and elimination of domestic violence which include raising public awareness 
and public education on the subject’,145 there is no recommendation in the 
substantive document that states adopt measures to raise public awareness. 
This is a surprising omission given that ‘the report is generally so 
comprehensive in its approach.’146 It is disappointing that the person specifically 
appointed to the role of addressing the causes and consequences of violence 
against women fails comprehensively to make the point that there is a vital link 
between domestic violence and the current gender hierarchy and stereotyped 
roles of males and females.  
Also of significance is the recognition in the DEVAW that ‘violence 
against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations 
between men and women, which have led to domination over and 
discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the full 
advancement of women, and that violence against women is one of the crucial 
social mechanisms by which women are forced into a subordinate position 
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compared with men’.147 There is also recognition in the Platform for Action that 
governments should ‘raise awareness of the responsibility of the media in 
promoting non-stereotyped images of women and men, as well as in eliminating 
patterns of media representation that generate violence’148 which ‘clearly 
demonstrates an awareness of the need to tackle the root causes of domestic 
violence by addressing attitudes within society’.149 However, this awareness is 
not consistently applied in the recommendations. It is also very different from 
the awareness-raising campaigns on the effects of violence emphasised by the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe which requires states to 
‘mobilise public opinion by organising or supporting conferences and 
information campaigns so that society is aware of the problem and its 
devastating effects on victims and society in general, and can therefore discuss 
the subject of violence towards women openly, without prejudice or 
preconceived ideas’.150 General Recommendation 19 of the CEDAW 
Committee recognises that domestic violence is perpetuated by traditional 
attitudes and calls for effective measure to be taken to ensure that ‘the media 
respect and promote respect for women’151 and ‘to overcome the attitudes and 
practices’ that perpetuate violence against women152 with the introduction of 
education and public information programmes to help eliminate prejudices that 
hinder women's equality.153 Yet whilst there is an emphasis on gender-sensitive 
training for judicial and law enforcement officers and other public officials, with 
the requirement of an initial course and an annual review, there is no mention of 
an obligation to educate other professionals such as social workers and 
doctors,154 even though these people are the first point of contact for victims of 
domestic violence in the UK. 
The CEDAW Committee has been praised for the substantive approach 
taken to equality155 because of its asymmetric nature (its sole aim is the 
elimination of discrimination against women). It has a proactive approach as it 
does not require a comparison of the situation of women with that of men (in the 
sense that women only have equal rights with the rights men already have), and 
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displays a positive attitude towards ‘temporary special measures’ (affirmative 
action). The next section deals with the obligation which can be read into Article 
5(a) to tackle the root causes of discrimination,156 and the ability of treaties to 
ensure the raising of awareness of the need for eradication of gender 
stereotypes. 
 
 
Eliminating Gender Stereotypes 
 
It could be claimed that it is now recognised under the UN human rights system 
that violence against women is both pervasive and also structural.157 This is 
reflected in the recognition that ‘the principal causes of this phenomenon lie in 
social, economic and cultural/religious practices and institutions in which men 
and women are perceived of as being inherently unequal or in which women are 
being pictured as inferior to men.’158 The Preamble of the CEDAW expresses 
awareness that a change in the traditional role of not just women but men as 
well is needed in both society and the family for full equality between men and 
women to be achieved.159 Prevention of domestic violence is dependent upon 
the elimination of these gender stereotypes, and the roles and expectations that 
accompany them. It will be claimed that the obligations that can be read into 
Article 5(a) of the CEDAW160 - when read in conjunction with ‘due diligence’ 
obligations – can be seen to be aimed specifically at this goal.  
Holtmaat interprets the ‘due diligence’ standard (discussed above) as 
involving the need to move the focus of attention away from the protection of 
individual victims and on to prevention in the sense of attacking root causes.161 
This would overcome one of the central difficulties found in the domestic legal 
response to domestic violence which is that it is reactive, rather than proactive, 
and cannot really act until abuse is already occurring. Whilst accepting that the 
emergence of the ‘due diligence’ standard shows potential in terms of targetting 
domestic violence and ideally should be interpreted in this way, it is submitted 
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that at present the ‘due diligence’ obligations imposed do not go far enough in 
terms of requiring states to take preventive action in a general sense, as 
opposed to specific measures to deal with domestic violence appropriately once 
it is occurring.  
Article 5(a) of the CEDAW obliges States to take measures aimed at 
eliminating stereotyped roles and practices based on the idea of the inferiority 
or superiority of either sex, thus recognising that it is not just negative portrayals 
of violence against women that need to be addressed but also conceptions of 
the appropriate roles for men and women more generally. Combining these 
obligations with those under a more proactive interpretation of the due diligence 
standard (see above) could impose positive obligations on states to address 
stereotypes in the media, the law and public life, identified in this research as 
some of the root causes of domestic violence. Holtmaat believes Article 5(a) of 
the CEDAW provides a legal basis for a strategy of social and cultural change 
whereby combating gender stereotypes becomes seen as a legal obligation, 
rather than just a desirable goal or a good practice.162 She goes on to identify 
two obligations that emerge from the Article, both of which can be seen to strike 
right at the heart of the underlying causes of domestic violence. The first is ‘a 
duty to intervene in those social relations and institutions in which negative and 
damaging stereotyped images and views about women are expressed and/or 
used’.163 This would cover images and views found in the media and 
commercial advertising, pornography and negative images that inspire violence 
against women. This is vital in light of the analysis of the contribution that 
pornography and degrading portrayals of women found in popular culture make 
to the continuation and acceptance of domestic violence.164 It is promising that 
the CEDAW Committee ‘leaves no room for discussion that States Parties are 
indeed obliged to develop and implement active policies in this field’.165 The 
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second duty Holtmaat identifies is for states to ‘take all appropriate measures to 
track down and eliminate gender stereotypes that are at the basis of law and 
public policy.’166 This is based on the acknowledgement that highly stereotyped 
ideas are to be found in many laws and public policies and thereby sustain 
certain fixed gender divisions in society, as reflected in the analysis of judicial 
interpretations of English and Welsh legislation contained in Chapter Four. 
Although opinions differ widely about how far-reaching this duty is and the 
Committee has not yet provided a definitive explanation of how far-reaching this 
obligation is, Holtmaat contends that the statement that there is ‘no such 
obligation is untenable.’167 This is due to the many concrete directions issued by 
the CEDAW Committee where links are made ‘between the continued existence 
of gender stereotypes and the existence of certain laws in which these 
stereotypes are affirmed’.168 These directions are reflective of the dynamic 
nature of the CEDAW, which has changed from an awareness raising agenda 
to one requiring structural change, and from equality as sameness to equality 
as transformation.169 In assessing whether the CEDAW has the potential to 
overcome the strictly formal approach to equality as a barrier to an appropriate 
legal and policy approach to domestic violence, the obligations arising from 
Article 5(a) are thus an integral part of the transformation that is needed.  
 It is clear that all these duties, which can be rephrased as a duty to ban 
systemic or structural gender discrimination,170 are integral to any approach to 
legal obligations that hope to tackle domestic violence in a holistic way. This is 
due to the recognition of the role that gendered stereotypes and expectations 
play in the continuation of patriarchal systems and the occurrence of domestic 
violence, and the ways in which they are sustained through the media, 
pornography, advertising and in judicial constructions of gender roles and 
behaviours. It is perhaps surprising, then, given its potentially important role, 
that Article 5(a) hasn’t yet attracted much interest from feminist legal scholars, 
underlining the lack of awareness both of the CEDAW itself and also, perhaps, 
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of the need to address the root causes of violence against women as a priority. 
However, human rights organisation Object (set up specifically to challenge the 
sexual objectification of women) has raised in public the obligations contained 
under Article 5 of CEDAW, as in its submission to the Leveson Inquiry in 
December 2011.171  
The CEDAW Committee expressed concern in their 2008 examination of 
the UK’s State Report over the ‘stereotyped media portrayals of women and of 
women’s roles in the family and in society’172 and called for ‘policies [to] be 
strengthened and programmes implemented, including awareness-raising and 
educational campaigns directed at women and men, and specifically at media 
and advertising agencies, to help ensure the elimination of stereotypes 
regarding the roles of women and men in society and in the family… It also 
recommends that the media be encouraged to project a positive image of 
women.’173 The Committee further recommended the expansion of training to 
sensitise those working with victims of violence and public awareness-raising 
campaigns.174 However, even if implemented, the difficulty remains that if those 
designing and running the training and campaigns do not have an adequate 
understanding of the causes and consequences of domestic violence then their 
activities could be detrimental, especially if public awareness-raising materials 
contain even subliminal messages of victim-blaming. There is nothing in the 
official interpretation of international human rights law pertaining to domestic 
violence that refers to the pervasive lack of understanding of why women 
remain in violent relationships. This means that even if the measures contained 
in the advocacy approach could be used to influence the domestic legal 
response, it would not be able to overcome this central limitation. 
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Council of Europe Convention on Violence Against Women 
 
It is suggested by McQuigg175 that the adoption of the Council of Europe 
Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and 
Domestic Violence176 is ‘a very important development, as it sets new legally 
binding standards in the area of gender-based violence,’177 including ‘not only 
criminal justice responses but also areas such as awareness raising and the 
provision of social support to victims’.178 However, at the time of writing, this 
Convention has not been ratified by the required number of European states179 
to enable it to enter into force. For this reason, a brief discussion of the potential 
benefits and limitations of the Convention appears sufficient at this point.180 
First, the Convention frames violence against women ‘in the wider context of 
achieving substantive equality between women and men and… [therefore] ‘as a 
form of discrimination’181 which means domestic violence would not be 
considered a human rights violation per se. The Preamble does, encouragingly, 
recognise ‘the link between achieving gender equality and the eradication of 
violence against women’ and ‘the structural nature of violence against women 
and that it is a manifestation of the historically unequal power relations between 
women and men.’182 It also recognises that ‘socially constructed roles, 
behaviours, activities and attributes that a given society considers appropriate 
for women and men… reproduce unwanted and harmful practices and 
contributes to make violence against women acceptable,’183 which although not 
a direct acknowledgement that domestic violence is caused by these 
stereotypes, does at least require ‘the eradication of prejudices, customs, 
traditions and other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority of 
women or on stereotyped gender roles as a general obligation to prevent 
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violence’.184 However, even if this Convention were to enter into force, the same 
enforcement problems and difficulties with the assimilation of domestic violence 
to sex discrimination would be encountered as are found with the CEDAW. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter aimed to evaluate responses under the international human rights 
law mechanisms to domestic violence and to assess their potential to improve 
the responses under national law in the UK. The ideology of the public/private 
divide in international human rights law was identified as a barrier to the 
influence of the international human rights strategies. Some feminists argue that 
the human rights movement can only accommodate women if the conceptual 
problem of the public/private divide is overcome.185 It is argued here that this 
conceptual problem in fact plays a significant and continuing role in maintaining 
the current hierarchical gender relations that sustain the patriarchal state. 
Therefore, unless there is the will to generate true equality for women both in 
the public and private spheres, the dichotomy will continue to operate as a 
conceptual tool to justify non-intervention in ‘private’ issues such as domestic 
violence.  
Even though positive obligations have developed in some areas of 
human rights through the ‘due diligence’ standard, the fact that the state is not 
seen to be complicit in incidents of domestic violence unless the relevant 
authorities knew that a particular individual was at risk and it could have 
reasonably acted to protect them186 continues to act as a significant obstacle to 
the utilisation of human rights law in the context of domestic violence. There is 
also no obligation resulting from the litigation approach to take preventative 
measures to combat the root causes of domestic violence, such as examining 
the role of the media in objectifying women and promoting the gendered 
stereotypes that contribute to the context in which domestic violence can occur.  
In relation to the advocacy approach, the three instruments containing 
provisions pertaining to domestic violence, and Article 5 of the CEDAW in 
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particular, are promising due to the concern they demonstrate regarding 
stereotypical attitudes towards women, their recognition of the persistent power 
imbalance between men and women, and their requirement of measures 
including public awareness directed at the media and the general public.187 
However, as was seen the potential influence of the advocacy approach is 
hampered by the enforcement difficulties found with the treaty body system 
generally. In addition, even the existence of a specific women’s Convention can 
be seen to reinforce the idea that men’s rights are universal and women’s are 
an afterthought188 and instead of prompting the other human rights treaty body 
committees to take women’s rights more seriously, both the Convention itself 
and the work of the Committee seem to have reinforced the marginalisation of 
women’s rights.189 This can be seen as greatly disappointing given that 
international human rights law, especially within the UN system, works to 
understand and address the underlying social causes of domestic violence in a 
way that the domestic law and policy does not yet do.190 
It does seem that the understanding of the causes and consequences of 
domestic violence displayed by the CEDAW Committee and the UN Special 
Rapporteur is one to be strived toward by the European and UK courts. Other 
states have demonstrated a willingness to use international human rights 
conventions in construing their own domestic laws,191 indicating a willingness 
unseen in Europe or the UK to date to use international human rights law to 
secure the rights of domestic violence victims. The European and UK judiciary 
may defend their failure to use the provisions of CEDAW by claiming that the 
ECHR (integrated into domestic law by the HRA) includes a clear prohibition on 
discrimination, but it is clear that the ways the provisions of CEDAW have been 
interpreted do go much further in relation to domestic violence than the 
interpretations of the ECHR provisions. The CEDAW Committee expressed 
concern in 2008 that ‘no measures have been taken by the State party to fully 
incorporate the Convention into domestic law’ and noted ‘the absence of 
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national legislation covering all aspects of the Convention’.192 It emphasised 
that ‘while the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms has been incorporated into domestic law through the Human Rights 
Act (1998), the European Convention does not provide for the full range of 
women’s human rights as enshrined in the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women’.193 
Although the definition of violence against women provided by the 
DEVAW194 is broadly construed and non-exhaustive195 and should not be held 
to only include domestic violence of a physical nature, one of the most 
prominent absences in both of these approaches to implementing international 
human rights law is that there has been little, if any, recognition that domestic 
violence is best understood as a programme coercive control rather than a 
series of isolated incidents.196 This is emphasised by the House of Lords 
decisions in Van Colle and Smith where the amount of discretion to be granted 
to the police in respect of their positive obligations following Osman was 
considered. Given the high level of discretion and the misunderstanding of the 
dynamics of domestic violence in evidence in these cases, it does not seem 
likely that the police will be under an obligation to take action in the absence of 
serious physical violence or threats to life. 
Following the analysis, above, of the obligations that can be seen to arise 
under Article 5(a) of the CEDAW, and their importance in addressing the root 
causes of domestic violence, there is a clear need to harness the obligations in 
a proactive way in the UK. This would provide a legal impetus for 
acknowledging the impact of gendered stereotypes found in the portrayals of 
women and men in media and advertising
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CONCLUSION  
                                                                                              
The intention of this thesis was to provide a critique of the legal remedies 
pertaining to domestic violence in England and Wales from the perspective of 
two central arguments concerning its causes, context and dynamics. The aim 
was to provide a critique of this type of abuse that moved beyond simply 
identifying the aspects of the legal system that do not work in practice, to an 
analysis encompassing the broader social and cultural issues that impact upon 
the operation of the legal and policy reforms targeted at domestic violence. The 
first of these arguments is that domestic violence is first and foremost a social 
problem, not one caused by the deviancy of particular individuals and 
relationship dynamics. The second is that a failure to take account of the root 
causes prevents recognition of the functional nature of domestic violence and 
has led to a misplaced focus on incidents of mainly physical violence as the 
defining feature of an abusive relationship, thus failing to capture the range of 
other strategies that men use to exert power and control over their female 
partners. 
The statistical and broader societal indications concerning the 
prevalence of domestic violence against women1 means that it must be a 
priority for state and legal institutions to address it. Indeed, it can be seen to 
have been prioritised in recent years by the police, the CPS, the legislature and 
the government.2 Extensive policy measures and legal reforms have been 
implemented over the last thirty years, and domestic violence is being taken 
more seriously than ever before by the government and the legal system. 
Suggestions as to why these reforms and commitments to tackle domestic 
violence may not have succeeded in reducing the prevalence will be explored 
below, drawing on the central findings of this research. Following this there will 
be a discussion of the implications of these findings and how they may impinge 
upon existing legal and policy theories and understandings of domestic 
violence. Alongside this will be suggestions as to how the legal system could 
better conceptualise domestic violence to reflect the findings relating to the two 
central arguments of the research. The limitations of this study will also be 
considered, together with recommendations for future research in this area. 
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Research Findings 
 
Through analysis of the period of European history characterised by state and 
church regulated witch hunts (circa 1550-1750), the argument was made that 
state-legitimated misogyny and violence against women extends back many 
hundreds of years and as such is firmly embedded in the patriarchal systems of 
the state. In demonstrating the witch hunts as predominantly attacks against 
women, and the control they were able to exercise over their own lives, 
sexuality and reproductive function, the witch hunts can be seen as a central 
method of maintaining male domination and control. Patriarchal systems can be 
seen to rely upon violence against women as a primary means of ensuring male 
control and female subordination. Support for the claim that we live in a society 
characterised by patriarchal systems is indicated by how the state and legal 
system of England and Wales responds to domestic violence in current times.  
For example, the availability of the civil law remedies for victims of domestic 
violence can be seen to be limited due to entrenched attitudes that bolster male 
privilege. The perception that excluding a man from his home, even when he 
has perpetrated violence against his female partner, is ‘draconian’ continues to 
impact upon the granting of exclusion orders.3  Engrained beliefs concerning 
the responsibility of women for provoking male violence are also still evident at 
a lower court level.4 
For patriarchal systems to be sustained there must be a clear division 
between the roles and behaviours held to be natural for men and women; one 
group cannot dominate another group unless they are seen in opposition. It has 
therefore been argued that gender differences are in part socially constructed. 
Furthermore, it is claimed that the legal system as a whole is implicated in these 
constructions, as evidenced by judicial constructions of gender found in case 
law.5 The portrayals of the gender role expectations found in these 
constructions can be seen to take a hetero-normative stance that privileges the 
patriarchal family unit.6 This provides further support for the claim that the state 
is patriarchal; a patriarchal state with a strong economic system relies upon the 
control of women’s sexuality and reproductive function in order for male lineage 
                                                          
3
 Re Y (Children) (Occupation Order) [2000] FCR 470 (discussed at pp. 124-5) 
4
 See Re H (A Child) (Contact: Domestic Violence) [2006] 1 FCR 102, discussed at p. 36, pp. 125-6, p. 138 and p. 186 
5
 See Chapter Four, pp. 98-104 
6
 See Chapter Four, pp. 105-114 
 
251 
 
to be traced and the next generation of workers to be provided. Therefore, 
some of the objectives of the witch hunts can be seen to have carried through to 
current times and still appear, albeit implicitly, in the intentions of the state 
today. State legitimation of male violence against women in the past is 
evidenced by the procedures and purpose of the witch hunts. It is argued that 
there is still implicit legitimation by the state. For example in Re H (A Child) 
(Contact: Domestic Violence)7 and in the first appeal hearing of Sara Thornton8 
where Lord Bedlam portrays her in a way that serves to impliedly justify the 
violence she suffers at the hands of her husband.  
Polarised masculine and feminine identities are integral to the 
maintenance of patriarchy, with the expectations placed upon women to be 
subservient in their role as wives and mothers, taking on the majority of 
domestic work and child care, creating the context in which domestic violence 
occurs. Alongside this run the expectations placed upon men to conform to the 
ideals of hegemonic masculinity,9 thus serving to legitimate the infliction of 
violence in order to dominate and control women. Pornography and the range of 
pornographic images that pervade popular culture and media were shown as 
one of the central sources of messages that perpetuate these polarised 
identities and the subordinate role of women. Under English and Welsh law, 
pornography has traditionally been viewed as an issue of morality and 
obscenity, with its harm thought  to be its tendency to deprave and corrupt 
those who consume it. However, when the messages it perpetuates are seen 
as contributing to the underlying causes of domestic violence, it can be 
reconceptualised as causing, or contributing to, harm to women. Statutes 
concerning the regulation of domestic violence in England and Wales continue 
to be based on an obscenity standard.10 This itself indicates the patriarchal 
nature of the state where men’s concerns dominate and women’s are side-lined 
or invisible. The failure to move away from this model with the new provisions 
regulating extreme pornography under the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 
2008 further affirms this argument. Legal responses send out powerful 
messages; in failing to identify and regulate the harm of pornography as one of 
discrimination and harm to women, the state is implicitly condoning and 
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supporting the harm by sending out the message that it is acceptable to view 
women in this way. 
The expectations of the appropriate roles and behaviours of men and 
women have also been argued to provide the context in which domestic 
violence occurs. Expectations that men should be dominant and in control 
provide the means of legitimating and normalising the control they exercise over 
their female partner and family life. Studies investigating the context in which 
violence occurs in the marital-type relationship confirmed that it is frequently 
caused by men’s desire to exert control over their female partner and family 
life.11 Stark’s assertion that domestic violence (or coercive control as he terms 
it) is a gendered phenomenon is based upon the observation that its main 
tactics consist of petty rules and restrictions concerning activities that are 
already consigned to women (such as cooking, cleaning, and child care).12 This 
helps to bolster claims that the state is patriarchal and that domestic violence is 
functional because the institutions of the state can be seen to create and 
sustain these expectations of the appropriate roles and behaviours of men and 
women. It was thought that this would impact upon the availability of the legal 
remedies for domestic violence in England and Wales. Evidence to support this 
claim was found in judicial understandings,13 which can be seen to both reflect 
and construct these gendered expectations, and thus to bear some 
responsibility for continuing to create the conditions and expectations in which 
domestic violence occurs. 
It is clear that the legal remedies available to victims of domestic violence 
in England and Wales are generally only able to respond to already occurring 
violence. The failure to address the root causes of domestic violence could be 
seen to result from this and thus it could be claimed that this is an inevitable 
limitation, simply reflective of the aims and purposes of any legal system. 
However, it was also argued that failing to see the root causes impacted upon 
the ability of the existing remedies even when they were responding to already 
occurring violence. This can be seen to happen in two main ways. The first is 
the use of gendered assumptions and stereotypes when the police, CPS and 
courts are dealing with domestic violence.14 The second is the use of gendered 
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assumptions and stereotypes more generally by the judiciary, as seen 
particularly in the cases of R v Smith (Morgan),15 Attorney General for Jersey v 
Holley,16 and Bonser v UK Coal Mining Ltd17 It is claimed that assumptions such 
as those contained in these cases contribute to the maintenance of the context 
in which domestic violence occurs. Alongside this can be seen an acceptability 
and reluctance to criminalise certain types and levels of male violence against 
other males because it is seen as a natural and expected part of being 
biologically male.18 
Analysis of the international human rights law standards under the UN 
Women’s Convention (the CEDAW) indicated recognition that the elimination of 
these gender-role stereotypes is an essential aspect of targetting domestic 
violence.19 Thus the root causes and functional nature of violence against 
women20 is recognised as being the objectification of women, linked to 
stereotypes and prejudices.21 However, due to the difficulties associated with 
the implementation of UN treaty body law into domestic law, the potential for 
this understanding and the obligations entailed to impact upon the national legal 
system remains limited. Although the CEDAW does show attempts to tackle the 
underlying causes of violence against women, the majority of the measures 
called for are still only targeted at already-occurring violence, not the root 
causes of this violence. The majority of the statements refer to improving the 
criminal and civil justice response, and many of the measures called for are 
already in place in England and Wales, it is the interpretation of the obligations 
under the measures in practice where the issues arise.22 In addition, the 
CEDAW Committee’s work on violence against women shows a predominant 
focus on physical violence, with insufficient recognition of the other abusive 
methods that can be used to gain power and control over the victim. this could, 
in part, be due to the fact that it is an international committee. If Stark’s 
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arguments, considered below, are followed, coercive control arises in the 
context of women’s newly found equality in the public sphere (because women 
are no longer subject to male control to the same extent by society generally, 
and physical violence is largely condemned in Western states, men have 
needed to find more subtle ways to exert their control in the private sphere). 
This means that much of CEDAW’s work, targeted at countries where women 
do not yet have formal equality in the public sphere, needs to remain targeted at 
physical violence. 
Due to the, perhaps inevitable, focus on targetting the symptoms of 
already-occurring domestic violence, rather than attempting to address the 
causes, the legal responses overlook the root causes. As Nedelsky 
emphasises, the majority of the analysis and advocacy on the issue of domestic 
violence is aimed at improving the situation for women who are already in 
abusive relationships, and whilst this is a worthy goal, it does not address the 
question of why so many men are violent and abusive to their intimate partners 
in the first place.23 This prevents domestic violence from being seen as 
functional, and instead perpetuates the view that it is caused by individual 
relationship dynamics and the deviancy of the individuals involved. The aim 
then becomes to reduce the prevalence through small alterations to the legal 
responses available, and through targetting the behaviours and choices of 
individual men and women. This means that the best that can presently be 
provided is the offer of safety and security for some victimised women, provided 
their behaviour conforms to that of the stereotypical deserving victim. As long as 
the reasons for the abuse remain hidden, these small alterations can have little 
impact. The limited success to date of reform initiatives could thus be seen to 
be due, in part, to insufficient acknowledgement of the role that the gendered 
expectations necessary to the maintenance of the patriarchal system play in the 
continuation of domestic violence.  
As a result of failing to see the functional nature of domestic violence, the 
focus of domestic violence becomes one of isolated incidents of mainly physical 
violence. Even when other types of violence, such as sexual or psychological, 
are envisaged, they are still deemed to be incident-based. This then overlooks 
the purpose of domestic violence as being to dominate and control the victim, 
leading to an abstraction of each incident of violence from the social context in 
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which it occurs. This abstraction can be also seen in the incident-based 
approach taken to the criminalisation of domestic violence.24 The criminal 
incident is abstracted from the context in which it occurs, so that a cumulative 
pattern of many small incidents will not result in the perpetrator being charged 
with a more serious offence, or any offence at all. The rest of the defendants 
abusive behaviour is not considered when assessing the severity of the charge 
and thus the defendant may be convicted of a relatively minor offence despite 
years of ongoing abuse.  
As an alternative to this conception, the theory of domestic violence as 
coercive control25 indicated its programmatic nature, providing the means by 
which to reconceptualise domestic violence as a liberty crime26 or a capture 
crime,27 not a crime of violence per se. In the absence of this, the focus remains 
incident-based (even when different types of violence such as sexual, economic 
and psychological are encompassed in understandings of domestic violence) 
and, due to the assumption based on this that there is space between incidents 
for a woman to make and act upon the decision to leave, it becomes unclear 
why women remain in abusive relationships. This results in the commonly heard 
question, or value judgment, of ‘why did she stay?’ This misunderstanding 
permeates legal and societal understandings of responses to violence in 
intimate relationships. For example, the operation of self-defence and the partial 
defences to homicide when an abused woman kills her abusive partner. Implicit 
in the trial judge’s summing up to the jury in the case of Sara Thornton were 
questions of why she did not just leave, rather than using fatal violence on the 
night she killed her partner.28 Self-defence is deemed an inappropriate defence 
when there are thought to be other options available at the time – for example 
going to a different room or leaving the house – or when violence was not being 
inflicted at that particular time. This ignores the coercion and control that victims 
of abuse are typically under which prevents them from leaving, and that by 
trying to leave they are likely to face fatal violence themselves. The woman’s 
actions in killing her violent partner are abstracted from the context in which 
they occur, thus preventing her actions from being seen as necessary or 
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reasonable. The operation of Section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and 
Victims Act 2004 in the context of victims of domestic violence helps to illustrate 
the ways in which women are both held responsible for ending male violence 
towards them and their children, and also thought to be able to freely and safely 
report the violence and exit the relationship if they choose to do so.29 
It was shown that Walker’s BWS30 strongly influences legal responses 
and understandings of domestic violence. For example, it was mentioned in the 
cases of Ahluwalia and Thornton, and Lord Denning referred to a victim as a 
‘battered woman’ in Davis v Johnson.31 Walker’s model retains the primary 
focus on incidents of physical violence due to the terminology and concepts she 
uses. She refers to abusive men as ‘batterers’ and abused women as ‘battered 
women,’ thus drawing attention away from the other methods used to establish 
male power and control and rendering experiences not characterised by serious 
physical violence as less worthy of attention. Herman’s trauma theory is useful 
in that it provides an explanation of the impact of ongoing trauma on a person’s 
sense of self and autonomy. However, her findings also retain the focus on 
serious physical violence as leading to the incidence of PTSD in abused 
women. Stark’s work with abused women leads him to assert that this link 
between serious physical violence and the psychological, social and emotional 
problems they face is misplaced. He has found that the majority of women do 
not experience frequent and serious physical violence and that the impact of the 
abuse results from a lack of freedom. This is not just physical freedom, but the 
freedom to make decisions and do things in the way they choose, something 
denied to them through having every aspect of their life monitored and 
controlled by their abuser.32 
One of the ways in which a misunderstanding of the essence of the harm 
of domestic violence manifests is through the medicalising of abused women, 
particularly through the use of Walker’s BWS to explain female behaviour in 
remaining in an abusive relationship. The syndrome attempts to explain why 
women may come to use fatal violence against their abuser through the concept 
of learned helplessness. This implies that their reaction in killing is extreme and 
irrational due to changes induced by the abuse. When these women are seen 
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as victims of capture or liberty crimes it becomes possible to understand their 
actions. In addition, BWS perpetuates the view that only certain types of women 
suffer from abuse. This leads to the individualisation of the phenomena and the 
seeking of explanations for why the women does not leave from within her 
personality and characteristics, rather than in the behaviour of the abuser.33  
International human rights law provides a means of scrutinising the national 
legal responses for domestic violence by holding states accountable for 
implementing and abiding by standards that have been internationally agreed 
upon. The mechanisms of international human rights law were assessed to 
establish the potential impact of these standards on the addressing of domestic 
violence nationally and whether these standards are likely to respond in a way 
that takes account of the causes, consequences and dynamics. Aspects of the 
advocacy approach as a strategy of implementing internationally agreed-upon 
standards were considered above. However, at present it can be seen that the 
litigation approach – via the decisions and statements of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) and the national courts implementing the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) through the Human Rights Act (HRA) 
1998) – is the one most likely to directly impact upon victims of domestic 
violence. One of the most significant limitations of this strategy is its reliance on 
the UK judiciary who, as seen above, typically have very traditional views on the 
appropriate roles and expectations for each gender. As shown by the joined 
appeals of Van Colle and Smith34 the courts continue to operate with prejudices 
concerning domestic violence, and have taken a limited approach to the fulfilling 
of their obligations under the ECHR. 
The ECtHR has not really extended the obligations the state is already 
under in this context. The divide between the public and private spheres may be 
being gradually eroded – with a clear willingness on the part of the courts to 
impose positive obligations on states in relation to the provisions of the ECHR 
and the development of the due diligence test35 – but it was shown that this 
extension into the private sphere currently goes nowhere near far enough in 
terms of imposing positive obligations on states to protect potential victims and 
prevent potential violations. This is because, under the Osman test,36  the 
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positive obligations on state bodies, such as the police, are only engaged when 
they are already aware of the risk to an identified individual and have failed to 
take taken reasonable steps to prevent it. 
 
 
Implications 
 
The central arguments discussed above can, therefore, be seen to challenge 
current understandings of domestic violence found within the legal arena. The 
harm of domestic violence has traditionally been understood as resulting from 
serious physical violence. This has led to a misplacement of responsibility on 
the woman to leave the relationship, alongside judgment and a lack of legal 
support when she does not. If the root causes and dynamics of domestic 
violence as coercive control were to be recognised within legal understandings, 
this focus would be shown to be misplaced and responsible for the exclusion of 
many women from legal protection. Instead of being seen as victims of violence, 
women in abusive relationships need to be recognised as victims of capture 
crimes37 (such as kidnapping) or liberty crimes.38 Stark has pointed out that, 
compared with other capture crimes, there is a lack of understanding about the 
duress under which women stay in abusive relationships. He argues that if their 
predicament were to be reframed as hostage-like much of this ambiguity would 
be dispelled.39 Making comparisons between domestic violence and capture 
crimes in the common terminology used in government policy and legislation 
would help to challenge the common misconception that women choose to be in 
abusive relationships and could leave if they wanted to. The analogy between 
domestic abuse and capture crimes can highlight the ‘cruel absurdity of the 
common tendency to blame the victim of domestic violence – for provoking 
violence, for failing to satisfy her violent partner, for falling apart, for failing to 
leave.’40 Viewing domestic violence in this way could ‘contribute to shifting the 
burden of responsibility from victim to perpetrator because these crimes are 
never excused or held to be ‘deserved.’41 It does, of course, need to be 
acknowledged that even if the legal system did begin to recognise the hostage-
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like status of abuse victims, there would be huge evidential problems in terms of 
proving that the psychological difficulties suffered by the victim were caused by 
abuse, and this would inevitably limit the response that could be provided by the 
criminal justice system. However, the potential of the state and legal system to 
respond to domestic violence extends beyond that of merely criminalising 
already occurring violence, and thus using this terminology in policy and legal 
definitions could be beneficial in shifting the focus away from the behaviour of 
the woman and why she remains in the relationship. 
If the obligations that can be read into the UN Women’s Convention were 
to be harnessed, this would have a clear impact on many of the aspects of the 
legal responses found to be contributing to the root causes of domestic 
violence. Measures under the CEDAW would be targeted toward tackling these 
causes, thus overcoming one of the central difficulties found in the domestic 
legal response to domestic violence which is that it is reactive, rather than 
proactive. Harnessing the obligations claimed by Holtmaat to exist as a result of 
combining due diligence obligations with Article 5(a) of the CEDAW would make 
the state responsible for eliminating the gender-role stereotypes and 
assumptions found in judicial constructions of appropriate masculine and 
feminine behaviour. This would impact upon the judicial understandings it is 
claimed contribute to the maintenance of the context in which domestic violence 
occurs, and also upon the treatment of victims and perpetrators when they 
come before the courts. The constructions of masculinity and femininity found 
within pornographic portrayals would also be targeted because portrayals seen 
to objectify and subordinate women are in violation of Article 5(a) when it is 
interpreted in this way. This would also have the implication of requiring the 
understandings of the harm of pornography found in the statutes concerning the 
regulation of pornography to be shifted from an obscenity standard to one 
recognising the harmful impact these portrayals have on perceptions of women. 
One of the difficulties that can be seen in terms of opposing pornography is how 
to do this without siding with conservative and religious opponents whose 
arguments against pornography are themselves typically based on patriarchal 
views about women’s role in society.42 Calling for an understanding of 
pornography as being based not on sexual explicitness per se, but on whether 
the material contains representations that degrade, subordinate and objectify 
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women in a sexual context, could overcome this difficulty. Accepted as erotica 
would be all material deemed not to degrade, subordinate and objectify women. 
One of the implications of this would be that much advertising and popular 
media portrayals could be condemned as pornographic, as the messages 
contained in these can be seen to be as damaging as those in more extreme 
and explicit pornography. Conceptualising the harm in this way could provide a 
better means of regulating pornography. Problems with harnessing these 
obligations in a practical way will be considered below. 
 
 
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research 
 
One of the difficulties encountered in any critique engaging with the social and 
cultural causes of a phenomena such as domestic violence is how the insights 
could be used in terms of bringing about a change in the social structures and 
relations that contribute to or cause the problem. This research highlights the 
purposive nature of male violence within intimate relationships, not just in terms 
of its purpose within the individual relationship, but also in terms of its role in the 
maintenance of patriarchal systems more generally. The focus should not, 
therefore, be on ending male violence; men cannot be ‘stopped’ until there is a 
change43 in the relations that enable, allow and encourage them to inflict 
violence and control women. The argument that domestic violence is functional 
and an integral way of sustaining male control carries the implication that it is 
the issue of men’s need for control that is most in need of addressing. Further 
research is therefore needed on how to engage men in male violence 
prevention in a way that takes account of the links between men, masculinity, 
patriarchal culture and domestic violence. 
There is beginning to be recognition (albeit primarily in the policy arena 
rather than within the legal sphere) that domestic violence is a pattern of 
coercive and controlling behaviour – a move away from the conception that it is 
primarily isolated incidents of physical violence. Due to the engrained nature of 
legal understandings concerning serious physical violence as the defining 
feature of domestic violence, and that this is seen to dictate how severe the 
abuse is, it is unlikely that merely extending the legal definition to encompass 
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coercive control would be sufficient to overcome the prevailing assumptions and 
misconceptions. In February 2014 the Domestic Violence (Legal Framework) 
Bill failed to complete its passage through Parliament. This would have 
criminalised abusive forms of behaviour that are not currently offences, 
including coercive control.44 It is suggested that, whilst representing a potentially 
significant move toward understanding the harm of domestic violence as 
resulting from its methods of exerting control over the victim, rather than its 
infliction of physical violence, the proposed legislation still would not have gone 
far enough in terms of changing the definition and thus changing 
understandings. Instead of domestic violence being seen to include coercive 
control, it is suggested that this needs to be the defining feature, with the 
inclusion of physical violence as one of the means of sustaining that control. 
Therefore, research is needed on how this definition can be amended and 
incorporated into any future legislation in this area. Research is also needed 
into how the understandings of the harm of domestic violence claimed in this 
research can be incorporated into legal understandings given the engrained 
nature of judicial attitudes concerning appropriate male and female behaviour 
and responsibility for violence, and their reliance on finding physical violence in 
order to justify measures such as occupation orders. 
This research has emphasised the importance of the obligations that can 
be read into Article 5(a) of the CEDAW in combatting the root causes of 
domestic violence. Further research is therefore needed to ascertain how these 
obligations could be harnessed and utilised in legal and policy measures 
concerning domestic violence in England and Wales. Very little attention has 
been paid to this provision, even by feminist scholars, indicating firstly a lack of 
awareness but also, perhaps, a lack of confidence concerning the potential of 
any of the human rights instruments, especially CEDAW due to its marginalised 
status as a ‘women’s’ Convention. Women in Asia and Africa use the CEDAW 
as a powerful tool much more frequently than women do in Western states; in 
the UK there is a distinct lack of awareness amongst domestic violence victims 
and the groups who work on their behalf about how the provisions of the 
CEDAW could be used to substantiate claims, and how the international human 
rights system could be used to benefit victims. How to successfully use Article 
5(a) of the CEDAW as a basis to call for a change in the understandings of the 
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causes and consequences of domestic violence found in statute, judicial 
guidelines, police and CPS policy and practice and other legally-regulated 
bodies demands further investigation given the potential of the obligations. 
The experiences of domestic violence amongst different groups of 
women will be very different, as will the legal response and support services 
they receive. It is known that black and minority ethnic women and lesbian 
women have very different experiences of abuse and responses from helping 
agencies. Women from lower socio-economic groups may find it more difficult to 
leave an abusive relationship due to financial restrictions as well as the 
dynamics of the abusive relationship. Therefore, a limitation of this study is that 
these differences are not taken into account and all women are discussed as if 
they are a homogenous group. This is a widely-held criticism of many fields of 
feminist theory; the tendency to essentialise women’s experiences and assume 
that the word ‘woman’ can be used to represent all women’s experiences. 
Therefore, research is needed into how the impact of the root causes differs 
amongst different social, ethnic and religious groups in terms of the different 
expectations placed upon male and female roles and behaviour to see how the 
conceptual framework could be mapped onto different experiences.  
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